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At the centre of this research is a performance, entitled Recreation. This performance features in 
this thesis both as a constituent element, where the reader is invited to review video documen-
tation of one of the live iterations halfway through, and as the primary choreographic work under 
examination. In this study, Recreation is followed from early making through to final production, its 
processes and actions pulled through conceptions of work and two of its supposed opposites: life 
and recreation. In turn, these frames are complicated and problematised through the lived expe-
rience of the practice and its description in order to come to a thinking-through of recreation as a 
set of qualities that are produced through as well as in resistance to work.
These ideas are then extended into another form of practice, curation, which frames three works 
by other artists: LAURA LAURA DOUBLE PENETRATION by immigrants and animals; Assembly 
by Nicola Conibere; and Swarm Sculptures by Lucy Suggate. What these works share with Recre-
ation is not only their location in the British independent dance scene but in that they each feature 
non-professional dancers. In the final chapter of this thesis these works are examined in order to 
think about how performances with this latter attribute, and the relationships established within 
them through work and non-work, can offer a way of thinking about professional dance and com-
munity dance as each other’s significant other.
As well as making an offering into contemporary discourses around choreographic practice, this 
research locates itself in vivid contemporary post-work thought. Employing an autoethnographic 
approach to artistic practice, the research makes use of political philosophy, mostly from con-
temporary post-work theory and its lineage, to explore the post-work potentials of contemporary 
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I’ll try to do this somewhat chronologically, which is, to a large degree, how this thesis works, and 
in something of a story, which is in line with the writing’s tone. In spring 2014 I was told I would be 
receiving a grant which would make this research possible, so first I’ll pause to thank the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council and the Doctoral Training Partnership TECHNE. Shortly thereafter 
I met with my supervisors, Dr Simon Bayly, whom I had known at this stage for 4 years, and Dr 
Sara Houston, whom I had known for a whole decade. They asked me if what I had proposed was 
still the thing in which I was most interested. This question, with its generosity, and care for the 
necessity of sincere motivation and inspiration towards the object of research, as well as the fore-
grounding of and trust in my capacity to follow my intuition, set the tone for the subsequent four 
and a half years. I am so grateful for their genuine interest, their warmth, their kindness and their 
strength. They are very different people, and different scholars, but I admire and respect each for 
all of this as well as their shared practical nature, academic rigour and good sense of humour.
Part of the reason for this research taking longer than I had anticipated was also discussed at that 
first meeting: my mother’s then newly-diagnosed terminal brain cancer. Cate Kleiman (née Gillie 
(really)) died in April 2016 after the most brutal 18 months or so of treatment, during which I moved 
back to my hometown of Newcastle to help. At the moment of diagnosis I told my father, Avner 
Kleiman, and her that I would postpone my PhD, or even drop out, to help. This was absolutely not 
going to happen after I saw their furious expressions appear beneath the tears and shock of the 
prognosis. I cannot thank them enough for their endless support. For my father’s resolute awk-
wardness in not letting me pass up the opportunity to do this work, I am in awe. Regarding my 
mother and her full, colourful, social, loving life—and as I said at her funeral—I am bereft, and I am 
grateful. My storytelling nature is entirely, completely, fully hers.
The other part of the reason for this research taking longer than I had anticipated was the volume 
and complexity of the practice that is at the heart of the research. I hold so dearly the relation-
ships I have cultivated through this process, particularly with Beckie Darlington, my long-suffering 
producer, and wonderful performers Amanda Drago, Kit Haigh and Victoria Guy. They are some of 
the best people I know and I am grateful for their open-hearted input into this process. I also thank 
Nicola Conibere, Jamila Johnson-Small, Mira Kautto and Lucy Suggate, whose work features in 
the final chapter of this thesis after being part of the festival I curated, Juncture, with Yorkshire 
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Dance. As well as Yorkshire Dance and its excellent team, I would like to thank all of the organi-
sations and individuals who were involved in the practical elements of my research; there are too 
many to list here, but I do have a list, and I really do wish to extend thanks to every single last one 
of the hundred or so. For offering his practice to make this thesis legible, Matthew Tye deserves 
much more than the dinners I fed him.
I have had to call on my friends a great deal over the past years. I will try to list some of those who 
helped me in the darkest times, with such tremendous gratitude that I find my head bowing. I hope 
not to miss anyone, but I probably will, and know that I have not forgotten you but that this listing 
business is not easy. Aaron, Alexandrina, Alice, Amy, Blanca, Brendan, Carole, Charlie, Dawn, Gef-
fen, Ed, Ellie, Erin, Flora, Hamish, Hannah, Harriet, Helena, Ilana, Iris, Jodie, Judith, Karin, Kate, Katy, 
Lizzie, Lucy, Marian, Michal, Nicola, Paul, Roberta, Rosa, Rose, Ruth, Sara, Sarah, Sarah, Serena, 





In 2013 I interviewed the choreographer Rosemary Lee for BELLYFLOP, the online dance maga-
zine I co-ran.1 I wanted to talk to her about her work in the widest sense, and this meant talking 
about her life. It meant her divulging how she went about her work now, and in the past. She talked 
about her family, her partner and her children, and introduced me to her son who was then in his 
early 20s. When he left the kitchen, whose table was the site of our conversation, Lee—known 
then and now to me as Rosie, from our slight connection as participants in the life of Chisenhale 
Dance Space—told me about his studies in music. She was proud of him, and happy for him, and 
their relationship, to be part of what she exposed to me. Lee told me about the financial circum-
stances through which she had been able to start her career, how state benefits and odd jobs were 
together enough to enable artists growing up around the 1980s to pursue creative work without 
the fear of destitution. She was candid enough to expose some of the details around her then 
set-up; when I sent her the written-up document—so long that I chose to publish it in a series of 
four articles—she asked to rewrite some sections for purposes, mostly, of privacy. We agreed that 
I would publish the texts with the changes marked with a different colour. The reader, then, was 
able to see the edges of what Lee felt she could and couldn’t say. There was a rather equivocal 
response from my fellow BELLYFLOP co-editors, but the interview was widely shared and read. 
Many readers contacted me to let me know that they appreciated the contact between personal 
and professional lives, and the rendering legible of that contact in the form of the text.
Though I was interested in the details of Lee’s life and work broadly, I was mostly, when choosing 
whom I might ask to interview for BELLYFLOP, interested in Lee’s work with non-professional per-
formers. I wanted to understand her motivations for this work, and how she went about recruiting, 
1  BELLYFLOP Magazine was initiated in 2010 by Louise Mochia and from circa 2011–2014 was extremely active in 
the London dance scene, publishing hundreds of reviews of dance plus interviews and blog posts, as well as organising 
events independently and at the invitation of Sadler’s Wells and Dance Umbrella. As well as Louise and me, the core team 
was Charlie Ashwell, Jamila Johnson-Small, Alexandrina Hemsley, Alice MacKenzie, Eleanor Sikorski and Flora Wellesley 
Wesley, all female or non-binary independent dance artists. The website and its contents are no longer available, so this 
interview is no longer accessible.
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choreographing with and directing people who described themselves as non-professionals. Even 
more specifically, I wanted to talk to her about the fact that in a recent performance of hers, 
Square Dances (2011), I had noticed that the ‘non-professional’ cast of the women’s dance was 
comprised of many professional contemporary dancers I knew from the London networks. Though 
I was satisfied with the depth and breadth of the interview, I felt I left with more questions than 
answers about the figure of the non-professional dancer—whether ‘really’ non-professional or not. 
The interview spurred a curiosity about what the actions and positions of non-professional per-
formers in professional performances by professional choreographers says about contemporary 
dance in Britain, and what this, in turn, says about the nature of work in Britain.
It is not just Lee’s work with non-professionals that triggers these questions. Many choreogra-
phers working in the UK work for one project or beyond with casts entirely or partially made up 
of non-professional performers, from more mainstream companies like Motionhouse or Protein 
Dance to experimental artists like Project O and Matthias Sperling. There is no scholarly research 
on this phenomenon. My initial suspicion, at the inception of this study, was that this was because 
there was a fear of the call of exploitation: if these dancers are doing a performance for which oth-
erwise professional performers would be paid, are these choreographers, companies and produc-
ers practising a form of worker exploitation? Perhaps more common is the fear of being accused 
of pandering to funders’ needs, particularly Arts Council England (ACE), the major funder for such 
works: if ACE wants a high beneficiary quota in relation to the funds ‘invested’, then not paying 
performers as workers but counting them as beneficiaries of the activity certainly satisfies that 
requirement well. I started this research, then, with a cynical point of view.2
Concepts, contexts, chronologies
As I began to watch many of these works my cynicism was set to one side (if not entirely put 
away). I wanted to see these works for what they might be doing beyond the knee-jerk mental yell 
of exploitation or pandering. Concurrently, I read from the (mostly recent) publications from post-
work political theorists. In this literature, the writers are often, from a Marxist perspective, rejecting 
contemporary forms of work and welcoming automation, imagining, arguing about and figuring out 
strategies to herald a post-work future. The following chapters, along with the practice element of 
2  The language of ACE changed in the 2000s from ‘subsidised’ to ‘invested’, distancing the body from subsidy and locat-
ing the work of the organisation more closely in relation to neoliberal demands for return on its contribution.
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this research, places professional choreography with non-professional performers in relation to 
this thinking, a discourse which has emerged from a crisis of work in society. This crisis arises out 
of a set of conditions where income and work are tied to one another, but where this relationship is 
squeezed or pressured. This is perhaps most apparent in the political rhetoric and public response 
to Universal Credit, an amalgam of multiple state benefits which de-incentivises non-work, or in 
the rise of the so-called gig economy, where a stable income is difficult to acquire (just as in the 
original gig economy, the performing arts). Not only are income and work twisted together, but 
identity and self-worth are connected too to paid work. Moreover, there appears to be an insuffi-
cient amount of ‘full-time’, paid work for every adult of working age to do (Beckett 2018). This can 
be seen in the panics around everyday automation—most notably self-checkouts in shops—as well 
as increasing momentum around the implementation of either a shorter working week, universal 
basic income (UBI), both, or other devices for shifting the focus from paid work to other things 
whilst allowing most people to retain a way of life to which they are accustomed in a rich country 
(Large 2018). 
This research situates choreography made with non-professional dancers in this milieu, in post-
work discourses which continue to gain both momentum and traction, with new texts by key 
writers expected within months of the submission of this thesis (Aaron Bastani’s Fully Automated 
Luxury Communism: A Manifesto and Helen Hester and Nick Srnicek’s After Work: What’s Left and 
Who Cares? will be published in 2019 and 2020 respectively). This research asks, then: when work 
is ‘everything’, what happens when some people are doing what appears to be work (performing 
in a performance) but it isn’t quite work? The chapters that follow, along with the performance 
component, are an attempt to think about these issues in plural ways, always guided by an interest 
in how the figure of the non-professional performer, and the conditions through which their status 
and activity come about, might be offering a choreographic response to the questions offered by 
contemporary thinking on work and post-work.
The performance component, entitled Recreation, can be seen as one of the objects of research 
and as the core method; it can be seen as a context, but also requires contextualisation. It has an 
independent, public life, having been produced and presented as any other of my choreographies 
have been in my work as a professional independent choreographer. It has multiple institutional 
partners and a creative team who collaborated in its production and creation, though I am the sole 
author. It explores the area of interest detailed above through choreographic and theatrical means, 
through movement and speech and song and lighting and set and props and the relationships 
between all of these in relation to a live audience in the moment.
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I will not give a detailed description of Recreation here, as it is discussed in great length over the 
coming pages: three of the four chapters of this thesis are dedicated to the detailed description 
and analysis of the performance and its production. However, for further context, it is important 
to say something about how the project was organised and a little about who was involved. The 
making of Recreation was led by me with the support of Beckie Darlington, a producer with whom 
I have collaborated since 2013. Though I was clear I wanted to make a work with non-professional 
performers, I was not sure how to structure this or whom exactly to invite. The first phase of mak-
ing was an exploratory one, in which I invited many different performers with different levels of 
experience and different senses of status in relation to professional contemporary dance. I worked 
with different combinations and numbers of people each day, discovering through doing what felt 
comfortable and challenging and generative. After some conversations with trusted friends and 
colleagues, I decided that the structure of a core cast with guest dancers at each venue offered 
the most interesting complications whilst being realisable logistically and financially. The final 
work was (apart from in one case, indicated below) performed by three core cast members, each 
of whom had a different relationship to the figure of a professional dancer, and two guest perform-
ers sought locally to the venue. Each rehearsal period, during production and touring, included an 
open-rehearsal-cum-workshop to which the guest performers would come and be joined by local 
professional and community dancers.
The chronology of the making of Recreation is one of a number of temporalities with which I have 
grappled during this research. The practice happened in stages and it has often felt that one 
section of time pushed against the other in an uncomfortable way, usually because of fundraising 
cycles. In relation to this tempo is the chronology of the thesis, whose chapters follow the major 
stages of practice and production and, perhaps, frame them in a form in which each stage is even 
less fluid than the clunky chunks of time of arts administration and production. As Recreation and 
its related activities developed, so did my ideas, so the thesis has a sense of the developmental, a 
chronology through which things move by growing. The writing itself seeks to produce a sense of 
time which lines up with the sometimes slow pace of production and somnambular atmosphere of 
Recreation, using description, story and even occasionally imagined dialogue to give access to the 
rhythm of studio or stage through the act of reading.
A final major chronology is an intellectual one. As described above, I have found myself within a 
political-philosophical zeitgeist, unanticipated when I began the project. The publishing on and 
interest in post-work are fervent. I have chosen to stick to the temporality of zeitgeist, focussing 
mostly on recent concepts. I have selected not to give genealogies of concepts but to work with 
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them as they are used in the current time, not ignoring their lineages but focussing my attention 
within the limited scope of this research project to a contemporary encounter between a particular 
set of current choreographies and a particular set of current thinking which has so far had little 
contact with dance and performance in artistic or scholarly domains.
I do wish to pause briefly to comment on one pair of terms which has appeared already a number 
of times in this text and continues to be a thread throughout the thesis: professional and non-pro-
fessional. I do not wish to provide a definition for these terms; I did not do that in the practice, but 
asked individuals and groups to self-identify. With Recreation I always described the cast as hav-
ing different relationships to the idea of being a professional dancer; I left the distance between 
the classification and the experience deliberately active, open to discussion, available for inves-
tigation. Far from trying to evade the question, the approach I have taken in this thesis is to leave 
available space for moving around these definitions from the different points of view the practice 
has offered. The writing which follows does not deal with this head-on—it is concerned with other, 
albeit related, things—but the question of what a professional or non-professional is, what a pro-
fessional or non-professional does or does not profess, remains visible.
Structure of the submission
Just as I want to avoid overwriting Recreation in this introduction, I will not provide an extended 
précis of each chapter here; instead, I offer a concise guide to the contents of the thesis. In Chap-
ter 1, I reflect upon the research and development period of Recreation’s production process, a 
fortnight of work across Newcastle and Nottingham in January 2016, thinking about how these 
weeks of activity expose and extend qualities associated with contemporary labour. I think through 
the process into the dynamics of contemporary work, using the experience of working with many 
participants with many forms and levels of dance experience and other professional or personal 
interests in a workshop-cum-creation process, to offer a depiction of choreographic labour which 
muddles its relationship to common themes in the philosophy of work.
In Chapter 2, I go on to think about the central creation weeks of the performance from December 
2016 to June 2017, thinking about one of many potential alternatives to work, ‘life’, and how it seeps 
out of the very workerly activity of creating an artwork. In this I focus on three themes—care, grief, 
and sabbath—that appeared out of the activities, relationships and emotions of the rehearsals, 
seeking a lifefulness that could contend with labour’s emphasis on economic value.
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It is after this chapter that I invite the reader to watch the documentation of Recreation’s pre-
sentation at BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead, recorded in November 2017. The 
performance has been documented at every possibility, including at the Shoreditch Town Hall, 
London; a presentation which the examiners attended. That performance was a difficult and 
unusual one, primarily because one of the core performers of the work was injured and had to be 
replaced at short notice, resulting in a markedly stressful preparation period for the whole team, 
including the other performers. As well as being free from this additional pressure, the Gateshead 
rendition was expertly filmed by the in-house archive team, resulting in a very clear and accessible 
video. Despite the fact that I consider this documentation successful, it is no true replacement for 
the live experience; it is the performance itself that is included as part of this work, and the doc-
umentation is a way to make that temporally and spatially possible, but I want to insist that the 
practice is not its documentation.
In Chapter 3 I turn to Recreation as a cultural artefact in its own right whilst holding my position as 
its creator. Through the performance and its encounter with audiences, I bring in further thinking 
from the post-work discourse, a field in which texts are being published at an alarmingly fast pace 
and whose outputs sit in relation to less academic discussions (such as the Green Party’s policies 
on work and various journalistic articles and popular texts about UBI). Through Recreation I con-
nect this to recent writing in the psychodynamics of work to think about what recreation as a way 
of living could be, problematising its resistance to work and considering what a leisure ethic could 
produce.
The final chapter moves the thinking to a new set of choreographic works related to a festival 
I curated with Yorkshire Dance, Leeds, in 2016. This festival, Juncture, contained only artworks 
where non-professionals took the place of professionals in one way or another. The festival itself 
is not offered as part of the doctoral submission, nor is the festival and its curation the real sub-
ject of Chapter 4, though it is an important backdrop (and I have included a copy of the festival’s 
programme in the appendices for reference). Instead, I look at three of the works shown within 
Juncture, discussing their practices of work and non-work in relation to community dance and 
associated participatory practices.
The thesis closes with thoughts about a future project whose interests continue, extend, and press 
against those of this research.
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Methodology and influences
This thesis belongs with practice. ‘Belongs with’ could be replaced with a range of different prep-
ositions. I would believe most versions to be true, though this one feels the truest. What I mean to 
say with this is that the writing and the practices are deeply intertwined whilst each remains whole 
and complete; they are not the same thing but one doesn’t exist without the other. It is by prac-
tising choreography that this thesis was written; it is by working with theory that the performance 
came to be made. As such, this thesis fulfils the practice-as-research paradigm. 
Alongside and within the practice and the necessary bibliographic work I undertook a series of 
interviews. Some of these were short question-and-answer sessions during rehearsals, with the 
participant-performers and sometimes with viewers. I also undertook semi-formal interviews with 
the two solo and one pair of choreographers whose work I discuss in Chapter 4. As the research 
progressed, it became clear that these interviews were for useful for contextual purposes and my 
thinking did not rest on them; as such I have not included transcripts. They are never cited directly.
I have found that the examination of my own experience within the processes of working and living 
has been the most generative place for the production of new thinking in relation to the ques-
tions of the research. As such, I describe this research as autoethnographic, a deep mining of my 
own experience to unfold observations and analysis of broader social questions. I have adopted 
a highly reflexive writerly position, and have attempted to work with an understanding of writing 
as a method of inquiry, in that the detail of the craft of writing is critically useful and impactful in 
relation to the content; as a result, the reader may notice strategies less usual for theses, such as 
extended description, accounts of events from my personal life, and alternative layouts, as suitable 
for the work of each chapter. I have positioned my own experience as being particular, whilst also 
hoping to make a contribution or even a change to the worlds that produce and contain that expe-
rience. I have thought about the potential readers, both in terms of the process of examination and 
of any future readers of this or a related text. All of these are aspects or qualities of a method that 
is usually called autoethnographic (Adams et al, 2014).
This way of working results in perhaps some unusual results in relation to the concepts of work 
and leisure, which are often studied through lenses of class, race, gender, migration status, lan-
guage and other intersecting identities associated with societal, structural and personal privileges 
and oppressions. I am a white-presenting, cisgendered, native-English-speaking, middle-class(-ish) 
woman, and speak from this position as well as from someone who is binational, culturally Jewish, 
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living with a chronic illness and who was, for much of the period of research, a carer. Mostly I do 
not work with these identities or the frames which make them socially and culturally important, not 
because I do not think that they are important tools for the study of choreography, work, post-work 
and recreation but that I have chosen other important tools, tools belonging to practice-as-re-
search and political philosophy in relation to autoethnography. Despite the fact that this is not 
proclaimed as a feminist study, I believe that it is one, and this viewpoint runs through the written 
thesis and the performance. I state this particularly to connect the post-work thinking back to 
its feminist roots—Kathi Weeks’ The Problem with Work (2011), the grounding for Chapter 2 and 
indeed for much of today’s post-work thinking is framed around explicitly feminist organising—and 
to look forward to forthcoming publications in the area, which promise to advance the discourse’s 
feminist potentials.
The methodological frames employed in this thesis (practice, bibliographic work, interviews, 
autoethnography) are emphasised differently from chapter to chapter. I have taken time in each 
section to restate and elaborate the methods deployed, so will not offer more detail here. It does 
seem important, however, to foreground three texts which have been most influential in the way 
in which I have thought and written during the project overall. First is filmmaker and writer Chris 
Kraus’ I Love Dick (1997), a novel which wraps fiction around memoir to create a literary force 
which hurtles surprisingly towards distinctive art criticism. Without the deeply personal and 
highly descriptive accounts of her actual experience, Kraus’ reflexivity and thus the potency of 
her art-writing would be insufficiently situated or energetic. The second text, influential in terms 
of both method and content, is feminist philosopher Donna Haraway’s The Companion Species 
Manifesto: Dogs, People and Significant Others (2003). Like I Love Dick, this pamphlet-style book 
also draws directly from the writer’s real-life experience. It is this insistence across her philosoph-
ical work in working from storytelling—sometimes described as ‘speculative fabulation’ (Terranova 
2016)—which connects the methods of philosophy and autoethnography in a manner which has 
inspired my approach to this research. The Companion Species Manifesto is also the primary crit-
ical interlocutor in Chapter 4. The third and final methodological influence has been I Swear I Saw 
This: Drawings in Fieldwork Notebooks, Namely My Own (2011). In this text, anthropologist Michael 
Taussig uses one drawing of one event scribbled in one notebook to proliferate thought about 
a host of interrelated topics, within and beyond his usual anthropological frame. With a dreamy 
fluency, he moves between foci and theoretical friends to think reflexively about his position as an 
anthropologist, taker of notes, and human being, without self-absorption. This text has given me 
confidence in the use of (mostly) one choreographic work, namely my own, as a device for making 
new contributions to the field.
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Just as I am influenced by the details of each writer’s approach, I am using the three texts 
together to form a protective and energising forcefield which enables me to defend the location 
of my research within my own life, including my own life beyond the choreographic and curatorial 
actions which are the objects of this study. The manner of research I have taken is analogous to 
Rosemary Lee’s inclusion of her wider circumstances and activities when thinking and talking 
about her practice. I think it is quite common for major life events to occur during PhD processes 
(many of my peers have married, had children, or moved cities or countries during their doctoral 
study). I too experienced such an event (though not one over which I had anything like control): the 
serious illness and then death of my mother. More than an influence, this completely reoriented 
my life and work, and had me engaging for the first time in both care and grief in profound ways 
for prolonged periods. These events demanded that I interrogate work and non-work in new ways, 
lived in ways other than read or danced or written or choreographed. This experience is inextrica-




10 January 2016 
From: Gillie Kleiman 




Thank you so much.
As lots of you know, I was super-nervous and really worried about how to look after everyone and 
remember how to make art at the same time. I had lots of goals for the week, more than I even 
realised, and so many of the questions have opened up with your help.
I forgot, in a way, how much performers are not just bodies but are minds and spirits and ener-
gies and all kinds of hokey things I can’t get into without sounding totally loopy, but I’m genuinely 
touched by how much you all gave to the project. It was a delight to get to know you all better 
and to see you meet each other, or meet each other in new ways (sometimes extremely confusing 
ways, I know).
I’m a right rotten hippy at heart and I really did fall in love with you all. Gaaaaaaaah!
As you know I’m continuing with a whole new group of people next week in Nottingham, and then 
we’ll see what happens after that, but you guys can always just meet up and care or sit like mer-
maids and sing or wrap each other in bondage tape or clamber into pyramids or rest, whenever you 
like.




This email is a useful starting point for this chapter. I’m glad I saved it specially, copying it from 
Gmail into my log. The log is a document I have been keeping, a simple text file organised in 
reverse order, by which I mean that when I open it I write the day’s date at the top and add from 
there, above what was written before. To look at it from the beginning means reading from the 
bottom in dated chunks; it’s not easy to read, but it wasn’t made to read. The log is one form of 
documentation of the process of making Recreation, a choreographic performance involving 
performers with different experiences of professional dance practice. The inclusion of this email 
represents the documentary nature of my research, the ethnographic determination with which I 
have collected materials and, hopefully, the basis of the account I would like to provide of the work 
and its interpretation. There are other traces that I have gathered: each day of rehearsal during 
this first period was broken into two three-hour sessions, and a rule for the structure of those 
rehearsals was that at least one photograph or video must be captured and saved. Alongside 
these mechanisms there was another self-imposed rule that each period of rehearsal should be 
concluded with a guided conversation, which was also recorded. The making process itself has 
been coloured and to some extent determined by its belonging in a practice-based research proj-
ect, the two practices infecting one another and determining their futures. Sometimes there was 
the impression that they inhibited one another: I would want to pursue the content of a discussion 
further but we needed to get to the lunch break so that we could continue working in the after-
noon; or, in an inverse situation, I would stop a run-through of one scenario or another to organise 
for a recorded conversation. Besides these mutual squeezings, the methods regularly failed: my 
terrible photography would result in a fuzzy mess of an image, the battery on a camera would run 
out during filming, or I would be too tired to write anything in the log.
Despite these mistakes, the evidence of the activity is available, on my computer and within my 
numerous backup systems. It’s not only the errors, though, that make this documentation incom-
plete or illegible or awkward. Rather, it’s not only the errors that make this documentation incom-
plete or illegible or awkward to anyone but me. Like the email, this material makes sense only to 
those with prior experience of the events, and as I was the only one present for all their capture, 
the materials altogether fully make sense only to me. I have the memories, real and imagined, 
insightful and pointless, which fill in the gaps and make a translation from fragments of digi-
tally-stored data to, in this chapter, a plausible interpretation of the activity. This is a deliberate 
vantage point as much as a practical fact: my theorisation of my practice departs from my own 
experience thereof. Whilst it is shaped and influenced by the people with whom I shared the time, 
my position is autoethnographic, using the perspectives and provocations opinions of others 
to influence my own rather than seeking to represent theirs. This email invokes an audience of 
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invested others, but their presence is manifested through my written voice.
The email announces a temporality. You can see that the activity had begun but was not complete 
on 10 January 2016, it marking a mid-point in the process I would like to discuss in this chapter, the 
weekend between two weeks of studio-based research and development time. In these two weeks 
I worked with two different groups of people. The Newcastle participant-collaborators in the first 
week, the ones I address in this email, were mostly people drawn from my personal and profes-
sional networks in the city and its environs; in Nottingham, in the second week, the group was 
brought in through a call out in partnership with Dance4, the organisation hosting the residency, 
meaning that I mostly didn’t know the people involved. To call either a group, in fact, is mislead-
ing—the work was structured so that there were between two and five participants in the room for 
any one session, with each participant joining for between two and five sessions. Many people in 
the ‘group’ didn’t actually encounter one another at all. The disjuncture doesn’t stop there: I would 
like to draw attention to the fact that I am writing quite some time after the activity took place, 
and, crucially, with a knowledge of some of its consequences, of aspects of its future. Naturally, 
this lag is filled with disadvantages (I am no longer as close to what happened, I don’t remember 
it well, new interactions with the same people, for instance, colour older memories) and benefits (I 
had useful afterthoughts, I am differently attached, I can take something more of an outside view). 
I did not know, then, the theoretical apparatuses I would deploy in the work’s interpretation, lend-
ing my reflections the uncomfortable power of hindsight.
The email is spilling over with my emotion. I write about nerves and worries, about care and being 
touched, about being delighted and falling in love. I offer virtual hugs and kisses in symbolic form. 
This is not what is meant by affective or emotional labour, the kind of labour most present in the 
attention of theorists over recent years. I don’t understand this conceptualisation of this form of 
work to mean that the workers experience heightened emotions or are particularly encouraged to 
express feelings.1 Rather, to follow Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, a philosopher and activist positioned cen-
trally in the theorisation of contemporary labour, this form of work demands a range of affective, 
cognitive, and aesthetic capacities from each worker simply in order to participate in the flows of 
capital, to be able to work at all (2009). For the purposes of this chapter, this form of labour can be 
1 Following the post-work discourse from which I begin to draw in this chapter and work with further in other chapters, 
I use ‘work’ and ‘labour’ interchangeably. I am aware of some of the ways in which these terms are pulled away from one 
another, in particular in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958), and, though I do not consider this line of think-
ing unrelated to the ideas in this thesis, I found it would be unnecessarily digressive to include a full drawing out of the 
differences.
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called post-Fordist, semiocapitalist, immaterial, affective, cognitive and more, each with their own 
inflections, lineages and conceptual priorities. What matters in this writing is that even in the cor-
poreal world of dance and choreography, practices that (mostly, or often) prioritise the body and 
embodiment, contemporary forms of labour take hold, despite the fact that they can be concep-
tualised as somewhat disembodied. Whilst I would not suggest that my invocation of emotional 
states in the email is a symptom or even a worthwhile representation of affective labour, it does 
allude to the fact that the content of the choreographic process, in my individual efforts as well 
as in a shared sociality, involved something other than the body. Further, I can attest to the fact 
that this outburst of emotion was not matched by my behaviour in the studio: though I liked and 
cared about the experience of the participants, it is only in this email, in tapping keys on my laptop, 
in adopting the shared posture of semiocapitalism (Berardi 2009 and Campagna 2013) that my 
‘soul’, as Berardi ‘metaphorically and even a bit ironically’ describes it, could be released (2009:22), 
resulting in a spilling-over of affect. 
This chapter is concerned with a kind of spilling-over in another sense. Here I come to the ques-
tion which started all the recorded conversations with the participants: ‘was that work?’. In a legal 
sense it was certainly a form of work: there were letters of agreement between each participant 
and myself, describing what was to be undertaken and the remuneration offered. Of course that’s 
not simple either, with the distinctions between employees, workers and contractors currently 
complicated in the UK in light of recent growth in self-employment and the practical and ethi-
cal fallout for individuals, businesses, and the state (Corlett and Tomlinson 2017). Because of the 
currently very mobile and active nature of concepts, policy, behaviour and publishing in this area, 
it is riddled with moving targets, terrifying and potent in equal measure, and I heed these continual 
movements. Through this legislative minefield, there are characteristics of contemporary labour 
that appear again and again in the literature on the subject. Mostly I draw from a European tradi-
tion of political philosophy, collecting, here, not the distinct nuances within the theory—a critical 
survey of the literature is not the purpose of this chapter—but the agreements around key terms. 
As such, the writers appear as supporting characters midst the action of the studio labours, an 
approach I take with caution but defend as a necessary method to foreground practice in this 
short writing. There are multiple common threads, of which I have chosen three: precarity, produc-
tivity and competition. In the body of this chapter, I will take these terms as categories, pressing 
the practice which is the subject of the writing into them. I am answering the question ‘was that 
work?’, here, in this limited way. In this, I will examine the extents to which and ways in which the 
research and development period satisfies the conceptual boxes the terms produce, and where 
it seems to expand them beyond mere illustration. In this I am seeking the overflow: not only 
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the stretching of terms but also the moments where the terms can no longer contain the lived 
experience.
In a large part the writers working with the theory of contemporary labour understand precarity 
and the emphasis on productivity and related characteristics to be negative or damaging, dan-
gers to the lives of the workers and of humanity as a whole. Largely I share this position. This is 
more than exemplified in the following material. However, I also share with most of the writers an 
impulse to find flickers of optimism, not just against the manners of and features of labour in the 
West in the 21st century, but also within them. Like Weeks (2011), Gregg (2011), Cederström and 
Fleming (2012), and others, I will begin to suggest not an alternative way of doing things but a kind 
of additional one, another axis of potential action. From Berardi’s concept of wealth, I will build a 
concept of care. I begin a gentle attention to the possibilities of care—which will find other appear-
ances elsewhere in the thesis—here because the term arose concretely through the practice 
which is the subject dealt with in this chapter and it appears as the consequence of the reflections 
within it.
Precarity
There is a section of the work we are calling ‘The Pyramids’. In this exercise, which is usually sand-
wiched between two other, choreographically related tasks, five or more participant-performers 
try to create cheerleading-style structures, with layers of bases, either on all fours in a table-top 
position or standing with strongly bent legs. Perhaps it’s easier to imagine one version as a set of 
instructions:
Get on your hands and knees. Flex your feet so your toes provide traction. Make it so that your 
thigh bones are absolutely perpendicular to the floor. Make it so that your whole arm is straight, 
and absolutely perpendicular to the floor. Pull your navel to your spine and make your back abso-
lutely parallel to the floor. Someone will join you, either directly at your side or at some other angle, 
but, either way, touching. Someone will climb onto you—a knee on a sacrum, a hand between 
shoulder blades. Don’t move.
So far, so stable. There is a vision of a purpose, a mental image of how this should be. Everyone 
understands what should happen without exemplification. There’s a simple task and it’s achiev-
able in the given time frame. Theatrically, it is deadening: the performers do it and it’s done. This 
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exercise, though, has been set up to produce a choreographic reward more complex than the mere 
satisfaction of the shape; the idea is that the pyramid structure is never quite complete, so the 
sense of a continual action, a working-towards, is always present as the group traverses the space 
from downstage right to upstage left. I am looking in this section for a suspension of usefulness, a 
using-up of time. The goal of the pyramid shape is meaningful only inasmuch as it inspires activity, 
in something of the same way that some forms of labour are described as ‘bullshit jobs’ (Graeber 
2018).
Precarity is present in multiple ways in both the process and choreographic content of this task. 
In his dystopic reflections on his own precarity, writer and precarious worker Ivor Southwood 
describes the state as ‘a feeling of being kept in suspense’ (2011:2), the exact aesthetic property I 
was seeking to produce in this nugget of choreography. Non-Stop Inertia, the title of Southwood’s 
book, could be a sub-title for The Pyramids.
You don’t have to go directly across the space. I mean, yes, go in that direction but you can come 
back on yourself. Make sure you’re always useful. Look to hold the climbing person’s hand, or offer 
yourself as base, clearly, with your whole body. But don’t go too easily. Go sideways; find new 
angles.
The choreography hinders itself as much as it wants to progress. In doing so, it raises questions 
about the overall precarity of the choreographic project—the always-present sense that it might 
collapse at any moment—and the nature of the work being undertaken by all involved, mirroring 
precarities existing outside of this project, dance, research—belonging in the ‘real’ world of work.
I’ll begin with the precarity of the project as a whole. The term ‘project’ itself suggests precarity, 
‘a processual, contingent and open practice, which cannot be controlled or planned and also 
entails the possibility of ending in a disaster,’ (Kunst 2015:162). The possibility of ending in disaster 
dangles over this period of work; though the future performance Recreation had been promised 
to funders, venues and indeed the university in which this degree is being undertaken, in Janu-
ary 2016 I had no way of knowing whether or not I would succeed in making it happen, mostly for 
financial reasons. How The Pyramids is able to be realised is circumscribed by this layer of precar-
ity; the interiority of the studio work is determined both by the sense that there is something to 
work on, for the future, and the instability of any individual component, including cast members.
One way in which this becomes visible is through the lack of preparation for this relatively 
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complicated and physical task. It quickly became clear that this activity involved a level of skill 
not necessarily present in every combination of participant-performers. It asked for a degree of 
basic strength and bodily awareness, enough experience with one’s own physicality to know that 
shoulders stacked over straight arms provide the vector stable enough for someone to offer their 
body weight safely between the shoulder blades, and that bracing the shoulders wide and press-
ing into the hands goes further than bending arms and activating biceps. Not everyone knows this, 
and I didn’t know that until I saw some of the extremely hazardous alignments of upper back and 
neck. This takes careful selection, and practice, neither of which were available to me and to the 
participants due to the composition of the situation, with its comings and goings of collaborators, 
some of whom I didn’t know before they walked into the studio. Had I established a different struc-
ture than this kind of shift work, I might have taken the time to work with the performers through 
exercises to heighten sensitivity to alignment and build strength around the shoulders and core; 
it didn’t seem worth it to invest this time of preparation when I didn’t know if these performers in 
particular would return even that week let alone in later portions of the creation process. Read-
ing this statement back, I see the ethical horror which I quite easily allowed myself to activate: 
because I wasn’t sure what I or my product, my dance performance, would get out of taking time to 
develop the people with whom I was working, I allowed safety to be secondary. At the same time I 
have the sense that the reason I also chose not to do more work on this was because I didn’t want 
to bother the participants with it. I was conscious that I wasn’t offering much as the person asking 
them to work—not much money, not many hours work, not a sexy title or outcome to put on a CV—
and I wanted them to have something of a good time, which meant not doing strenuous exercises 
repeatedly. The precarity of the situation shook apart the bond between ‘employer’ and worker, 
loosening the mutual investment and resulting in something of a surface engagement.2
In another version of events, I could have put more of my eggs in The Pyramids’ basket and gone 
for the physical work each time. Imagining doing the same exercises at every session for the pur-
pose of making The Pyramids more successful in terms perhaps limited only to safety, connects 
precarity to monotony not only in the sense of a continuous state of monotone anxiety but also in 
the repetition of previous activities, necessary because precarity seems to preclude the accumu-
lation of skill or experience.  This seems a contradiction: I think of the monotony of an office or a 
factory or even a ballet company, both somehow emblematic of a different time of non-precarious 
work, with the workers entering each day at the same time, going into the same spaces, making 
2 I’m not an employer; I was not offering what UK law would call employment—instead, I was offering a contract to 
self-employed people. The term ‘employer’ is used in common parlance whatever the legal situation, so I will continue to 
use it here.
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the same shapes with their bodies. This sort of working life is repetitious, but stable, seen in dif-
ferent directions: the archetypal factory worker is able to spend a lifetime doing the same physi-
cal actions because the market for their labour is stable, whereas the ballet dancer repeats their 
motions daily in order to produce a stability of body in performance. Precarity prescribes a differ-
ent monotony, the monotony of always being a certain kind of beginner. A beginner’s mind, most 
cherished in yoga for instance, implies an open curiosity, a quest for knowledge, humility. Under 
precarious conditions, this monotony of the beginner, then, is of always knowing that you will not 
know if you know what will happen that day, certainly a condition created in the development of 
Recreation. It’s not an option to have a beginner’s mind, in the way that it might be a mental state 
conjured by a yogi in order to facilitate forms of attention or interest; the precarious worker’s mind 
is simply forced into the peculiar situation of never knowing what will be known. This is neither 
starting from scratch with either enthusiasm or fear, nor settling into something comfortable and 
familiar. It’s a suspension between both, which, Southwood suggests, produces an uneasy state of 
living with too many and too few expectations (2011).  A beginner’s body is rather a different state 
of being altogether, and conjures for me, as the person responsible, concern and fear, a genuine 
worry about injury, about the precarity not only within my work or within the group but understood 
as the fallibility of a human body, marked through the unpreparedness which was the result of 
flexible work.
It’s not that every one of my participant-collaborators was inexperienced in physical practices; 
many of them had dance training of one sort or another. It’s that this was not reliable. Depending 
on the constitution of the group in that moment, I could be with experienced and athletic movers 
entirely, or those totally uncomfortable with even kneeling on the floor, or a combination across 
the spectrum. Mostly, those with more experience helped to explain safe practices, showing with 
their own bodies and correcting problems. A hierarchy appeared between those who knew and 
those who didn’t, those who could and those who couldn’t, those who were doing something like 
teaching and those who were doing something like learning. This was not because some had 
been in rehearsals with me more or had learned The Pyramids on a previous day, but because 
of external, previous experience. This indexes another aspect of precarity within contemporary 
labour, which effects both workers and production: the fact that when a precarious worker is not 
working, they should be preparing for or seeking work in their own time (Southwood 2011). Not only 
is non-work time ‘haunted by the prospect of being called to do a shift’ (Gregg 2011:154), but the 
worker should continue to develop their skills and capacities outside of work. The collaborators 
with whom I work had skills that were useful to me, but I had neither transparently sought nor con-
tributed to developing. On the one hand this is to the benefit of the employer, or, in this case, the 
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choreographer: I did not need to prepare these performers for these tasks because their capaci-
ties were already there to deploy. This would be the case in any situation of employment or indeed 
choreography, but the mixed cast, comprised of collaborators of different relations to professional 
dance, foregrounded this external knowledge despite my attempts at finding equilibrium. This pro-
duced an ethical awkwardness: I was trying to make a convivial rehearsal context wherein differ-
ent sorts of experiences could be valued and at the same time investigate certain formal possibili-
ties that can be better realised by some participants than others: in fact, every single proposal, not 
only The Pyramids, offered this same tension.3 The many guilts of being an employer of any kind, 
the person who pays as well as the person who facilitates, were extended along this line: everyone 
was paid the same sum (£40) for the same amount of time (3 hours), but such examples demon-
strate that time does not ever equal money, for some participant-collaborators were drawing on 
years of practical experience whilst others seemed to be the recipients of training through the 
rehearsal. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that just because a worker has prior knowledge 
which could contribute to the work, they must offer it. I do not remember asking anyone to do any-
thing because they already knew how to do it, neither did I delegate my responsibility of describ-
ing or demonstrating or instructing to anyone else in this research and development period, even 
if it was clear they could do it. It simply happened that those who could generously and gently put 
their experience into the room, supporting the others. They seemed to offer it quite naturally:
Yep, that’s it. Hang on a second, straighten your arms? You might find it easier with flat hands, I 
know it sounds like it wouldn’t be right…yes! And you can lean into me. Perfect.
This sits in contrast to the dominant understanding of the forms of sociality available within pre-
carious labour. Precarity theorists argue that ‘precarious jobs actively prevent the quality of time 
necessary to maintain personal and social relationships’ (Gregg 2011: 154). It’s true that, because of 
the structure of the rehearsals, few of the collaborators met on multiple occasions in the studios. 
In the case of The Pyramids, at least, this did not seem to matter: it was not the same person doing 
the same thing or being in the same place that produced connection or collegiality. Rather, I would 
like to suggest that it was the very sense of contingency and insecurity that is at the heart of 
precarity that required each performer to go beyond an execution of material in order to make the 
choreography possible, which enabled some other kind of relation to manifest. Because the mate-
rial is physically precarious, the collaborators had to enter into a relationship of mutual support. 
3 This tension is common within community, participatory and intergenerational dance activity; its nature and conse-
quences is discussed further in Chapter 4.
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The Pyramids does not allow for an understanding of these labours as depersonalised, as the mere 
filling in of packets of time paid for by an employer (Berardi 2009). The Pyramids introduces pre-
carity as bodily, personal, with weak shoulders and a sweaty back, or with inconveniently long hair 
and slippy leggings. The fluctuations of personnel under this enforced corporeal precarity can be 
understood as enhancing rather than limiting the bonds between individual participants, charging 
the uncertainty with a trust that someone will be there to take the weight. The insecurity of the 
physical situation squeezes out the fleeting, inconsistent social bonds in favour of invested, caring 
physical ones, which in turn appear to bring everyone closer. It’s not necessary to know a person’s 
name or where they live if you’re about to stand on them, but you’ll become mighty familiar with 
their shoulder girdle.
There was a tipping point in The Pyramids in which I understood that to get the choreography 
to be both safe and satisfying I needed to work with a particular group. Even though I was trying 
to relax, constantly reminding myself that this was a situation of research, a place of finding out 
rather than fabrication, I needed greater investment from collaborators to develop choreographic 
structures, investment in terms of time which they were not invited to offer. I’d placed myself in the 
inverse of what Melissa Gregg describes as ‘[t]he bind of today’s white-collar professional’ wherein 
the worker ‘is to be invested in work as and when required but without the reciprocal assurance 
from employers that commitment will be rewarded’ (2011: 165). I was to be attentive and responsive 
to the collaborators whatever the situation, prepared for the day and ready with clear proposals in 
each session and a continuity through the week, whereas the others in the room could dip in for 
three hours and never come back. This difficulty is perhaps the case for any kind of employer, but 
the role of choreographer in contemporary dance with non-professional performers is particularly 
coloured with the facilitative, and this facilitative function appears to enhance the inversion. Unlike 
the work contexts Gregg researches, the Recreation research and development is an example 
of how choreographic practice might flip such directions of dependability, creating frictions with 
orthodoxies despite the appearance of similar working structures.
For The Pyramids, I needed the collaborators, or rather particular collaborators, to be with me 
more, do more work, so that we could progress in developing the performance without having 
to reintroduce structures or material repeatedly. Where the performers were at the beginning 
‘dispensable’, the physical, cognitive and affective experiences produced through earlier labours 
literally walked out of the studio with the participant-performers each day and the process was 
rendered inefficient. I wanted to be able to say:
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Go back to the place we were yesterday. Yep, do it again. Can we try that way where you turn 
around again? I think I know how we can do it now. So yeah, Amanda kneel and yeah, if Kit, if you 
stand next to her.
There was a quick fix: I had chosen five people to come for the whole of the last day of the first 
week and they became the performers of this section. The roles settled. Small, athletic, young, 
dance-trained Viki was the natural pinnacle of the pyramid; she can clamber on and be carried by 
almost anyone else in almost any way without any harm.  There was a certain predictable pleasure 
in watching this happen, but Viki was uncomfortable and she told me so. Whilst the other four per-
formers continued with the wrangling and negotiating characteristic of the task, and independent 
of the composition of the team, Viki floated above them. The base collaborators were still engaged 
in creating and resolving precarity: they did not know where another one would kneel or stand, 
they had to communicate actively to identify who would take a foot or be ready to have a hand 
placed on their head. They are engaged in what Berardi would call the ‘[p]recariousness of the 
collective perception,’ ‘the anguish of failing to find each other, while endlessly, fanatically meeting 
each other along the paths of connection’ (Berardi in Campagna 2013:4). They are engaged in an 
interpersonal physical task which could be seen as dependent on a collective understanding of 
the continued production and near-resolution of a physical precarity. They are stimulated by the 
near-success—the just failing—that the task prescribes, and, in so doing, are meeting each other 
within, through, and beyond the instabilities they share. Viki is not participant in this. In a way, she 
has shifted position from precarious worker to stable boss: she knows what her role is and that 
role includes directing others:
Hannah just stand there. No, I don’t think I can go there. Can someone take my hand? Right, I’m 
going to put my leg on your shoulder; are you ready?
Berardi’s description of precarity’s sociality is, of course, something of a lament. Reading the state-
ment against this situation, though, offers a new angle. Where there might be ‘anguish,’ or at least 
difficulty in this choreographic situation, the collaborators are indeed finding each other, or at the 
very least seeking one another. It is not the depersonalisation of the precarious worker but a deep 
and felt repersonalisation. The ‘fanaticism’ returns as motivation to connect, to find one another 
and meet—physically—in order to make something happen. I want to suggest that this choreo-
graphic situation exposes the fact that the discomfort lies not in the precarity itself but in the 
relationship between stability and precarity. When everyone’s role is constantly shifting there is 
no problem even with failure: there is a suppleness that always already expects that it won’t quite 
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work, that there will be frustration and hindrance and even hazard. When stability—such as Viki’s 
stable role—is inserted, the relation shifts, an expectation of expediency enters and the relations 
lose their primacy in favour of meeting a goal, here the goal of a sort of virtuosic supported flight 
of a woman from one place to another. Outside of this stability, precarity is filled with an anxious 
lack, but in that absence new relations grow. 
Productivity
There is a contradiction at the heart of contemporary labour around productivity, discussed by, 
amongst others, philosopher Federico Campagna in The Last Night (2013). On one hand, produc-
tivity is no longer measurable in human terms. Referring particularly to the current state of pro-
ductive activity as enveloped in ever-increasing automation—and I always think most readily of 
self-service checkouts at supermarkets—Campagna describes the way in which expectations of 
productivity are so machine-like that they become meaningless. The will to productivity is in rela-
tion to an inhuman and possibly inhumane goal, the psychological effect being that the humans 
ourselves are viewed as second-rate, never able to meet those machinic standards, making the 
efforts unabashedly pointless. On the other hand, it is through a person’s working situation and 
their level of productivity that they come to have worth ‘not only in front of their peers, but also 
in front of themselves’ (2013:12).  Work and its outcomes are transformed into worth within the 
‘intimate theatre of happiness’ according to Campagna (2013:12), a curious invocation of a perfor-
mance setting which aligns with Nick Srnicek’s and Alex Williams’ assertion that workers ‘put on 
performances of productivity’ (2015: 125). Humans can’t meet the unknowable, unattainable mea-
sures of productivity and at the same time must be productive for personal and social satisfaction, 
resolving the disjuncture through performance. In this section I’d like to think about these state-
ments in reference to another choreographic proposal developed during the weeks of research 
and development for Recreation in 2016.
The terms ‘research’ and ‘development’ are not mere hangers-on in this thinking. Research implies 
finding, discovering and working out. Development, on the other hand, includes in it a propulsion 
forwards, decisions made, some things rejected and some things advanced. The former seems to 
understand that it is worth it to be there, the latter suggests that it is worth it to be there as long 
as something useful, productive, comes out. This was reflected in the practice itself.  
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As discussed above, when The Pyramids too neatly satisfied a commonly understood measure 
of productivity—making a nice sturdy tower—there seemed to be no point in continuing with it. 
As soon as an efficiency landed, as soon as there was a way to measure the success of an out-
come, to produce something solid, or as solid as a fragment of performance can be, it was clear 
that an end had been met and it could not be used as a means for further development. In these 
instances, what gathered the mark of productivity was that which could indeed act as the seed for 
future growth; any ‘product’ that could not be the basis of more work lost its value. In this I hear a 
haunting of today’s politicians from every political corner calling for job creation, the ultimate invo-
cation of work without real social necessity, effort summoned just to make the context for more 
effort.
The landscape is more complex than this rhetoric. Those thinking more carefully observe that con-
temporary labour is characterised by the ‘disjunction between Work [sic] and economic produc-
tion’ and the fact that ‘products and services constitute Work’s most spectacular outcome, but in 
the present day they can hardly be considered as its core production’ (Campagna 2013:11), whilst 
at the same time ‘[w]e need to have a sense of necessity and purpose in our work; to find this, we 
should produce useful products’ (Mies 1986:217). The efforts my collaborators and I were making 
to make things that lasted, had borders and edges of comprehensibility dramaturgically or visually, 
always appeared as eventual failures, for work today insists that productivity is a visible action in 
time—the performance of work—rather than a commodity. We must keep working to feel produc-
tive—in fact, this is the very meaning of working at all (Campagna 2013).
This requires illustration.
In the rehearsals, the participant-collaborators and I often worked with scores, sets of instructions 
for improvised scenarios. Each slight variation in a score would be lettered (Score A, Score B etc.), 
and I would write down their contents in my log. Score A’s list is
building, gardening, singing, videos
A station was set up in the space for each of these activities, with a bunch of working materials 
for building and gardening offstage, a selection including plants, a lamp, yoga blocks and mats, 
books, stationery materials, magnets, a mirror, rolls and rolls of tape and other miscellany. Build-
ing was downstage centre-right; gardening was in a strip upstage, a microphone on a stand for 
singing was upstage left; and a technical box with a laptop on it, facing downstage, was set up in 
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the remaining space with a selection of videos from the internet available to screen. The levels of 
detail in the instruction were variable, the collaborators invited to find a way of working with each 
one. With each there was a sense of making something, bringing something into being: building 
produced a built thing, gardening a ‘garden’, singing a recognisable song, and the videos might 
well have been better titled ‘dancing’, as each of the videos depicted some kind of movement and 
the rule was to copy it as closely as possible, making a dance its product. On the surface, each 
of these actions has a very concrete end. However, each activity was ever-so-slightly shifted so 
that it couldn’t ever meet its aim: the song had to be sung in a karaoke style, explored earlier in 
the day, disrupting the possibility of it being well-performed in a recognisable way; because the 
laptop faced downstage the dancer would have to face upstage, ruining the frontality of a nice-
ly-presented dance; building and gardening both lacked the proper materials for their productions. 
There were perceptible potential outcomes, but the details of the choreography prevented their 
realisation, materialising the activity or effort of production rather than products.
The purposefulness was relational as well as individual. In one version of Score A the collaborators 
started at one station, moving to another one-by-one until the group re-formed, then drip-feeding 
themselves on to the next and so on. Though this offered a comforting recurring collegiality, a new 
product arose called ‘group’, the structure disbanding and recreating a new version of this prod-
uct over and over. In another, each performer worked a while at one station independently before 
moving to another, each activity activated by a different number of people. Gardening, for example, 
could look like two in a space on the stage, one drawing lines with tape whilst the other picked 
up and replaced magnets in a pattern on the floor. There was no specific relationship performed 
beyond gentle undetermined conviviality, no sense that this was static or personal. No social prod-
uct was produced, no identity solidified between actor and activity or between actors.
In this way Score A might be seen as an activation of Marx’s famous lines, appearing in several of 
the texts forming the background for this chapter, in which a fictitious future worker might
…hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic…
Marx and Engels 1970: 53
My collaborators garden for five minutes, dance for seven, sing a song for 90 seconds and then 
go back to gardening, without ever becoming a gardener, a dancer or a singer. Though each of 
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the activities in the score was infused with a potential product, the action itself could continue 
ad infinitum: there was no natural end. Marx’s worker might ‘fish in the afternoon’ but there is no 
description of how long this afternoon might be, whether the fishing would be one solid block or 
several attempts, if a certain number of fish were required for that evening’s dinner or any other 
measure of fulfilment. There is a breeziness to this, and there was a breeziness to Score A. The 
performers pottered from this to that, following instructions and following their noses, feeling 
out what they might like to do next or if they’d like to stay doing what they were doing. They were 
doing for the sake of doing. In the thinking of Campagna and others, this is somewhat terrifying: 
workers mindlessly yet religiously jabbing at keyboards for the sake of doing something that 
seems productive even if there’s no way of knowing whether there is anything socially useful being 
created (2013). Contemporary work, writes Campagna, is ‘striking for its unproductiveness and 
absurdity’ (2013:12). I can see how Score A might exemplify this waste of human powers. I would 
prefer to follow Kathi Weeks to William Morris when she writes that there is pleasure for all liv-
ing things in the exercise of energies (2011). Score A was an opportunity for my collaborators to 
exercise their energies. This doesn’t mean hanging out, doing ‘whatever’, or even an open improvi-
sation. Their energies were guided towards a particular direction, even if that direction was open, 
vague or absurd. There were challenges in the material: building a sculpture or structure out of the 
limited materials required intention and ingenuity, and the dance material on the videos demanded 
careful attention not to mention physical skill in its mimesis. And yet there was a palpable softness 
to the situation which relates more readily to Morris’ pleasure, to an aesthetic, sensible, work-
ing-through of the actions, than to the frantic, anxious, empty quality of the contemporary worker 
as described by Campagna and Berardi. I would like to figure Score A as the kind of reorganisa-
tion and redistribution of the productive for which Weeks calls because it holds in it the tension 
between the seemingly-productive activity and the unproductive outcome, not despite of it.
Just as the participant-collaborators did not become builders because they were building, it 
seems to me that they did not become performers because they were engaged in the task of 
performing. When conjuring Score A in my imagination, we are at Dance City in the first week of 
research. We are in the theatre. This theatre was specially-designed for the needs of touring dance 
performances, and has a particularly large playing space in relation to its 254 seats. In all other 
respects it is quite a typical black box, with a bank of seating raking down to meet the stage. I am 
sitting in maybe row F or row G, six or seven rows back from the stage. There are five performers 
to watch, each with a different personal history of being on stage, including very little experience 
whatsoever. I watch as the performers repeat this score over and over, with brief chats and slight 
reforming of instruction in between each go. My attention homes in on Erin, probably the least 
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experienced and least comfortable performer. She is gardening. She seems to me to be absolutely 
absorbed in creating a pattern with objects on the floor, making a neat border, a bed of flowers 
and plants. She doesn’t mime gardening actions—there’s no hoeing or digging or dusting-off of 
muddy knees—but in the frame of the action I am convinced she is gardening. This absorption is 
characteristic of the score at large. Despite the busy-ness of the space—though there are only four 
activities and five performers the stage feels full—concentration abounds. Sure, there’s an ease in 
moving from one thing to the next but things are taken seriously. I have the sense that I’ve been 
forgotten about. Where this space, the theatre at Dance City, perhaps like any theatre, can bring 
forth the force of an audience through the powers of architecture and memory, I have the sense 
that I needn’t be there, that the idea of an audience has disappeared. Where Melissa Gregg argues 
that in contemporary work it is not a boss but the teammates who are the supervisors of each 
worker’s efforts (2011), I have the impression that it’s not only me who is forgotten but the very 
nature of the work at hand, that is, the creation of a performance, including the context in this situ-
ation of performing as a group. Suspended between the presence of productivity and the absence 
of a product, inhabiting their (temporary, directed) interest, the performers have stopped perform-
ing. Performance in this situation is not an individualist show, showing, or showing off, but a sort 
of excuse. ‘Performance’ or even ‘performing’ is not a state being developed to bridge the gap 
between the paradox I described at the beginning of this section; in this choreographic proposal 
‘performing’ is a frame which allows working to shift to new shapes. Where Srnicek and Williams 
invite performing into their theory as a shared but ultimately individually-felt neurotic necessity in 
contemporary work, Score A uses the pretence of a performance to drop away the sense of work-
ing towards something. It is telling that Score A did not become part of Recreation; it fell away in 
the first week of the creation period after the research and development weeks. It seemed to serve 
itself better than it might serve an audience; many of the collaborators commented on how much 
they enjoyed doing it, but it never seemed to ‘work’, in that other meaning of having aesthetic res-
onance understood at least firstly through the intuition of the director. Its theatrical solidity never 
realised, it was put to one side as one of those actions of choreographic research that belongs 
only there.
My optimism on the potentialities held within the research and development weeks of Recreation 
is calming. Looking at the notes from the time, though, brings forth abdominal tension, slight 
throaty nausea, and an overall fear that nothing’s getting done: a personal crisis of productiv-
ity. Despite the theoretical backdrop and utopian disposition, I was scared that I wouldn’t have 
anything to show for my time. Where here, as I write, I use wordcounts as measures, in the period 
of studio work time, indeed, became the framework for understanding productivity, or, more 
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accurately, for quelling this anxiety. My tactic for doing so was to break the research into ever more 
manageable chunks—a fortnight into weeks, weeks into days, days into sessions, sessions into 
sections, sections into timed scores. According to Berardi, this is characteristic of contemporary 
life, where ‘[l]iving time is subjected to work through a fractal dispersion of both consciousness 
and experience, reducing the coherence of lived time to fragments’ (2009:132). Berardi sees this as 
a psychologically and socially damaging quality of contemporary labour; I am conditioned by this 
form of labour—it’s what I know—and, contrarily, see it is a comfort. At the time, I was not aware 
that I was doing this, merely concerned that I did not know what I was doing and needed some 
way to organise the practice that was to take place each day. This became a dominating emblem 
of the studio, as I would offer some instruction or set up a score, then ‘waste time’ apologetically 
hunting among everyone’s belongings for my phone or iPad so I could set a timer.
Score A was always timed. If memory serves me correctly, the smallest fragment of time it occu-
pied was 12 minutes; later, it became the centrepiece of a larger score lasting an hour. My only job 
was to watch and not tinker with the timer. This was not always an easy task. Other measures of 
success, of a kind of productivity, would drift past me—perhaps I would understand that someone 
had misheard a rule and I’d want to correct the error, maybe something like building their struc-
ture in the spot where the microphone was supposed to be, or doing something explicitly together 
with someone instead of occupying the same space and choreography, or I’d realise that my 
assumptions about how the set-up should be were faulty from the outset. I had to practice sub-
mitting to time, and it became easier to see that the value—emerging in different ways at different 
moments—would be produced through letting time be. This practice allowed me to drop whatever 
criterion I had been inadvertently using to assess the situation and once again allow time to pass.
Berardi reminds that ‘the relation between time and quantity of produced value is difficult to 
determine, since for a cognitive worker every hour is not the same from the standpoint of pro-
duced value’ (2009:75). This statement is true of the practice discussed here, despite its corporeal 
condition. Connecting this to contemporary work’s method of fragmenting time, creating a fright-
ening incoherence of experience, it is easy to see why this is problematic. My solution to my own 
sense of unproductiveness along with the will to produce was to deploy this tactic of fragmenta-
tion and could have quite easily amplified the neurosis, as I found that fragments of time no more 
prescribed productivity. However, though it was not always straightforward, the sense was more 
of creating temporal structures to fill, enabling the truth that it has no determinable quantity of 
produced value to be an opportunity. Once the length of time for any particular activity had been 
agreed, any kind of productivity other than ‘fill this time’ became inconsequential or additional or 
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an interesting quirk. This meant that the activities within the scores had to hold a balance between 
challenging—it had to be somewhat difficult to fill the time, even if it was difficult because of bore-
dom—so that there was some sense of achieving something, and at the same time easy enough 
to keep going. Over the period of research the timed scores became longer and longer. It became 
a practice to be able to keep going, and the choreographic decisions became increasingly guided 
by finding sets of instructions that could allow time to stretch. In this way, my collaborators and I 
were liberated from any other kind of meter, and passing the time became enough. This could be 
an instance of productivity for productivity’s sake, where work is a mere holding ground for the 
performance of productivity, where ‘performance’ is understood as a dangerous fakery. Workers 
put on performances of productivity, sure, but that doesn’t mean any one thing. Performance, or at 
least Score A, stretches productivity until it is thin until it is weakened until it gets holes until it is 
not a compression band but fishnets and then it breathes. The activity is still contained by some-
thing called productivity, still captured in productivity as a value, but this value is loose, sensual, 
tearable.
Competition
There’s a person who took part in the process here discussed whose description will seem unflat-
tering. I have considered omitting the thinking I have done about their participation, but it is so 
helpful in thinking about aspects of contemporary work and their impacts that I am choosing to 
retain this writing, with some changes. I will not disclose where they participated, or their gender, 
and I will use the pronouns they/them to describe them. I name them C, which is not their initial in 
real life. Some of the other details about C cannot be disguised because they are essential to the 
analysis.
I don’t know what C does, most days. Over the past few years I have heard from them, through 
others and through social media that they have been odd-jobbing: a cafe here, some administra-
tive work there, a bit of performing when it suits. C is a trained performer and, for several years, had 
a permanent, full-time role as a performer in a company. Outside of work or work-like activities, I 
know that C has a dependent and has caring duties.
I get the impression that C is relishing the experience of taking part in the Recreation research. 
They are enthusiastic and cheery, making jokes, and generally making the environment seem 
buoyant. They see themselves as a professional performer; I don’t have any reason to consider 
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them otherwise. To my perception, though, there is a performance of what it means to be a per-
former happening, an over-assertion, a playing-up. On the one hand, C’s work identity is their 
identity: working is the favourite part of their life and the main one through which they experience 
themselves as vital, creative, whole. Weeks (2011), Berardi (2009) and Srnicek and Williams (2015) 
flag this as typical of the contemporary worker in neoliberal capitalism. On the other, it seems that 
this playing up of being ‘a performer’ indicates a gap between C’s ordinary personhood and their 
operation in this environment.
I watch C in a long-form improvisation, similar to Score A, discussed above. In this score there are 
fewer things on stage but more performers. The performers have available to them several differ-
ent ways of being on the stage, moving, standing, or sitting like mermaids, and they are to move 
between silence, singing quietly, or singing loudly, either into a microphone or unamplified. There 
are rules about the use of the space. There is the option to robe oneself with some gold fabric for 
the purposes of hiding in plain (and shiny) sight. The score has been set up to think about differ-
ent interactions between the leisurely and the presentational. While the others move hesitantly 
around, shy to puncture a gentle space with loud sound, C doesn’t care, or doesn’t realise, or 
wants to do it enough, or thinks it should be done so does it. I don’t know the motivation, but I can 
see that C hogs the microphone, singing as if in an X Factor audition, masking poorly their pleasure 
in being on stage and singing well according to normative ideas of good singing with an edge of 
irony, a cheeky expression.
C seems to be staking their ground, making sure they are seen as a professional, hinting at pre-
vious experience and making it clear they know how rehearsals work. It’s not necessary, and it 
grates—not because it alienates less experienced collaborators but because the environment 
doesn’t require it and so it glimmers with a sense of desperation. The environment seems to reject 
it. I can’t blame C; I get the sense that they are emphasising the professional nature of the con-
text and their participation within it for precisely the psychosocial reasons that epitomise con-
temporary labour. C is using their skills and relaying their experience as a professional because 
to identify themselves as a worker ensures that their activity is work, in the context of a project in 
which the activity therein is slippery and dubious when it comes to its status as work and the par-
ticipants as workers. As Weeks describes, ‘[w]ork is often understood and experienced as a field of 
individual agency and as a sign of and a path to self-reliance’ (2011:51). Work is an ‘ultimate good’ 
(Srnicek and Williams 2015: 124), around which our ‘inner lives’ and ‘social world’ are organised 
(130). C is one of the ‘significant number of people for whom paid employment is the most com-
pelling demonstration of virtue, accomplishment, and self-identity that society makes available’ 
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(Gregg 2011:xi). Why wouldn’t C want to be seen as a professional in this process in which some 
people are and some people aren’t, and where the kinds of value being produced are somewhat 
ungraspable? As Srnicek and Williams are clear to outline, this has nothing to do with the political 
inclinations of the individual, or their intellectual engagement with such questions; the effects 
of the neoliberal environment are strong enough to drive anyone into the kind of work-centred 
identity construction C was performing (2011). Going further, Berardi proposes that ‘[n]o desire, 
no vitality seems to exist anymore outside the economic enterprise, outside productive labor and 
business. Capital was able to renew its psychic, ideological and economic energy specifically 
thanks to the absorption of creativity, desire, and individualistic, libertarian drives for self-realiza-
tion’ (2009:79). It’s no wonder that C got sucked in, and that that was spat out in their contribution 
to the rehearsals.
What is more curious, then, is why this manner of being appeared as an anomaly midst the 27 
collaborators across two cities. Mostly, we found ourselves in a convivial situation. Apart from 
me, leading the project, it was rare that one collaborator stood out in particular (The Pyramids, 
discussed above, is an exception). The forms that I chose to propose to the participants always 
involved everybody in the room apart from me, usually in the form of a game, exercise or score with 
a set of rules which were often the same for all performers. This might suggest a coolness or even 
an individualism within the structures, but because the activities often invited a physical or inter-
personal intimacy, this potential did not appear to be activated. This intimacy was multiple: we did 
long, group cuddling scores, partner or group actions involving touch, and discussions on personal 
matters. These carried with them no motive past themselves: I was interested in the theatrical 
and, yes, affective potentials of these suggestions but I couldn’t or didn’t predict their effects and 
proposed them as open-ended. There was nowhere to go with any intimacy that might have been 
developed.
I’ll offer a more elaborated example. At various points in the research I proposed an exercise in 
which a collaborator would adopt a posture which, by itself, could be read neutrally, or at least 
be ambiguous or multiple in its potential referents or lack thereof. I have the image in mind of a 
performer taking a shape on hands and knees, a pose that might be equally created by a person 
looking for something on the floor, doing Pilates or yoga exercises, playing an animal in a children’s 
game, or aiming to produce rectangular geometries with their body. The next person would come 
and make another shape near to but not touching the initiator which, again, would be ambiguous 
in itself but, together, would allude to some kind of sexual act. At first these were very straightfor-
ward, with hands, faces and groins coming close to one another in what seemed like a finite variety 
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of combinations and physical postures. As the exercise went on, either with a constantly changing 
stream of pairs, or as a cascading line travelling across the space in a leapfrog structure, a greater 
repertoire developed, with unusual and puzzling compositions realising themselves, and then 
fading away.
This flow of people, positions, and combinations is analogous to the flow of people, positions and 
combinations of the overall research and development period. Though some of the collaborators 
knew each other—especially in Newcastle, where they were invited through my personal networks 
rather than any other kind of mechanism—they never all met one another in one place in one time. 
I made very little effort to catch collaborators up with events of previous days; it seemed as point-
less as the much-hated CCing culture of contemporary offices. Instead, I offered as much infor-
mation as seemed necessary for the activities at hand, encouraging or allowing others to pitch in 
when it seemed they wanted to. Nobody could gather an overview and understand the constituent 
parts of this collaboration so any one person’s comprehension of themselves within the ‘team’ was 
partial at best. In fact, calling the ever-changing mixture of people gathering around this proj-
ect a team is a stretch. ‘Team’ suggests a stable group of individuals who work together towards 
something concrete: a set of goals, maybe even a ‘win’. To be a team, it requires drive towards 
something, perhaps, ultimately, a scaled-up version of Campagna’s idea of the aim of all workers 
under capitalism, ‘Success in our Career’ (2013:18). In a team, ‘all colleagues work together, sharing 
responsibility for the organization’ (Gregg 2011:74). Such a constellation of workers indeed involves 
certain intimacies: the pleasure of the ongoing relationships present in regular work—something I 
don’t often experience myself, working independently—as well as the reciprocal ‘bearing witness’ 
to one another’s professional efforts (Gregg 2011:74). This bearing witness produces a ‘mythically 
egalitarian playing field’, a coercive environment in which simulates a form of democracy whilst 
invariably acting as the ‘omnipotent surveillance’ of each workers’ endeavours (Gregg 2011:74).
Thinking this conception of team through the parallel structures of the sex positions game and 
the organisation of the research and development period offers some interest. Unlike the form of 
group Gregg critiques, the studio environment always included a boss: me. Though not panoptical, 
my presence as both initiator and audience meant that the participants themselves were freed 
from the responsibility of reflecting on one another’s contributions. There was no opportunity 
for the internally constituted coercion described by Gregg to appear, for the participants were 
not collectively responsible: I was. Moreover, the participants couldn’t ever see each other fully: 
there were glimpses, traces, hauntings, but not a way to assess, a way to compete squarely. Being 
a team is how collaboration turns into competition, working together the context within which 
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individuals can compete (for attention, for promotion, for resources). The lack of teamness gave 
way to something that gets close to Campagna’s ‘union of egoists’, in which each collaborator 
is individually engaged in a collaborative, rather than collective, act (2013:70). There were bonds 
but not indelible ones, each one of Campagna’s ‘adventurers’ following their own line of action 
(2013:70), finding their way into following a similar path, supportive but for themselves, neither 
competing individually or as a team. Berardi puts forward another form of group organisation, 
a ‘swarm’. He defines this as ‘a particular kind of collectivity or group phenomenon that may be 
dependent upon a condition of connectivity. A swarm is a collectivity that is defined by relational-
ity...The swarm has no political soul, only an automatic and relational soul...The swarm now tends 
to become the dominant form of human action’ (2009:195). I think Gregg’s team and Berardi’s 
swarm share something of the coercive vacuity the union of egoists contends, but I think swarm, 
as a metaphor, need not always be an animation of a zombified mass empty of soul, lacking ‘atten-
tiveness, the ability to address, care for and appeal to others’ (Smith in Berardi 2009:10). Instead, 
I’d like to imagine a swarm in terms of a murmuration, a natural swarm of birds. The form is what 
holds the relations, and the relations are true, for that time and space. A murmuration is not a com-
petitive space but a breezily collaborative one, each element valued but not needed. 
I don’t want to be too romantic; I want to be wary of washing away forms of competition that did 
make themselves visible. There are two instances where competition, as a form of relation, stood 
out. I’ll describe each briefly, in order to think about how different manifestations of competition 
reflect on to the extent to which these two weeks of rehearsal were work. 
At Dance4 in Nottingham the participants for the research week were drawn mostly from an open 
call, managed by the organisation. Competition suddenly appeared, as, surprisingly, many more 
people expressed an interest than we could have accommodated, in terms of money, as all partic-
ipants were paid; time, for we were aiming to have repeat visits from all collaborators; and admin-
istration, as each person needed to be scheduled and contracted and paid separately. Some of the 
applicants had written an expression of interest that was a few sentences long, said something 
about themselves, and appeared not to know anything about the project or about my other work. 
These were mostly local people who did not work in dance. Others wrote long letters describing 
why they wanted to take part, in particular in this project, in particular with me, and were willing 
to travel long distances or find places to stay in Nottingham in order to participate. These were 
mostly people with dance or performance training within five years of graduating from an under-
graduate course. One group understood it as a recreational activity which required certain attri-
butes which they would or wouldn’t have and they simply needed to inform me, and the other a 
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professional opportunity which demanded a case being made for their selection; this latter group 
had firmly placed this activity in the context ‘work’. An open call is a mechanism that belongs 
firmly within competition, whether or not it explicitly relates to labour, paid or unpaid. Competition 
itself is not necessarily associated with work: both Berardi and Campagna explain that it is one 
of the main conditions of contemporary life, unavoidable and dramatic in its power (Berardi 2009; 
Campagna 2011). It is the responses to the competitive frame, rather than the frame itself, which 
demonstrate the fact that the project and its call were ambiguous or even entirely dual, operating 
as both work and not-work dependent on the individual’s relationship to and understanding of 
the situation. This dual nature did not seem to have a negative effect on the resulting collection 
of participants—most of whom did not know one another—and the theme of competition did not 
arise again.
In Newcastle, however, a different set of circumstances made competition appear in another form. 
In this city, where I live, the collaborators were invited to participate; my networks in Newcastle 
are quite broad, facilitating a range of participants from different parts of life. Despite this breadth, 
Newcastle is a small city and many of the collaborators knew one another, some very well indeed. 
In my efforts towards transparency, I made it known that I was seeking to find a small core cast for 
the final work, and that this cast would likely be based in Newcastle, for the sake of logistics and 
cost, for the sake of efficiency, to make the final work competitively priced in a market. Unthink-
ingly I added to all the different sorts of textures in the space an additional one: the audition. I 
suppose I always assume honesty is the most ethical policy: an error. Most participants said noth-
ing—perhaps they knew they wouldn’t have wanted to do it for longer anyway, or feel so far away 
from the idea of performing in a ‘professional’ production that they wouldn’t think I would ever ask 
them—but there is, I sense, a charge. One participant exposed it explicitly with exasperation, voic-
ing her discomfort and imagining that she would be never be favoured above C, described above. 
C’s behaviour could be seen as exemplifying some ways of being common or even preferred in 
audition scenarios: vocal, performing presence, taking the starring roles. This engendered a loss of 
solidarity, a loss of conviviality, between me and the collaborators and the collaborators with one 
another. When this arose, we understood each ‘other according to rules of competition’ (Berardi 
2009:80). We saw each other as ‘danger, impoverishment and limitation, rather than experience, 
pleasure and enrichment’ (Berardi 2009:80). I don’t think this undid the intimate, collaborative, 
murmuring union we had produced, but it certainly tarnished it.
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Care
Each of the writers to whom I refer try to offer something of a solution or response to the dangers 
or predicaments of contemporary labour. These vary in elaboration as well as form, from Federico 
Campagna’s call for parasitism as a tactic to defend against the worst of labour whilst living within 
it, to Carl Cederström and Peter Fleming’s invocation of the figure of the little girl as a deworking 
of the human body, to Nick Srnicek’s and Alex Williams’ more practical directives for a post-work 
future. Franco Berardi suggests another, starting from a reconceptualization of wealth. Wealth, 
Berardi describes, is understood as quantity of resources gathered by a person or group, the 
cumulative possession of money and property. Throughout The Soul at Work (2009), he posits 
this as a refrain, indicating, perhaps, the recurrent quality of this idea in contemporary thinking, 
the sense that this construction is absorbed into the collective psyche as permanent truth rather 
than selected belief until brought under question. Each time Berardi points this out, he posits his 
alternative: a reapprehension of the term, a reclamation of ‘wealth as the simple capacity to enjoy 
the world available in terms of time, concentration and freedom’ (81). Wealth can be refigured, 
Berardi claims, by nourishing the soul, those forces of ‘mind, language and creativity’ that have 
become the agents of work and whose activities have been co-opted to the benefit of capital (21). 
He claims that the economic disjunctures inherent in contemporary life cannot be solved by new 
economic conceptualisations. Instead, he offers a sidestep, suggesting that to rethink wealth in 
terms of sensual pleasure, rather than the pleasure of possessing, would offer a new way of being 
rich which would gradually surface as a new economic and social reality.
He offers a method for realising this form of wealth. Berardi suggests that ‘[i]n the days to come, 
politics and therapy will be one and the same’ (220). The action that is required from those of us 
who wish to pursue it is to create therapeutic contexts, not in order to overthrow capitalism and its 
consequences for work but to heal the traumas through ‘social zones of human resistance, zones 
of therapeutic contagion’ (220). Crucially, Berardi does not believe that a total revolution resulting 
in a new economic future is really possible, but that capitalism as it is today will become one of 
multiple possible methods for organising society and its resources. The process for achieving this 
new state is therapy. Though there are multiple therapeutic methods in contemporary use, includ-
ing somatic approaches, Berardi writes about psycho- and schizoanalysis; this, it seems, is a direct 
match for the capacities of the soul, the cognitive and psychical energies that are subsumed by 
capital within contemporary work. For me there is a gap, a bridge that the form of therapy Berardi 
outlines cannot make between the capacities of the soul and the bodily, sensual, aesthetic version 
of wealth that Berardi is trying to reach. Berardi describes a form of therapy which involves an 
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engagement mostly through language that does not fully harness the sensible. I’d like to make a 
twist and turn therapy into care. Care is always already bodily, as I see it. The feeling of care pro-
duces a desire for the physical; I think of the urge to put an arm around someone if they’re upset, 
or the cautions given to schoolteachers to attempt to circumvent the urge to comfort children with 
the physical gestures of care. By the same token, the physical gestures of care cannot be fruitfully 
undertaken without the feeling ‘care’: why would you carefully—laboriously—mask the edges of a 
wall to carefully paint another unless there was some will to care, some concern for the pleasures 
and wellbeing of yourself or another?
Though not whatsoever fixed, there is a firm distinction between therapist and client, a hierarchical 
relationship where one needs the other more in one direction; though at our final session yester-
day, my therapist expressed a satisfied sadness that our relationship was ending for now, she still 
rightfully accepted the payment for her work, work which I required for my wellbeing. Though care 
can also be understood in these terms—otherwise we wouldn’t have the word ‘carer’—I would sug-
gest that all people are engaged in care as both carer and ‘cared-for’, a term used by care scholar 
Nel Noddings (2013), at different points in their lives. Beyond reciprocity, there is an indirect and 
networked system of carers and cared-fors in all lives, care already offering or invoking a system 
both more readily available and more suitable for the production of the kind of transformative 
contagion Berardi suggests.
Berardi relates an interaction between Sigmund Freud and a young psychoanalyst in which the 
former informs the latter that psychoanalysis reaches its goal when it is understood that therapy 
never ends, that it is ‘an interminable process’ (221). Therapy, then, works towards a horizon that 
keeps its distance, a walk towards a goal that keeps shifting away. This relates to the forms of 
futurity artist Valentina Desideri and philosopher Stefano Harney draw out in their conversation on 
‘Fate Work’ (2013). In this, they discuss work fate, the state of being in which we currently operate, 
in which our sense of the future is intimately tied to our work in multiply unavoidable and problem-
atic ways. They elaborate their opposite, fate work, through the discussion, describing the ways in 
which it can circumvent the traps of (neoliberal) strategy through proliferating multiple futures at 
once, futures that cannot be known ahead or selected, rather like the range of political-economic 
futures Berardi imagines existing simultaneously. For Desideri and Harney, this fate work, this ini-
tiation of multiple futures, must be done with others in a relation of complicity, with accomplices, 
under the auspices of ‘a kind of love’ (2013: np). In the conversation, the interlocutors emphasise 
the need to adopt practices of living that avoid work fate and produce fate work through engag-
ing in the present. They advocate a practice that allows us ‘to come into the present as sensation, 
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as something susceptible to the senses and something that in turn works on those senses in the 
present’ (2013: np). This is what I call ‘care’. Care does not demand the sense of progress belonging 
to therapy. Care is not a tool for feeling better in the future, but for growing the sensible pleasures 
right now. Care is a production of wellness or positive experience in the present, or, as Desideri and 
Harney describe it, ‘a present wealth, a wealth of being in the present together’ (2013: np). 
I would like to offer an example of this care at work.
There is a video lasting five minutes and one second from the fourth day of studio research. In it, 
three women I have known for at least ten years each engage in what my collaborators and I call 
‘care’. I watched the video twice.
First viewing
Lynn is being cared for. There is some music whose origin I don’t recall, but knowing these women 
I can guess that it is Lynn’s own choice. Lynn is lying on her back, centre stage, her body appearing 
relaxed with her dancerly, open hips giving her the model savasana, yoga’s corpse pose, despite 
being unsupported by any mat or blanket, which is how we do this these days. Mel stands, moving 
gingerly at her feet stage right, awaiting the ‘go’ from me, which I did not hear, or perhaps was not 
listening for. 
Anna is somewhere nearby, also waiting.
There is a certain scenography set up, yellow fabric and blue yoga mat clamped onto the black 
curtain by Susie on a previous day, and piles of resources, awaiting use, hoping to be transformed 
from objects into theatrical properties through their selection, lined up in a row like the dancers 
in A Chorus Line. When the camera starts to record Lynn is already lying down in a rope circle, a 
ritual marking that part of the space as even more special than the already special place of the 
stage.
Mel kneels near Lynn’s head and folds forward, a kind of perverted balasana, or child’s pose, 
bowing gently and purposefully as if entirely accustomed to performing the humbling gesture of 
a worshipper before a shrine. Instead of forehead to earth her left check touches the black dance-
floor, facing away from me and my camera, her face coming so close to Lynn’s that it doesn’t quite 
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seem possible that they wouldn’t be touching.
Mel moves gently, to Lynn’s side, picking up a hand, later attending to feet. Meanwhile, Anna 
dashes increasingly frantically, first closing the rope circle to frame Lynn and Mel more neatly, 
then choosing items to support Mel and Lynn’s duet. It is brusque, the kind of careless, perfunc-
tory set of operations of a waitress quickly cleaning and resetting tables in a café during a busy 
lunchtime. There is a desire to do, a sincere wish to be helpful, but there’s simply no time to worry 
about whether it looks nice as long as it works. It reminds me of the many times for which I cared 
for my mother, before, during, and after this artistic research period, during her dying process, and 
it reminds me of seeing mothers, my friends who are mothers, and my mother, and my maternal 
grandmother, habitually caring for their children with a loving impatience, a sense of distraction.
Anna takes red tape, pulling it out to make another loop, echoing the shape of the rope, and as I 
write I think of a vulva, of course, a red womany oval, layers of tissue enclosing woman’s work. It 
is significant that we are all women. Moreover, we are all women who care: Anna is a mother, and, 
in this video, pregnant, though I didn’t know it then and I’m not sure she did, either. I associate 
her personality with caring. She is ‘caring’, as a feature of her character as well as an action she 
undertakes. Lynn is also a mother, and a mover, leading movement medicine activities, teaching 
active birth yoga. I also think of her as caring. Mel and Lynn know each other from the antenatal 
world in Newcastle, as Mel is a midwife, professionally skilled at caring for other women in both 
medical and emotional modes; we talked about this during a lunchtime one day. Mel, too, is very 
caring. Later, she would be the midwife for my friend Sarah, but would not actually deliver the 
baby because she, too, was on maternity leave, though she is not yet pregnant at the time of the 
rehearsal. (I sometimes overidentify with Mel because we look quite alike; when we used to work in 
different branches of the same shoe shop in the early 2000s more than one customer asked if we 
were sisters. This affects my viewing.) I was not then and am not now a mother, but my mother was 
then and is now very present in these thoughts despite her current mortal absence.
Anna is working hard, and it shows. She is running into corners, collecting materials, actively trying 
to add to the space. She takes my pink lamp and pulls it closer to Mel and Lynn, and it breaks. 
She’s kneeling and briefly looks towards the camera, towards me, embarrassedly, and I suppose 
I shrug or pull a reassuring face because she puts it down and carries on. There is a moment of 
suspension in her actions and my understanding which seems to slow both movement and com-
prehension. It’s a rupture that brings to light her sense of role, now that it’s momentarily fractured, 
that indexes the performer’s work and draws attention to the limits of her action, a kind of workerly 
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motivation that is choreographic (that is, determines the scope of movements available in space, 
time, relation, dynamic qualities and so on) as well as interpersonal, despite the fact that I do not 
remember discussing these things at all. Anna is confident in her skills as a performer and is acti-
vating herself from her experience, not requiring direction until set-up falters with a faulty object.
A broken lamp is clearly not going to curb her performance of this role, or maybe even her per-
sonal desire to complete the task successfully; I don’t know how she feels. She finds stickers and 
adheres them to Lynn, to Mel, maybe to the floor, consecrating the action and drawing attention 
away from it, for she is the one with the power to anoint and that’s what’s important. She’s the god-
dess and the priestess and the cleaner, asking the others to pick up their legs so she can hoover 
under them in order to show that it’s her space and she can do what she likes and what she likes is 
making the space nice for everyone. She commands with care, and commands by caring.
A small, pre-fabricated DIY statue made of blue sticky-paper is placed at Lynn’s head, a tower of 
yoga blocks dumped at the side, a mirror hurriedly placed against them after a brief search for an 
alternative site. Before dumping a bunch of books, opened to random pages one-by-one, between 
Lynn’s legs—another amusing yonic reference, accidental or knowing—Anna robes Mel in a sheet 
of golden lamé (borrowed from another performance of mine in which, as it happens, it sometimes 
undertakes the same task) as the latter kneels at Lynn’s feet. Anna appears to be unsatisfied with 
the perfunctory covering, and, with grace no less than with haste pulls out the fabric from behind 
Mel, a wedding gown or regal costume elongating the collective body Lynn-Mel until it’s almost 
out of shot. 
Mel, always calm, walks around to Lynn’s left, now, I imagine, with the pulsing gait of a bride or 
queen taking her time to be seen by the assembled crowd whilst also performing her eager hesi-
tation at the coming rite. She kneels, golden surface hiding small working body from me, the only 
audience member both in real time and now, in this time of reflection. She takes off her robe and 
gently lays it over Lynn, lifting and sending it away a couple of times so it billows and then rests.
I don’t remember this scene; I wonder if the others do.
Lynn is oblivious, or so it seems.
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Second viewing
I can’t tell whether or not the things that Mel is doing is something she knows ‘works’. Are these 
particular actions taught in midwifery training, or perhaps on some special course she took once 
qualified, to advance her skills? Is there a ‘Shiatsu 101 for Midwives?’ Perhaps she even learnt them 
with Lynn, on a course for midwives and others supporting childbirth. Or, even, it could be that 
Lynn taught a bodywork course for professional midwives, and Mel learnt from Lynn to take each 
hand one by one, lifting the forearm off the earth but keeping the heavy upper arm weighted into 
the floor, and rocking the lower part of the limb, circling it, gently massaging the upper arm with 
the elbow as axis. I can’t know. I choose to read a complicity; I want there to be an understanding.
Some things I understand just by watching. I can feel for myself just by watching how comforting 
and relaxing it would be to have gentle, firm pressure applied into ankles, not a squeeze or a nip 
but the confident touch of someone who often touches bodies, people, for ‘a living’. Kinaesthetic 
empathy activates warmth in my own ankles, and an out-breath, a slight ghostly relaxation despite 
current tension (I am writing, so I am tense).
Part of Mel’s work seems to be surveying, attending. She acts only when she feels it is necessary, 
and I can choose to think this even though I know I am the one who has given her particular direc-
tions which at least implicitly implore her to keep doing something. My reading can flutter between 
worrying for her, sensing insecurity that she doesn’t know what to do, or feels silly, or is concerned 
with impressing someone—me, Lynn, Anna, some imagined audience, always on the verge of being 
conjured in a theatre—and more openly seeing her as absolutely in control of the situation. 
Necessity is presented here as a construct, a fabrication which becomes real through its satis-
faction. I don’t suppose Lynn needed Mel to lie next to her, foetal, the small, roundish curl of her 
frame tessellating sideways, slipping head next to head, abdomen next to arm, knees by hip. But as 
soon as it is done it seems obvious, somehow, that this would be the next thing to do. There is not 
a need, and then a solution which meets that need; instead, there is an action that is welcomed 
as much as it was unwanted, or better not known to be wanted, before it occurred. In that sense it 
is consumed the moment it is produced, because it is not produced—not really, not as its whole—
until it is consumed. It disappears between the cracks of productivity, quietly dissolved between 
usefulness and uselessness.
This particular action has reference. I have the sense that perhaps someone has lain next to me in 
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this pose, maybe when I was a child, or when I was very sad sometimes. I remember lying like this 
next to a lover when he was moving into another phase of depression and we were both powerless 
to fight it, and touching him, it, would have made it all the more heartbreaking, even though that 
touch would have comforted me. I remember lying like this next to my mother in her bed late in her 
illness, the room darkened and us both sleepy. Her cognitive capacities were dimming, the whole 
organism called Mum exhausted, creaturely in its tiredness. I wanted to talk to her but like the 
movement to touch my past love I knew it was for me, not for her. I lay another time in the same 
bed, my parents’ bed, again with curtains closed, this time on my right side facing away from the 
door; in this memory I am lying on my mum’s side of the bed. I am checking on my dad a few hours 
after Mum’s death. He is depleted and devastated. He says, ‘I am just so sad.’ I say, ‘I know.’
This foetal shape is associated with self-protection and care: it is often an intermediary shape 
between the final resting pose and returning to worldly awareness at the end of a yoga practice. 
In films it’s a position crying people take, alone, sobbing. It’s the shape of spooning when there is 
more than one and they are facing the same way and they are touching, an image which reminds 
me of something I read about homosexual sex and the importance of the fact that the two part-
ners are facing in the same direction. I guess it was about men. I can’t remember. Spooning sort of 
makes two into one, a grown-up version of the two-in-one originator of the foetal position, preg-
nancy. But the foetal position where its performer is solitary in the presence of another is another 
thing altogether. It carries with it the passivity and receptivity of a tiny baby with the control and 
attentiveness of an adult. Its vulnerability is in service. Here, as Mel undertakes this act of service; 
she protects Lynn from the grasping witnesses, real and potential, child and parent in one.
Where I suspect Mel has found herself in this position before, I can speculate that this is the first 
time she has swept fabric over another human’s body for the purposes of ‘care’. She finds this pos-
sibility quite by accident, noticing the drag of the synthetic softness pulling against Lynn’s clothes 
as she moves around the resting body. She experiments with ways to have the fabric swirl, moving 
over Lynn and looking back to test not only the movement but its visual impact in the cascading 
ripple. She walks grandly from Lynn’s head to her feet, feet placed carefully, the thin robe stroking 
her face (I can feel it), then her chest (I can feel it, but less), then her legs (I can feel it, but still less). 
The material clinging to Lynn’s feet, Mel sits downstage of her cared-for, the gold sheet draping 
classically, and then lies down.
I can know what it feels like to lie next to someone, or to be lain next to, or even to touch another’s 
hands or ankles or legs, or to be touched at the hands or ankles or legs, because these things have 
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almost certainly happened; they are so strangely commonplace, especially for dance workers, that 
I can’t name particular instances. I am fairly sure, however, that I have never had someone dance 
gently over for me in order to have fabric move over my flesh, and I believe I am truthful when I say 
I haven’t done this for someone else. But I know what it feels like, I do, and I can sense immedi-
ately why it can rest under the description ‘care’. We built this exercise with the instructions from 
the work of another artist, Valentina Desideri, called ‘Fake Therapy’. In this she asks participants to 
assume that there is nothing wrong with anyone and nobody has the power to heal those non-ex-
istent problems. But care is different to therapy, for someone can be cared for even if they don’t 
need it, or maybe it’s that everyone always needs more care, even if they don’t. Once again, it’s not 
that there is a lack that is met with this customer service, and not even that a lack appears once 
the service is available, but that the surplus is effective, productive, useful. There is no wasted 
effort here.
Anna, participating in the situation from the outside and her own apparently involuntarily hectic 
pace, takes the fabric and tucks both women under it, transforming service into mutuality. Now 
they are together, common.




I notice on Instagram a recent trend of identifying the content of a post or of a feed with a word 
signifying its major topic or theme and the suffix -lyf or -lyfe, a millennial respelling of its homoph-
onous original. It wouldn’t be enough, it seems, to (hash)tag a post of a BBQ pulled jackfruit ‘pork’ 
burger with #vegan, or, say, an illustration depicting some aspect of postgraduate research, hilar-
ious for its knowing misery, with #PhD. It has to have #veganlyf, or #PhDlyfe, too. It’s not that this 
addition to the tag makes it any more searchable (which is the very function of the tag, after all); 
in fact, the opposite is more likely to be true. Most of the time it is excessive, for the simple topic 
word is there as a tag in any case. The purpose of this tag, then, is to stratify and intensify portions 
of existence, tying them together under their common word. Each image so branded is not seen as 
a representation of a unique event amongst the countless events within a person’s existence, but 
turns the particular into a general within a tidy man-made channel of activities, which, together, 
form a ‘lyf’. Lyf is streamlined, managed, homogenous. Against real life, in which different sorts 
of actions make up any one day, it takes effort and resolve to be so consistent, to formulate a lyf. 
Making a lyf is hard work.
In Work’s Intimacy (2011), Melissa Gregg discusses the slippages that contemporary working 
practices cause between work and nonwork aspects of human existence. For the latter of these 
categories I will here exchange the term ‘life’, the reasons for which will, I hope, become clear in the 
following passages; I will use Instagram’s lyf as a way of thinking about what this could be. There 
are various aspects to this sliding of human capacities between work and life. For instance, Gregg 
describes the much-theorised area of affective and emotional labour, traditionally connected 
to nonwork life, in which workers in many if not most present-day working cultures in the West 
are required to deploy interpersonal capacities of kindness, empathy, humour and so on in their 
day-to-day professional conduct, including but not limited to direct service roles, to the point of 
exhaustion (2011:10).
The relationships between one worker and another is also subject to additional complexity under 
these conditions. Where once the workplace setting could be a context in which a person might 
be ‘a long term witness to another person’s life’ (Sennett 1998:20), a social bond built over time 
is replaced by the cultivation of ‘enforced intimacy’ between ever-shifting casts of colleagues 
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through teambuilding programmes. This results in weaker connections that are less present as 
supportive emotional ties for the workers and, instead, these relationships serve as temporary 
synthetic lubricant for the turning of a workteam’s productive wheels (Gregg 2011:75). Interestingly, 
one intimacy appears to replace another: in an earlier image of workplace conviviality, in which 
permanent contracts resulted in long careers within single workplaces, workers are able to find a 
‘shared context for daily intimacies’ (Gregg 2011:83). It is by working alongside one another over 
a significant portion of a lifetime that a friendship might develop alongside collegiality, by the 
happenstance of daily encounters rather than by design. In contemporary corporate culture (and 
beyond), the creation of bonds occurs through designated moments in the working day: ‘birthday 
morning teas, Friday afternoon drinks and weekend get-to-know-you retreats’ (84). Though on the 
surface, this suggests that workplaces are supporting individual and collective development —the 
office becoming a place that is ‘friendly and fun’ (83)—but these relationships are designed to be 
of service to the employer, to contribute to the creation of value, in Marxist terms. Where work was 
once a context for a certain form of friendship to be developed, those friendships are now intimate 
tools for the good of work (Gregg 2011). Of course, it is possible that these friendships could be sin-
cere including ways that might include solidarity or collegiality, but they are constructed in such 
a way that Gregg is led to describe them as ‘simulated’ (167). Where the veneer of the simulated is 
spread over all workplace relationships, it is difficult to put trust in the genuine intimacy of any of 
them. Is it a work relationship or a life relationship?
In The Problem with Work (2011), in the epilogue entitled ‘A Life beyond Work’, Kathi Weeks asserts 
that ‘life is part of work, and work is part of life. Life as an alternative to work does not pretend 
to be something more authentic and true, which we can find somewhere outside of work’ (232). 
Nonetheless, following the authors of The Post-Work Manifesto (1998), she advocates for ‘getting a 
life’ as a method of moving away from a work-centred society. With the invocation of this colloquial 
directive, Weeks hopes to provide a way to shift the focus of social worth and the right to subsis-
tence from those activities which produce economic value to those that do not. Weeks does not 
identify clearly what of human existence befits the category ‘life’, but does provide some guidance 
in the negative, describing what her theorisation excludes or what problems might arise with its 
misuse. A drawback Weeks identifies in the positing of work against life is precisely the entangle-
ment which is the topic of Melissa Gregg’s book (and which is discussed in much of the work of 
the writers cited in Chapter 1): the fact that work encroaches upon life in order to steal from its 
capacities, that ‘life could be too easily co-opted by management initiatives and subordinated to 
their purposes, in which case life would function less against work than as a further basis for its 
hegemony’ (Weeks 2011: 231). Weeks’ life is not life if it is indeed for the purpose of work.
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Another way in which life is not life for Weeks is if it can be ‘recuperated into the logic of com-
modity culture’ (231). By this she means that if that which is called life is those things that can be 
packaged up, exchanged for money and consumed in private spheres, then the very purpose of 
creating this category ‘life’ in opposition to ‘work’ is undone or at least limited. To my mind, raising 
this limitation forces a consideration of not only the contents of life but the qualities of those con-
tents, the particular details, the sensible natures of human activity in fine detail. For instance, and 
in relation to the content of this thesis, the activity ‘dancing’ is readily commodifiable in multiple 
ways: expensive commercial dance classes and the accoutrements that come with them (‘dance-
wear’, for example); television dance competitions funded by advertisers; dancers hired to enter-
tain partygoers at corporate functions—these would all be suited to a #dancelyf hashtag. Equally 
dancing can be witnessing an Argentinian tango practica, moving with friends at a party, or jigging 
to the radio in the kitchen. The actions themselves might be rather similar, but one set is commod-
ified and the other is not, or is at least less so. (The same exposition could be made with all sorts 
of other things, like cooking, or driving, or football.) In her brief comment on this matter, Weeks is 
careful not to align commodification with work and non-commodification with life, and, just as with 
other complexes of concepts, it is far from straightforward. However, I’d like to suggest that the 
difficulty here is that commodification implies that this part of life’s content is someone’s work: in 
the case of dancing, a commercial dance class involves a financial transaction, a commodification 
of the interactions of humans in movement in order that the teacher’s labour (and probably, less 
directly, the innumerable other workers who contribute to that class existing in that place at that 
time) is remunerated. Some people are working and others aren’t, and it is in the direct meeting of 
the worker and the non-worker (the lyfer?) in which the commodification arises. The actions might 
look similar—they can all be called ‘dance’—but the feeling-states and physical experiences pro-
duced by them are predicated on all the conditions of their manifestation, including their relative 
commodification and the relations involved. 
So, Weeks’ conception of life in relation to work does not come down to commodifiability as a neat 
axis; rather it emerges in a richer but less tidy way through her method. Weeks’ proposition has 
arisen through a feminist Marxist analysis of the wages for housework campaigns of the 1970s. 
Through this she charts the ways in which women made demands based on their reproductive 
labour through repositioning housework as work, and the various impacts of these actions. The 
space that the wages for housework campaign made for women, their labours, and their needs 
was predicated on the value of work, that is, on a person’s social worth and right to freedom based 
on their contribution to the creation of economic value, in this case through reproductive labour. 
Housework and other unwaged domestic work were positioned as creating the social world on 
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which capital accumulation could be possible, becoming productive along the same lines. Though 
there were many advantages to this tack, one of the problems that Weeks outlines is the fact that 
this ‘continues to build on productivist mandates’ (Weeks 2011:230), disabling an argument for an 
alternative view which could de-centre work. Using this history to make a case for basic income, 
Weeks asks what would happen if this income was seen not as remuneration for the production of 
value (now including unwaged domestic labour), ‘but for the common reproduction of life?’ (230). 
This ‘invokes a broader notion of social reproduction than the wages for housework analysis typ-
ically offered’ (230); that is, it asks us to consider more expansively the kinds of human contribu-
tions necessary for our worlds to continue, beyond those associated with production. Moreover, it 
suggests that to make ‘valuable’ contributions might be missing the point altogether, that, instead, 
‘lifeful’ actions might be worthy of remuneration from the commons. We might not always know 
what these lifeful parts of life are doing against any sort of pre-existing rubric but Weeks’ proposal 
implies that human beings deserve the opportunity to sustain their existences nonetheless.
Even though she takes these steps to determine what she considers to be a useful conception 
of ‘life’ in relation to work, Weeks is unequivocal about the fact that life and work are not, in fact, 
cleanly distinguishable. Rather than see the attempt at creating a space for life as an alternative 
to work as an escape to an exterior plane, life, Weeks writes, ‘must be continually invented in the 
struggle to mark distinctions between fields of experience that nonetheless remain intertwined’ 
(232). If life is to replace value as the purpose of human activities, life is something that needs to 
be created, rather than simply lived. I don’t believe that Weeks is encouraging something like the 
‘lyf’ of Instagram users, though; this is not the sense of invention Weeks avows. In fact, it is possi-
ble to consider the creation of a lyf to be something more like the creation of a brand, a laboured 
and sealed representation of human actions that is dependent on the sorts of labour that draws 
from formerly non-work human capacities—from the soul, as Berardi would have it. It appears as 
something of a peak example of the semiocapitalist advances many of the thinkers worked with 
in Chapter 1 criticise. In the creation of a lyf, work and life are both present. But the ‘distinctions 
between fields of experience’ Weeks is taking pains to produce have disappeared. Without dis-
tinctions, there can be no intertwining, no space for creative gaps between one kind of human 
doing and another. The sense of invention, the exciting, potent, possibilities of finding new ways 
to operate beyond the subsuming of life to work disappear despite the apparent foregrounding 
of life within lyf. Lyf, in a sense, collapses into itself, finding stability only when it is seamless, 
unpunctured.
Instagrammers talk about ‘curating’ their feed. The etymological root of curation is care. There is 
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great care, of a sort, in the creation of a lyf, as it comes to mean in this writing a slick depiction of 
a set of behaviours and events through carefully chosen images, shared with the world online. It is 
not uncommon to see amongst prolific Instagram users a distinct palette of colour or composition 
consistent through their photographs, or thumbnails that together on the profile page form a larger 
composite image. Some users alternate photographs with quotes in a particular font on a partic-
ular colour background, which, when gathered together, form a satisfying and indeed very careful 
check effect. If this description all sounds like the determined and studied outputs of the market-
ing department of a company, then the encounter with such feeds directly is all the stronger; the 
impact is strong, and strangely confusing, as I try to figure out whether this ‘person’ is a private 
individual or a public-facing business. The ‘best’ Instagrammers, the private individuals whose 
depiction of lyf is most attractive to followers, are termed ‘influencers’, and can acquire agents who 
will sell on their behalf mentions of company names or the chance to have a photograph feature 
a product. This isn’t the social media of an earlier moment when Facebook was beginning and 
most users seemed to document and present their lives in quite the haphazard, unstructured and 
forgetful way that feels more ‘true to life’. Now, this medium of social media and the savvy with 
which it is used confuses work and non-work, with meals and relationships and holidays and social 
gatherings all set and staging and costume for the production of value, for a financial return. Lyf is 
life as work as life, not intertwined but squashed one into another without room for movement, for 
nuance. It’s a boring trick, a complex masquerade with twists and turns that appear first interest-
ing and formidable but ultimately seem to deflate both work and life. It’s not caring, after all, to 
present as a life something so streamlined and inhuman, disregarding all the rest of what might 
make a human life, demoting life in all its vivacity and strangeness to a mere tweezed selection of 
best bits for use at work. Care implies a taking of the whole at once, a holistic attention to all that 
there is, and this sort of lyf-curation cannot accommodate the attitude of care that life needs.
But perhaps this selective approach is no different from any other interaction between a private 
life and a worker’s contribution. In each phase of economic development—and indeed in each form 
of work in present times—certain aspects of human capacities are extracted for their application 
to labour, from the physical strength and skill of, say, a school caretaker, to the intellectual work 
of a mathematician, to the interpersonal qualities of a nurse. (Of course, no job divides parts of a 
person in quite such a coarse manner, but some forms of work rest more heavily on certain kinds 
of capacity than others, resulting in Weberian or Taylorist divisions of labour). What would be the 
problem with this? In some ways there isn’t one: in order to survive we need to exercise something 
of ourselves to gain the necessary sustenance of all sorts to reproduce. In other ways, each form 
of labour carries with it its own downfall: profoundly physical work has a detrimental impact on the 
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body (I think of my late maternal grandfather, a former miner, with his double hip replacement and 
rough breathing). Many of the critics of late capitalism, with its affective, aesthetic and intellectual 
demands, detail the effects of such work on the individual, from Campagna’s evocation of zom-
bie-like religiosity (2013) to the personal near-breakdown described vividly by Southwood (2011). 
Berardi extends this to an account of a society riddled with mental ill-health, offering something 
in the direction of a solution via therapy (2009), as discussed in Chapter 1. In these ways, the form 
of work has an impact (at least mostly) on the corresponding aspect of the worker. But the cre-
ation of a lyf as a form of work has an ever-greater intimacy with the worker’s personhood than 
the intimacy of post-Fordist, cognitive labour described by Gregg (2011). It’s not just the character 
that is corroded, as Richard Sennett would have it (and he’s writing, on this, in 1998, before social 
media existed). It’s not just that work and life are swapping aspects, with professional communi-
cation taking place in the domestic environment or friendships harnessed by the business appa-
ratus and the like. It’s that a whole life is offered up as the site of work. It is more like the lifeworks 
of performance artists like Tehching Hsieh: just as cultivated, just as aesthetic. I want to write 
that it is just as knowing, but I hesitate. I don’t think the ‘influencers’ of Instagram producing lyfs 
do see that they’re doing that; their activity shares the sort of accidental pervasiveness of other 
forms of affective labour, in that there’s a sucking in or sliding down of the usual boundaries of life 
and work, similar to the breaking down of workers’ boundaries between the professional and the 
personal described in the writing of Melissa Gregg. Where Hsieh and others designated a period of 
life to do something which became an artwork, these social media workers crop away sections of 
life, leaving behind the representation of the selected highlights. It’s obvious that Hsieh’s lifeworks 
are not the documentation of a normal life but an aesthetic offering, whereas even the designation 
‘lyf’ proposes that this is all of what a person is (even if the experienced lyfer can afford to occa-
sionally insert an ironic gesture towards their self-awareness as a brand). If typical forms of affec-
tive labour cause mental ill-health, then this intensification of lyf-as-work may provoke even graver 
concerns. What could its therapy be? Where do the bits of life that lyf discards go?
I think this trend of the creation of lyf does not only demonstrate or exemplify an increasing 
tendency towards the collapse of work and life in a particular direction. It is also an opportunity 
to consider again what of life, as in Kathi Weeks’ suggestion, might be of importance. Where lyf is 
consistent, life is varied and jangled with paradoxes; where lyf is publicly shared, equally amongst 
everyone, life might be private, or, more likely, operating with different degrees of publicity accord-
ing to sometimes erratic individual tendencies; where lyf’s events manifest in order to draw atten-
tion, life’s events might be more or less interesting without much consideration; where lyf func-
tions in the interests of commercial gain (even if that gain is only in the potentiality represented by 
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a rise in the number of followers), life happens only for itself, or has multiple, interrelated functions 
that evade a neat purpose; lyf follows or has followers, life has all kinds of relationships of different 
strengths and tones. 
In the rest of this chapter, I will build from here to search for life. Life against lyf seems renegade, 
maverick. Rather than an amorphous blob of whatever is not work, life is indistinct but dynamic, 
requiring the ‘struggle’ to give it its space (Weeks 2011: 232). To find it, describe it, look for its 
consequences and rejoice in its possibilities, it needs to be posited against its opposites; in the 
previous chapter this was work. This work has now been expanded to include not only the qualities 
associated with labour in the well-theorised post-Fordist economy, but extends to this new form of 
work, the creation of a lyf. Searching for life, then, is a response to Weeks’ call for this as a potential 
opposite to the difficult, uncomfortable, undesirable or even dangerous aspects of work, a way to 
enlarge the scope of value-making within human activity, thus decentring work whilst still keeping 
it in view in a complex, rather than binary, way.
It may be obvious, but it strikes me as important to note that I am a heavy Instagram user. I find 
myself almost writing that this is not for commercial use, but then I think to the many images of 
rehearsals, of set, of amusing moments from production that I uploaded and shared for the pur-
poses of marketing, albeit to only my few hundred followers, most of whom are dance and per-
formance professionals, because that’s whom I know. It would be too much to call this a lyf, and 
I have never used this tag, but sometimes I regret the inconsistency of my digital offer midst the 
plethora of better-‘curated’ accounts, such as the designer with whom I worked on Recreation, 
Emer Tumilty. She hasn’t made a lyf for herself, but her profile certainly supports her professional 
life, her branding, better than mine does. Mine seems to have a bit too much life for its own (com-
mercial) good: photographs of dogs I know, reposts of me sitting in a tree, a nice view. In this chap-
ter I seek to unfold the IRL (a common shorthand for In Real Life) version of my Instagram life in a 
particular context: the production of the performance Recreation. In so doing, I use the production 
of an artwork—something I have already, in Chapter 1, placed within the context of a complicated 
form of work—as the lens through which I might access life, drawing out life’s non-workness 
through muddling as well as pulling apart.
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Context
Recreation developed from the weeks of research and development analysed in Chapter 1 with 
continued funding from Arts Council England and other supporters. The phase of production 
which is the topic of this chapter involved three weeks of studio-based rehearsals in December 
2016 and January 2017, and then a further three weeks in May and June 2017. These latter weeks 
were punctuated by a preview, in-progress performance at Yorkshire Dance, Leeds prior to the 
final week of rehearsal, after which the performance was premiered at ARC, Stockton Arts Centre 
in Teesside. Rehearsals took place at Northumbria University and Dance City (Newcastle), Dance4 
(Nottingham), ARC, and Yorkshire Dance. The team for each week included three core performers, 
selected from the larger pool of participant-performers in the research and development process, 
plus other creative collaborators including a set and costume designer, a lighting designer, two 
artistic advisors with different emphases, producer Beckie Darlington, and sometimes visits from 
staff members from partner organisations. In addition to the core cast, in the final two days of each 
five-day working week we were joined by two guest performers, local to the venue. This mirrors the 
performance itself, whose cast shares this composition. In most rehearsal periods, it was possible 
to organise for one of these local guest performers to be a member of the host venue’s staff, a 
key element in the set-up of the production. Each of the five people performing always had differ-
ent relationships to the idea of being a professional dancer; some of the reasons for and conse-
quences of this will appear in the following writing.
For an independent artist without a permanent infrastructure to support the production of perfor-
mances, this is a relatively complex situation, in which I was highly involved with every detail of the 
project, from emails arranging times of meetings to the exact colours of the backdrop as well as, 
of course, the minutiae of the events on stage. It would not be possible to provide anything like a 
comprehensive description of all details of everything that happened, nor would it be very inter-
esting. This writing, along with the rest of this thesis, is necessarily selective, with components, 
situations, or characters chosen for examination in accordance with the purpose of the chapter. 
Here, that is to uncover some of the lifeful aspects of what went on, and to see how these might 
further the thinking around an opposition to the negative aspects of work. Of course, this work was 
certainly work, not least as described in the previous chapter. Here, I want to push life into focus, 




As I’ve described, lyf is the artificial production of a pattern, a pattern so neat and clean and 
perfect as to evade any sense of the mixed-up, murky swirl of real life. It’s not the kind of pattern 
that might be discussed by sociologists or historians, looking in the swell of existence for trends 
and through-lines to bring insight on human behaviour into discourse. It is used here as a tool as it 
invites a consideration of what it lacks, and so as a form of work can illuminate areas of life that sit 
outside labour. 
The use of this conceptual frame finds itself best used in a method of exposition which can enable 
a generous unfolding of life’s variety and disorder. To do this, in this chapter I am choosing to work 
with a hybrid, a methodological meeting-point and coming-together. My intention is not to deploy 
any of them in their entirety, nor am I merely looking at what I am doing and trying to retrospec-
tively tack my efforts to disciplines that might give them more weight. I am consciously working 
through the means and forms and agendas of a number of ways of doing research in order to 
produce the thinking necessary to develop a set of expositions in this chapter and a direction of 
thinking that proceeds throughout the thesis as a whole.
As I have written earlier, part of the approach is ethnographic. It has a distinct field—in this chap-
ter, the production period of Recreation, a dance performance for theatre spaces—and a position 
from which I, the ethnographer, am witnessing, observing, following, participating, noting and 
analysing that which I find in that field. Just as with any ethnography, this vantage point is limited 
and problematic. Just as with any ethnography, the ethnographer’s presence changes that which 
she observes. Unlike some other ethnography, my position as choreographer-ethnographer, art-
ist-scholar, could be understood as somehow simpler, in fact, than the typical ethnographer taking 
part in an activity or community in which they wouldn’t usually be included, in that because I am 
the witness and analyst of my own choreographic project the whole set-up is that I will be a large 
part of the decision-making. It’s a given. My presence as choreographer rather than scholar will 
have always been a determining factor in what happens. I have to be there to make it happen, else 
it would be a different project altogether. I can’t but acknowledge my somewhat overdetermined 
presence, so I take it, in this chapter, as a starting point from which to discuss the lifeful poten-
tials within the making of Recreation. It is in this sense I consider this project autoethnographic. 
It is me writing about my own experience in a project that was initiated by me (in Chapter 4 I will 
also discuss the work of others, albeit in a curatorial frame of my co-devising). I start with myself 
in the numerous ways that autoethnography frames—intimate, somatic, cognitive, sensorial, 
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relational—together relaying and considering what appears in the field (Ellis 2012).
In this chapter in particular, I am working with a feature of autoethnographic methodology more 
deliberately: I am working with narrative, with storytelling, despite the accounts being non-fic-
tional (unlike, for example, Carolyn Ellis’ 2003 autoethnographic novel The Ethnographic I). In 
what follows, I tell a number of short stories drawn from the time making Recreation. Following 
autoethnographic methods, I have tried to find appropriate forms for these stories, purposefully 
and I hope productively invoking something of the literary in order to be able to think through 
specific moments, working more carefully with the form as well as using language as our standard 
communicative tool (Ellis 2012). I am not a poet or novelist but a choreographer, writing, and that 
has benefits and disadvantages. Part of this choreography has been thinking about the page, and 
about my own metaphorical dancing in relation to that of others. I wanted to keep my own danc-
ing, my own storytelling, intact, whilst being able to place it in relation to other thinking to enrich 
the narrative. I have done this in the form of annotations. In the first two of the three story-like 
episodes, I take with me theoretical companions to elaborate the themes. In the final one, I have 
chosen a literary companion in the form of a novel; choosing quotations from Max Porter’s novel 
Grief is the Thing with Feathers (2015) and placing them in conversation with my own narrative is 
a literary-theoretical experiment which, I feel, makes more vivid the conversation about work and 
life through a quality of grief. This method of writing, with narratives plus discussion, allows for a 
longer elaboration of what happened, a closer reading of life, as life itself becomes the focus for 
this chapter. This takes up more space on the page and time in the reading, a temporality closer to 
life as it unfolds.
This writerly experimentation connects this practice to another discipline: everyday life studies. 
As Ben Highmore suggests, this field has and continues to be invested in a meeting of social 
sciences and literature in form as well as content (2002). Though these approaches have been 
delegitimised or criticised for ‘simply aestheticising social life’ (2002:20), because this chapter 
itself seeks to find moments in an art project, already an aesthetic domain, in which life and work, 
non-art-making and art-making (mostly), get bashed together, entangled, hollowed and refilled, I 
see a good fit, and, moreover, an opportunity to try to achieve a mode of expression that might be 
productive in a way not possible with typical academic prose. In Highmore’s broad and detailed 
introduction to The Everyday Life Reader (2002), he describes everyday life studies’ strategy of 
‘denaturalising’ everyday phenomena. Proponents of the discipline make, sometimes through 
cross-cultural estrangement, montage or borrowing the form of another discipline, an event or 
trend strange and unfamiliar, producing new insight into its being in the world. In a sense, this 
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chapter does the inverse, trying to renaturalise events and actions, to speak for them as part of a 
continuous flow of a life which has meaning within its unspecialness. Of course this is unachiev-
able, for in selecting specific moments to describe and discuss they attain or express special sta-
tus, but this is not the glamorous commercial status of an Instagram photo designed to attract fol-
lowers. This renaturalisation comes with a focus on ‘non-ideational sensation’, which I extend from 
Highmore’s examples of the ‘tactile and odorous’ to the affective and relational, for these too can 
exist outwith the frame of ideas (2002:20); this involves an attention to the minutiae of experience, 
from my own imagined conversations to the coffee-drinking of others, which take place adjacent 
to but not within the framework of concepts, belonging instead in the domain of the sensate.
Perhaps one of the most important things to be drawn from this brief address towards everyday 
life studies can be found in Highmore’s discussion of its history amongst other crisscrossing 
disciplines: the question of the general versus the particular: is it the job of the scholar to attend 
to the micro, the aberrant, the special, or the general, the pattern, the repeated? Cautious not to 
subsume instances of individual and complex theoretical contributions into this sweeping binary, 
Highmore proposes poles that represent tendencies, rather than strict boundaries. Everyday life 
studies works amongst these tendencies, with some writers favouring micro-analyses that hover 
over the particular, and others using the lived experience of everyday life to seek patterns in mac-
ro-analyses. This reminds me to return to the question of lyf versus life, reminds me for what I am 
looking. The creation of a lyf is predicated on uninterrupted patterning, the synthetic repetition of 
forms in perpetuity and contiguity. Life, or the life studied by everyday life studies, could be seen 
as the synthesis of the general and particular, which, as Highmore describes following everyday 
life thinker Henri Lefebvre, ‘could be an endless chain of everyday particularities and plural differ-
ences, linked in ways that neither obliterate them nor abandon them to isolation’ (2002: 14). It is in 
this spirit that I go forth, to describe these everyday particularities with a view to producing some 
insights into their links and their meanings, without diminishing them to aberrant singularity nor 
rendering their connections smooth, as in a lyf. I am looking for moments which seem rich with life 
in an experiential way—in that they seem especially charged with a kind of lifefulness Kathi Weeks 
implores us to find—in order that they can push themselves past or through or in front of lyf, even 
past or through or in front of work.
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Care
I’m looking at photographs taken by Kit, one of the core per-
formers, during a workshop at Dance4. As with most of the 
places the project visited in its production, the afternoon of the 
third day of each week was given over to a workshop open to 
the public. At Dance4, in Nottingham, the workshop filled up 
quickly, perhaps because I’m an associate artist there so visit 
regularly enough to be known a bit, but more likely because it 
was half-term so those studying or working in education set-
tings found themselves free.
There’s at least a double-layering of Kit’s work in this scenario. 
Kit is part of the cast and has been since the team was com-
posed. He’s not a professional dancer by any means, but is 
married to one (another member of the cast, Amanda) and so 
has been around contemporary dance for a significant portion 
of his life. He’s a musician; he and Amanda met on a collabora-
tive project. He has also worked with me as a technician on a 
previous touring production where we needed specialist sup-
port with the sound systems we had to work with on this tour 
of pubs and gig venues. Our knowing of one another is through 
work, and here his contract says he is working as a performer 
and is being remunerated as such.
Kit is a photographer. He’s not quite a professional photogra-
pher, or at least wouldn’t call himself that. Earlier in the process 
he had spoken about how everything he does as a hobby even-
tually finds its way into his livelihood. He takes photographs of 
the beautiful countryside around the Hadrian’s Wall home he 
and Amanda are renovating. He does vintage-style portraits for 
bands and burlesque acts in the northeast of England. Some 
of his photographs of the previous show I mentioned above 
are of my favourites, even though they were snapped from his 
corner at the side of the stage from which he operated the 
It seems important to include Kit’s posi-
tion in the cast, and the position of pho-
tography in Kit’s life, before going on to 
think this story through an aesthetics 
of care. In James Thompson’s essay 
on the topic he begins with a story of 
a Congolese colleague who comes for 
treatment in the UK after an incident 
which left him very injured. Thompson 
describes how he and his wife both 
found themselves describing the caring 
relationships and practices in which 
Thompson’s colleague was involved 
as beautiful, using the language of the 
aesthetic to discuss care (Thompson 
2015). Kit also began photography 
because its beauty interested him;  
now it is a serious part of his work.  
The motivation has changed.
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sound. Kit does make money from his photography work, most 
notably through the business he and Amanda own and run, a 
1920s-style photobooth with a set in the form of a crescent 
moon which people hire for weddings, parties, and events. On 
this day Kit does not have a neat backdrop for his photography. 
Though all the participants have signed a consent form, and we 
have verbally introduced Kit and the fact he will be photograph-
ing as well as co-leading the session with Amanda, Viki and me, 
and given time for anyone who isn’t comfortable being photo-
graphed to see Kit individually, and announced that a certain 
warm-up exercise referring to sexual movements will neither 
be witnessed nor photographed, the participants seldom pose 
for Kit’s lens. I, for one (though one who is sensitive about her 
image being captured), forget all about the camera, and I think 
the others mostly do too.
Not everyone. In one image, Greg looks down the lens cheekily 
from his snuggled posture with Paul and a man whose name 
I don’t remember. Let’s call him Brian. Brian appears to be the 
base of this cluster, lying on his back with left leg outstretched 
and right knee bent, foot on the floor. His left palm faces down 
and the muscles of his arm look active, forcefully pressing into 
the floor. Paul lies over the outstretched leg, his own right arm 
hooked underneath. Paul’s head and shoulder lean into Bri-
an’s bent leg. This is not a pose that looks comfortable. Greg 
is sitting, his small legs folded beneath him. His large abdo-
men leans uneasily into Brian, countering Paul’s weight from 
the other side. Brian’s right arm reaches around in a gesture 
of support—Greg doesn’t find it easy to hold his own weight 
upright—but the photograph doesn’t show that. The photograph 
as photograph shows an unusual kind of cuddle, a connecting of 
multiple people in interlinked ways, pressing skin against fabric, 
hair against skin, muscle against floor against fascia against 
mat against bone against breath. Three men hold each other. 
Three men nestle, settle, compose themselves in relation to 
As Thompson describes, the litera-
ture on care has often placed care 
ethics in opposition to justice ethics. 
These actions of ethics participate in 
the justice ethics regime; part of this 
is about privacy and data control. 
But here it is also caring, or at least 
undertaken from the point of view of 
wishing to take care of the people 
who share the space, recognising my 
power and privilege and feeling that 
I am being ‘called to care’ (Thompson 
2015: 432). 
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one another. The composition reaches an apex as Greg’s head 
rests on the peak of Brian’s knee, temple against the bottom 
of the thighbone, face angled slightly. It’s angled in this way to 
acknowledge the camera, to offer a smile. The angling looks 
awkward, uncomfortable. Where Brian’s profile shows closed 
eyes and all that can be seen of Paul’s head is his half-shaved 
haircut, topped with a puff of fair froth, Greg is alert. The photo-
graph shows a resting body and a working mind, moving out of 
absorption in the arrangement to present an image.
Slightly beyond the men kneels Amanda. She is relaxedly 
upright, hands on knees, with her typically straight posture, 
all shoulders-back-collarbones-wide: the posture of a high-
ly-trained dancer. Behind the tangled trio, her hands rest on her 
knees. Like Greg, her head is angled, but not towards the cam-
era. Her gaze rests slightly beyond the unmarked legs creeping 
into the bottom left corner of the shot. In the photograph as 
photograph she looks distracted, thinking about other things, 
wistful. The light from the window catches her profile from the 
back and renders her features dark; her expression is made 
serious by the contrast. In the photograph as reminder I know 
she’s looking at the other twelve or so participants stretching 
out beyond the first three men in their extended tangle. Amanda 
isn’t in her own world; she’s working. Amanda is sitting in this 
particular spot because she wants to support Greg. She is very 
experienced in working in participatory dance and can easily 
see where an extra pair of hands or pair of eyes or pair of legs 
or pair of words can make the difference between being able to 
join in or not for some participants. In this image, as in the lived 
moments, this sitting out is not to be out but to be very deeply 
in, to remove oneself from the fun of participating in order to be 
available for a different sort of being-there.
In these photographs sitting up means working. In a later image, 
a worker who has come to support Greg sits up. The thirteen 
Thompson describes an aesthetics of 
care as an ethics of care played out 
in the domain of artistic production. 
I would like to extend this term in a 
Rancièrian fashion, thinking about a 
care aesthetics that is a distribution of 
the sensible in the orientation of care. 
This distribution of the sensible—this 
dividing and sharing of that which can 
be sensed, is, Rancière asserts, that 
from which new politics, new commu-
nity, can be created (2004). These are, 
then, notes towards an aesthetics of 
care which can produce a politics of life.
The aesthetic of care is a lifeful aes-
thetic—not as an opposition to work 
but in this case through something 
conceived of as a workshop—working 
with while going beyond Thompson’s 
assertion that ‘the aesthetics of care 
seeks to focus upon how the sensory 
and affective are realised in human 
relations fostered in art projects’ (2015: 
436).
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other people in the frame each lie on their right side, facing 
towards the left of the image, stage right. The soles of their 
feet, bare or stockinged, point towards the camera, towards 
Kit. The similarity of their positions—each somewhat foetal, 
the high point of their outer left hip the edge of a chevron of 
legs—betrays small differences: the varied closeness of bodies, 
the use of arms to hug in or push away, the tucking in of soles 
against the top of another’s foot, one foot further backwards or 
forwards or down or up than the other. There are some bolder 
differences: Greg’s legs don’t fold this way, so his left knee 
points up, and Brian, behind him, has his legs outstretched. Still, 
the image looks very carefully composed. In the photograph as 
photograph I see the newly-hung draping backdrop, beautiful in 
the wonderful light of the Dance4 studio with windows on two 
opposite sides, the variations in the individual compositions of 
bodies feeling designed and purposeful. On closer inspection, 
I see the red train of part of the backdrop leading towards a 
discarded garment, some scraps of paper, a chair peeping into 
shot, half a yoga block. Despite the composition, the photo-
graph can’t hide the messy traces of the activity before the 
snapshot. In the photograph as reminder, I feel myself in the 
midst of the line-up, despite the fact that I joined this exercise 
after this photograph was taken; I’m not there in the image. I 
feel my sitting bones and the backs of my thighs resting against 
someone else’s quadriceps, my back against their front. I know 
I rock a little to find the sweet spot where my pelvis doesn’t 
jut into the floor, and I probably bring my left leg forward of my 
right; I like the slight twisting stretch. I’m a cuddler: I put my arm 
around the person in front, finding a place for my head. I don’t 
like to have my nose and mouth covered. I need to feel that I 
can breathe.
Breathing is what this sculpture of bodies does. Abdo-
men-to-abdomen contact means that one person’s breath 
is felt by the next and the next and the next, the swelling rib 
In the writing to the left there are layers 
of the aesthetic. On one layer there is 
the photograph, taken with care and 
observed with care. Kit’s photographs 
are beautiful, striking. My viewing of the 
photograph is given space and time on 
the page and in the reading and writing, 
the long (or longer) time Thompson 
calls for in the production of an aes-
thetics of care (2015: 437). The senses 
are conjured in the text: bodily position, 
touch, smell. They are senses in rela-
tion; part of the difficulty of this action, 
of caring, is knowing that the carer can 
sense the cared-for, her weight, her 
shape, her temperature, her moisture.
One of the characteristics of Rec-
reation, both as an artwork and as a 
process, is that things take a long time. 
This is not in the sense of the long-term 
projects Thompson privileges in his 
aesthetics of care, but, again turning to 
Rancière, I want to suggest that even 
this relative length is a kind of redistri-
bution of the sensible in the direction 
of care in the moment, creating the 
potential for an inefficient lifefulness.
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cages conduits for a pulsating, irregular rhythm. It’s not that the 
breath becomes one breath—that’s a push, even for my roman-
tic sensibilities—but the breathing becomes one breathing. It’s 
like breathing for the same purpose, breathing put to work not 
only as the mysterious lifeforce of an individual body but put to 
work as the connector of this new, multi-headed, multi-limbed 
collective body of one and many.
‘Make yourself ever more comfortable’ is the primary instruction 
for this exercise. Despite the intimacy of the frame, it seems that 
this instruction never solicits a moving-away of any individual. It 
always makes people move closer. Some things appear to come 
naturally: hooking a top leg over the leg of the person in front 
alleviates tight hips, or rolling forward makes more space to find 
alternative pressure points. Other things come with practice: 
the core performers, especially Viki, each have ways to change 
orientation, facings or body shapes. I like to roll onto my back, 
overlapping with the person behind me, who then usually moves 
a bit. It invites the person in front of me to change shape, per-
haps finding a diagonal to use my soft belly as a cushion for a 
shoulder or head. I find it comfortable, and comforting.
When I make myself ever more comfortable I am responsible 
only for myself, for making more space for my breath, for my 
breathing flesh. I am not of service; even though I am always the 
director of the situation, when I am participating I am not asking 
anything of anyone and not providing anything for anyone. But 
by making myself ever more comfortable I also make space 
for others to do the same; I accidentally take care by not being 
very bothered. For me, the closeness means this spaciousness 
of experience. I can drop the workerly efforts, the pains taken 
to keep everything going, and retreat into this shared singu-
larity, where each person seeks their own comfort in relation 
to the others. In this way my own needs, my own life, is fore-
grounded in my experience not in spite of everyone else but in 
An aesthetics of care and a feeling of 
individual comfort are not the same 
thing. The care practices that Thomp-
son’s colleague benefited from included 
detailed and painstaking physiother-
apy. In this workshop activity—and in 
the performance element to which it 
is analogous—the aesthetics of care 
complicate the relationship between 
individual comfort and group respon-
sibility on a sensorial level. Care ethics 
questions the ‘individual rational actor’ 
as primary ethical agent, looking rather 
to the connections between peo-
ple (Thompson 2015:433). Here, the 
connections between people and their 
ethics are determined by individual 
aesthetic (that is sensible, sensorial) 
choices: this is care as self-care.
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companionship with everyone else doing the same. I don’t even 
need to do the usual workshop-leader work to be with anyone; 
everyone’s working and not working for themselves in a series 
of self-satisfying closed-loops that interlink with every other 
loop. It’s self-supporting without being selfish.
In other images from this series I see more closely the devel-
opment of this spooning practice. I see Hannah echoing Paul’s 
lean body as he lies on his front and she lies half-over him, her 
breath over his right scapula and her hand over his left. Beyond 
her the other Amanda faces the other direction, so their bums 
touch, and beyond her there is a tangle of indistinguishable 
human, knees and fingers and eyebrows and toenails peeking 
from the mass. Core performer Amanda, my Amanda, rests her 
head on the back of Paul’s thigh, her relaxed hand folding near 
her chin. Paul’s arm hugs Brian, his hand tucking under Greg. 
Brian is lying on his back, face meeting sky, and touches the 
pale skin of Paul’s forearm. In yet another photograph I see my 
own contented face, the mass that is my hair forming a sea 
with two other dark-haired women’s manes. In looking at these 
images I experience a softness even as my writing brings aptly 
fleshy fingers to the cold hard plastic of a keyboard. The images 
are so squashy, fleshy, hairy, and somehow warm and smelly in 
that good human way, the warm smelliness of people near one 
another. I’m so aware of skin and fabric, the textures of beings, 
and I’m so aware of fascia and fat, the textures of beings from 
within. How could this not be life?
Of course, this exercise involves all sorts of labours. It involves 
the creative, intellectual, imaginative labour needed for the 
comprehension of the task, the putting to one side or otherwise 
processing any discomfort at the unusual demands, the emo-
tional work of surrendering to the closeness of other human 
beings, however well-prepared the group might have been by 
the other activities in the session. It requires communicative 
It is a ‘combination of values and 
practices’ which support an ethics of 
care (Thompson 2015:433). Here, in this 
workshop exercise, I can see values of 
work and of life, practices of work and 
of life, mixed together in as tangled a 
way as my hair is, as the bodies are. An 
aesthetics of care creates the potential 
for a politics of life not in negation to 
work but by a kind of overpowering of 
the senses, by stimulating enough of a 
sensing organism through the practices 
of care that the perceptual objects 
associated with work become less 
important.
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labour of a profound sort, one beyond the linguistic and into the 
sensorial, or something even more mysterious. It is, it’s safe to 
say, in the realm of physical labour: though the instruction is to 
make ourselves ever more comfortable, this is not without effort, 
the efforts to relax, to notice, to be aware, to follow physical 
impulses and so on. It’s not manual labour, neither in the sense 
of belonging mostly or exclusively to the hands, nor in the sense 
of it being very demanding in a brute way, but it is physical work, 
work of the body. Collecting all these together doesn’t drag 
the worker through history, cumulatively adding on the pains of 
work through the manual to the affective; rather, it synthesises 
all the human capacities that have been put to work through 
even relatively recent history to resist their application to the 
productive in any visible sense.
And still, the sitting worker is sitting, working. She is designated 
the worker, rather than the participant, by her sitting out. I inter-
preted her wish to sit out to be more to do with her own dis-
comfort at the description of the activity in its introduction than 
through any sense of adherence to her role as specialist sup-
porter. Nonetheless, her separation and verticality are protected 
by this role; she’s hiding from what is happening in plain view, 
using the tactic of work. Because she is sitting out she cannot, 
in fact, really help at all; she can’t have any real idea of what is 
going on, not on the level at which her companion is working, 
not somatically. She’s not doing much, sitting there, watch-
ing. She’s not doing anything that could be called work in any 
usual sense; I’d say the participants who are lying on the floor 
and cuddling are engaged in much more effort, individual and 
collective. In doing so she is neither working nor not working, 
sitting in limbo. And because she’s not working, she’s not bene-
fiting from the bodily, felt life that is produced by these strange 
efforts. Her so-called work has prevented her from participating 
in the juicy life-work of the others, of us.
This worker is the only person who 
might be normatively described as a 
‘carer’; she is the support worker for a 
disabled person and sometimes such 
workers acquire this title; we discussed 
it when she arrived. Where Thompson’s 
development of his conception of an 
aesthetics of care came from an ‘unfor-
tunate intervention of the professional 
into…personal life’ (2015:432), here it is 
this carer’s professional edges being 
challenged but ultimately not surren-
dered, putting into question her own 
call to care and the reciprocal conse-
quences of the resistance.
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Grief
It’s Tuesday 20 June 2017. I don’t remember the date because 
it’s a special one to me. There’s no birthday or anniversary. I 
didn’t write it down. Nothing particular happened on this day 
to have me remember the date. I worked out on what date this 
event happened from remembering the organisation of the 
week during which my collaborators and I premiered Recreation.
In this memory I am sitting in the cafe at ARC in Stockton-on-
Tees, the friendly multi-artform venue at which we are working 
and to which we later that week welcome an audience of mostly 
people I know from my home city Newcastle upon Tyne, forty 
miles away. I have sat in the cafe most mornings, working on my 
computer as I am now, either preparing activities for the rest of 
the day, writing emails, rewriting text elements of the perfor-
mance, or worrying. In another space, the three core performers 
warm up. I have been banished from this part of the studio-day, 
as my presence is both distracting and inefficient; I find myself 
telling stories and jokes and thinking of ever more exercises 
or practices that could support the performers in their perfor-
mance. It is better if I leave it, them, alone. By this part of the 
process, this is part of the work to which I am no longer invited. 
The performers, a bit like children in relation to schoolteachers 
outside of the classroom, don’t really know what I’m doing in 
this time and never ask. But it’s not really the performers who 
have done the uninviting; of course, it is me who is ultimately 
responsible for the project and if I wanted to be there I would 
be. It is as if the project itself has expelled me—it needs its own 
life without me, even if it’s only for an hour a day.
I remember this day because after being in the cafe, drinking 
my decaf black coffee given to me for free because I’m an 
artist working there, I am to go downstairs to the Workshop. 
The Workshop is a multipurpose space. I’ve been to an artists’ 
All the quotations in this column are 
taken from Grief is the Thing with 
Feathers (2015). The bracketed numbers 
are page numbers.
‘CROW: I believe in the therapeutic 
method’ (12).
‘Today I got back to work.
I managed half an hour and then doo-
dled’ (11).
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mixer there, and seen choirs of older people sing. It’s pretty grey, 
with a hard floor and no windows. It is not an ideal rehearsal 
space for two days before the performance. On this morn-
ing, we can’t use the theatre for rehearsal, because this is the 
morning we’ve designated as technical time, where the show’s 
lighting designer and the in-house team can do their work 
uninterrupted. Or, from another view, the cast has moved their 
operations downstairs so that they can work uninterrupted. I 
remember conversations about this division of space and activ-
ities with producer Beckie, remember asking her to ask ARC 
if there was another room, and she asking when should that 
happen? Tuesday morning. Wednesday we’ll have the workshop 
and Monday we need to set everything up. We need everything 
ready for Thursday and Friday. So: Tuesday morning.
That’s how I know it’s Tuesday 20 June 2017. The date of the 
premiere was 22 June. This is indelible in my mind. The inti-
macy of this knowledge feels harsh, branded; I don’t want 
the calendar to be imprinted in me in this way. In most of my 
working life I am floating in time, plugging along with longer 
or shorter tasks completed day-to-day, but not with any rou-
tine. I don’t remember what happened last Tuesday. I know I 
worked, worked at home, worked alone, but I can’t remember 
what happened when, what I read or wrote exactly, to whom I 
spoke on the phone, or what I drank or ate in between or during 
working. If I saw anyone I don’t remember what our encoun-
ter contained. Rehearsal weeks are different. Because of the 
nature of my practice I am seldom in one venue for more than 
a week at a time. These dates are planned months in advance 
and are discussed at length; they are reiterated between the 
team, the team and the organisational partners, and each of us 
with friends and family as we tell those about us where we’re 
going, please could you water the plants, sure, you can have 
my flat, I won’t be there, I’ll be in Nottingham making the show 
and then going straight to Leeds. The dates for these activities, 
‘We are agreed the book will reflect the 
subject. It will hop about a bit. Paren-
thesis hope my book might appeal to 
everyone sick of Ted & Sylvia archaeol-
ogy. It’s not about them, we agree. We 
neglect to discuss what it should be 
about’ (27).
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these special weeks or days that scaffold what looks like the 
real work of a choreographer, are scorched into my memory. It’s 
as if each time these dates are mentioned a line is drawn onto 
paper with a scratchy nib, one over the other, so that eventually 
there is not so much a dark line of ink but an incision, a perma-
nent alteration in the feeling of time. It disturbs my sense of 
the distribution of my activities, their relative importance and 
visibility not only to others but to myself. It’s as if all this sitting 
on my sofa in a dressing gown reading and writing and sending 
emails and adjusting budgets and sending invoices isn’t the 
work, the work is only the work when it is contained by dates 
in multiple personal diaries and venue calendars, shared and 
repeated. To know these dates, to be able to figure out when 
things happened according to work schedules, reminds me that 
as much as I think I work ‘independently’ and organise ‘my’ ‘own’ 
time, that I have the luxury of a freelance life (of sorts, during 
this research process), I am organised by my work. This ‘I’, these 
intimate parts of me that manifest as memories or feelings or 
emotions, of elusive senses of what is important, my parts in 
relationships, my process of nutrition and digestion, even (the 
coffee given to me at ARC is not what I would usually consume 
at this time of day), are sliced into shapes according the parts of 
my labouring endeavours that look more like work. Sometimes 
the life outside work seems pushed aside by work, but on closer 
inspection work cuts through life in varied difficult and joyous 
ways.
This is the case only because of the specificities of my situa-
tion. Not all independent choreographers, even, balance their 
portfolios in this way. Some have an office, for example, a place 
for working that makes every day feel like real work in a real 
workplace, somewhere to go in the morning and leave in the 
evening, where one must wear appropriate clothing for meet-
ing others. Others are much more prolific than I am, going from 
project to project, residency to gig to residency to gig, with the 
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patches in between being either work or holiday or some kind 
of mixture but still being the minor aspect midst the production 
or presentation, the real work. Others still maybe do other kinds 
of dance-related or non-dance related work between creation 
periods, or their making of art knits into other kinds of activity 
on certain days of the week, for instance. I am not so situated. 
As a result, my experience is that the weeks of ‘working on 
the performance’—that is, those weeks where it looks like I’m 
working on the performance—are quite as special and separate 
as they might be for the guest performers who take part in the 
project for a few sessions at a time. The rest of my work feels 
like my life, the routine collection of ordinary things that include 
working from home as well as exercising, friendship, moving 
house, washing and so on. The rehearsal and creation weeks, in 
comparison, are memorable, specific, set aside for a sort of work 
which doesn’t happen always and requires very precise condi-
tions for its manifestation. It feels like I’m playing a role. There’s 
an effort in remembering those lines, that staging, these move-
ments, all required to manifest the situation of doing the real 
stuff of ‘being a choreographer’ for a period of a week at a time. 
‘Being a choreographer’ also implies certain things about the 
structure of my life for those periods: it means I live in someone 
else’s house, rented to me so I can live the life of a choreogra-
pher in this city or that town; it means preparing a set of clothes 
to wear only for that week and probably doing no laundry; it 
means eating more often in restaurants than at ‘home’ for the 
period, because it’s less likely that there’s somewhere to cook or 
even to sit and eat; it means socialising only with people related 
the project. Life is still life—I still shower and meditate and 
eat and date and all the other things—but the contents seem 
cornered, specific, cut up. It’s a bit like being on holiday, but a 
holiday which involves working all day, a holiday from life.
---
‘There was very little division between 
my imaginary and real worlds, and 
people talked of sensible workloads and 
recovery periods and healthy obses-
sions’ (38).
‘Where are the fire engines? Where is 
the noise and clamour of an event like 
this? Where are the strangers going out 
of their way to help, screaming, flinging 
bits of emergency glow-in-the-dark 
equipment at us to try and settle us and 
save us?’ (13).
‘There should be men in helmets speak-
ing a new and dramatic language of 
crisis. There should be horrible levels of 
noise, completely foreign and inappro-
priate for our cosy London flat.
There were no crowds and no uni-
formed strangers and there was no new 
language of crisis. We stayed in our PJs 
and people visited and gave us stuff.
Holiday and school became the same’ 
(14).
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Sitting in the cafe at ARC presses me into even more of an 
in-between state. I am only in this place in this town because 
of work, and I would never be there otherwise. I am sort of 
working, I suppose, sitting at my computer, but though I’d like 
to think I was being productive I recall clearly my fractured 
attention, my desire to get involved in what I was witnessing. I’m 
not, here, in the studio or theatre, and that seemed to give me 
license to inhabit the patterns of the territory in which I found 
myself. I look around at the others in the space: the staff getting 
organised for the rest of the day, construction workers coming 
in and out of a private door behind which the kitchen is being 
renovated, other artists and companies having meetings over 
MacBooks and coffees, and the people of Stockton, chatting 
and drinking teas and eating scones. I don’t feel like working 
here, neither in the sense that I don’t feel like I am working, nor 
in my wishes; my volition was not to work. If I’d really wanted to 
do some concentrated work I would have found myself a spot 
elsewhere in the large venue, a bar area empty in the morning 
maybe, or the never-used green room. It seems I want to be 
in this place of non-work within this place of work; my actions 
and wishes resonate with the structures of the building. I don’t 
feel I am working because I am too connected to the lifeful, 
front of house of the venue. There are the people here, like me, 
who might have snuck out of the behind-the-scenes of an arts 
venue, into this other, non-working space. Mostly, though, and 
particularly because this is a place also visited for its cinema 
and café, there are those local people who are definitely not 
working, or definitely appear to me to be not working.
I find myself focused on a woman of about seventy or seven-
ty-five years old. She is maybe three tables away from where 
I sit, facing towards me. She keeps looking through the huge 
glass windows that form the venue’s arched wall, peeping down 
the pedestrianised road that leads to the town’s high street. 
She asks a member of cafe staff what time is it? Just gone ten 
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o’clock. Oh, she must be on her way. Must have got stuck in 
River Island or something. The slightly anxious waiting contin-
ues. The woman is excited, or nervous, or both.
A few minutes later another woman of maybe forty years old 
comes into the cafe with shopping bags. It turns out she got 
stuck in Debenhams, not in River Island. She seems disgruntled, 
and greets the older woman briefly, unsmilingly, not meeting her 
with the same loving, excited energy. I decide they are mother 
and daughter. Daughter orders at the bar, dealing with the 
encounter on a practical basis, what needs to be ordered have 
you finished your tea do you want a scone? Mother sits slightly 
awkwardly, waiting, smiling. Once Daughter is seated I watch 
the conversation, notice how Mother is chatting always, how 
Daughter looks away and at her phone, talks less. I feel very sad. 
My own mother did not live to seventy; I did not get to meet her 
for scones in theatre cafes for very long. I remember this feeling 
that my mother was a slight irritation, a bit of a burden, some-
one I had to meet rather than wished to meet, and imagined my 
own mother waiting for me if I were to be late, feeling excited to 
see her firstborn child and only daughter who then wanders in 
tardily and can’t be bothered. I sit in the cafe and feel huge sor-
row that I was not kinder, not more thoughtful, not more present 
to the fact that this person loved me and I loved her and she 
would probably die before me and I should be better to her. 
I should meet her fully. I wanted to shout across the cafe be nice 
to her! She was waiting for you and you were late, you ungrate-
ful woman! She loves you! Talk to her! Look her in the eye! Enjoy 
her! I find myself overwhelmed with grief, teary, heavy, foggy. 
Work is impossible.
Work is also a refuge from this part of life that is certainly 
not work. Grief is not work. It cannot be work. Mourning can 
be work—there’s even a word for a professional mourner, a 
‘There was a crack and a whoosh and 
I was smacked back, winded, onto the 
doorstep’ (6).
‘...lint, flack, gack-pack-nack, the whole 
place was heavy mourning, every sur-
face dead Mum, every crayon, tractor, 
coat, welly, covered in a film of grief. 
Down the dead Mum stairs, plinkety 
plink curled claws whisper, down to 
Daddy’s recently Mum-and-Dad’s 
bedroom’ (9).
‘Look at that, look, did I or did I not, oi, 
look, stab it. Good book, funny bodies, 
open door, slam door, spit this, lick that, 
lift, oi, look, stop it’ (11).
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moirologist—but grieving, the emotional processing after a loss, 
is not work, despite the enormous expenditures of energy, phys-
ical and psychical. It is clearly not productive: it can’t produce 
any economic value for the grieving. Neither is it really repro-
ductive; it doesn’t help but rather hinders the continuation of 
human life. Grief is a form of love between the present and the 
absent that has no socially or personally reproductive aspect: 
it is not love that produces bonds with the beloved and missed 
on which anything else depends. Grief just is. As artists and 
thinkers and writers of all sorts have unfolded at length, grief 
cannot be chosen: it’s not possible to contain it, to direct it, to 
make space and time for it in a controllable way. Even tactics 
like bereavement counselling go only so far, perhaps preventing 
negative spill elsewhere to a degree but certainly not ever man-
aging to hold all of a person’s grief in an hour’s session once 
a week. Where the spaces, places, and organisations of work 
mould life—the perceptions, actions, decisions of a person—in 
something of a modular way (this goes there, in that place I do 
this, in this chunk of time that happens), grief overrides these 
temporal and spatial configurations with fluidity. This fluidity 
is not just that of waves, sweeping over a life and stopping it 
breathing for a moment or swallowing it up and then subsiding, 
the most common metaphor for moments of grief. The fluids 
can be of different sorts: the drip-drip-dripping of a broken 
gutter staining a wall; the crawly seeping of a leaky bucket; the 
dropping torrent of a waterfall; or even the sticky weeping of a 
something more viscous, like snot from a nose.
On Tuesday 20 June 2017 the grief is like a plunge pool: cold, 
shocking. The whole body at once. Palpitations. Prickly skin. 
Numbness. In this feeling-state I pack up my things and go 
downstairs to the Workshop. The three core performers are 
working there, warming up, and let me know that they’re not 
finished with the planned tasks for various practical reasons. 
They are answerable to me and the relationship calls for this 
‘For a souvenir, for a warning, for a lick 
of night in the morning.
 For a little break in the 
mourning. I will give you something to 
think about, I whispered. He woke up 
and didn’t see me against the black-
ness of his trauma (10)’.
‘Oil, when you look closer mud, when 
you look closer sand, when you sip it, 
silt becoming silk’ (50).
‘Grief felt fourth-dimensional, abstract, 
faintly familiar. I was cold’ (4).
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reporting, which I cannot receive. I nod and sit down and reopen 
my computer. As they finish up their work, I hover in my state, 
and, when they begin to set up for the next part of the rehearsal 
I relay my story about Mother and Daughter. I am very, very sad 
but trying, I remember, to be analytical and composed. I’m not 
sure why. The tears come and, with them, Amanda and Viki, hug-
ging me. I apologise, I think. It seems aberrant to allow this part 
of life—my life, but also the life of the world, the life of other peo-
ple not working but just doing life, adjacent to us as we work—
into the room. And yes, at this point I am working: I am in the 
workroom, the Workshop, no less, with my workmates. My grief 
before them and their caring response to me tangles work and 
life together in a complicated way. My emotional energies would 
not have been released here if I had not felt that life could seep 
into the workspace in this manner; I have experienced stronger 
moments of grief during collaborative workdays and have felt 
it without expressing it visibly or audibly. This working environ-
ment seemed to permit this leaking.
---
This leaking is not dissimilar to that for which I was sent out of 
warm-ups. I seem unable, at certain moments, to prevent myself 
from telling stories, following trains of thought associatively or 
argumentatively or analytically, gossiping, or asking questions. 
Once these lifeful topics, or, really, this lifeful mood enters the 
space, it is enormously difficult to cut through it and revive a 
working tone. This is no more the case, I would suggest, with 
visible grief than it is with a complaint about a bad meal the 
previous night. It’s as if the life-tone really is bigger than the 
work-tone, but it’s also more tender, more vulnerable, making it 
socially and perhaps psychologically difficult to put a stop to it 
once it has begun. It’s also more seductive, exciting; it’s rich and 
fun versus the domain of work. And this is work that I like, work 
that I choose, work that I want to do! But as soon as this place 
‘But I care, deeply. I find humans dull 
except in grief...Motherless children 
are pure crow. For a sentimental bird 
it is ripe, rich and delicious to raid 
such a nest’ (16).
‘My friend said, You have to stop think-
ing this way, involving her. There’s grief 
and there’s impractical obsession’ (51).
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is the place of work and this time is the time of work and these 
people are the people of work they stand aside from being part 
of life in the same way, and life mustn’t touch them too much. To 
maintain the possibility of working—which is what we are here 
to do, my collaborators and I—life can’t come in.
Nevertheless, working together has produced some life 
between us. The four of us, by this stage in the process, are 
close. Amanda and Kit are wife and husband, so that is perhaps 
to be expected. Apart from Kit and Viki, prior to Recreation we 
had all known one another in various ways. Amanda had been 
a dance teacher when Viki and I were growing up dancing in 
Newcastle, and the two of them especially spent many hours 
in the studio together. When I was starting in choreography 
Amanda was a more senior artist, and we often petitioned for 
support from local organisations together. Amanda, then, was 
the Arts Council England Relationship Manager for dance in the 
region, so she knew my work from a funder’s perspective. She 
suggested in a meeting once that Kit, whom I’d met because 
Amanda and Kit lived near me and let me use their scanner 
when I needed it for a project, might be a good person to take 
on tour with another show that needed technical sound support. 
I had met Viki when she was a youth dancer and I was work-
ing in a Newcastle arts organisation, and, later, when I was a 
producer in London, she turned up for an internship interview 
with one of my colleagues, and subsequently became part of 
the team for a period. Kit and Amanda themselves met through 
their professional lives, taking part in a project which involved 
musicians and dancers working together. Our broader lives, our 
histories together and apart, already ooze into the project with 
shared experiences and memories.
Though we knew one another before the project began, it was 
the work itself that created the possibility for this leaking of life 
into work, creating tiny holes in the fabric of our relationships  
‘Oh, I said, we move. WE FUCKING 
HURTLE THROUGH SPACE LIKE 
THREE MAGNIFICENT BRAKE-FAILED 
BANGERS, thank you Geoffrey, and 
send my love to Jean.
Moving on, as a concept, is for stupid 
people, because any sensible person 
knows grief is a long-term project. I 
refuse to rush. The pain that is thrust 
upon us let no man slow or speed or 
fix’ (99).
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that allowed for our separate lives, or something of a temporary 
shared life to seep through. There is a high probability of this in 
many artistic projects, as the strains and joys over many inten-
sive weeks in the studio facilitate a real intimacy; many of the 
activities undertaken in a rehearsal studio look like or perhaps 
are even the same things that happen in corporate teambuilding 
scenarios. In addition, we were travelling to different rehearsal 
venues around the country, living together outside of the studio 
in some cases. I do think, though, that there were particularities 
to this project, to the content of the action in the studio, which 
advanced this sense of admission or permission. Nothing in 
this project was confessional: this is not the kind of dance-the-
atre project that trades on the personal lives, the stories, the 
traumas or delights of its performers. But the performers were 
asked to consider, for example, the types of activities they 
undertake in their non-work life, to examine meditatively those 
domains, and to feed back something of their experience. We 
did improvised dances that pushed into the fat tissues of the 
body, or that invoked private sexual activity, or that involved the 
touch of another driving sensation. We sang together, a lot. It is 
on the basis of this content that our personal lives emerged to 
one another: in a one-on-one rehearsal for Amanda’s solo sec-
tion, she went past her usual cheerful professionalism to admit 
that she had been struggling with her mental health, and, in the 
daily drives to ARC during a rehearsal period, Viki and I dis-
cussed our romantic woes. This wasn’t designed in advance but 
sort of arrived at, slowly. Like our work, which, though sharing 
characteristics of the cognitive, affective, contemporary labour-
ing of our time, goes beyond these aspects of each person to 
include and even intertwine with the physical, all those tactile 
and sensate and frankly smelly, clumsy, sweaty, bodily bits of us. 
Our life together, based on our work together, is vivid and whole, 
leaking both ways.
This culture of life-ing together is thrown into relief each time 
‘The friends and family who had been 
hanging around being kind had gone 
home to their own lives. When the 
children went to bed the flat had no 
meaning, nothing moved (4)’.
‘The doorbell rang and I braced myself 
for more kindness. Another lasagne, 
some books, a cuddle, some little pot-
ted ready-meals for the boys. Of course, 
I was becoming expert in the behaviour 
of orbiting grievers. Being at the epicen-
tre grants a curiously anthropological 
awareness of everybody else; the 
overwhelmeds, the affectedly lacka-
daisacals, the nothing so fars, the over-
stayers, the new best friends of hers, of 
mine, of the boys. The people I still have 
no fucking idea who they were. I felt like 
the Earth in that extraordinary picture 
of the planet surrounded by a thick belt 
of space junk. I felt it would be years 
before the knotted-string dream of 
other people’s performances of woe for 
my dead wife would thin enough for me 
to see any black space again, and of 
course—needless to say—thoughts of 
this kind made me feel guilty...’(4).
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someone comes to join us, which is often. This is most evident 
when we are co-leading our weekly public workshop-cum-open 
rehearsal, and, most of all, when we are with the two guest per-
formers at the end of each week. Here, we are working. We are 
the working team, and the others there have some other sort of 
status. Amanda doesn’t call Kit ‘honey’. I do not discuss my grief, 
however present it might be. We plug the leaks of life into work 
as work slices into life again, determining the edges of proper 
behaviour, sealing ourselves as best we can.
Sabbath
CJ is a poet. Google him, as I did, and you will find that he has 
published a book of Christian poetry.
CJ’s a Christian. He does not tell me this directly but because 
I have Googled him I know. I want to talk to him about it, to 
raise it explicitly. Mostly this is because I also practise within 
an organised faith system and somehow I want to think that he 
would like that, even though I have no evidence for it, and do  
not know him. I want to tell him that I meditate most days, that  
it is a special place I have found that is productive in many ways 
but is not work. I want to tell him how surprised I am to find that 
I, a secular atheist of Dawkinsesque vigour, turn up at least once 
a week at a Buddhist centre almost wherever I am in order to 
hear the Dharma and spend time with other Buddhists. I want  
to tell him how I think that all spiritual traditions share some 
common practices, like silence, confession, aesthetic ritual, 
generosity, and how I think that maybe these are things that we 
just need as human beings to be anything but entirely miser-
able and self-involved. I don’t say anything. Not everybody’s 
as impressed with me as I am with myself, I hear myself say to 
myself.
‘I explained that Crow would violate, 
illustrate and pollute Ted’s work. It 
would be a deeper, truly wild analy-
sis, a critical reckoning and an act of 
vengeance. It would be a scrapbook, a 
collage, a graphic novel, a dissolving of 
the boundaries between forms because 
Crow is a trickster, he is ancient and 
post-modern, illustrator, editor, vandal...’ 
(107).
There are rituals to end and begin 
sacred moments, sacred timespaces 
in which other things can happen. This 
needn’t be the sacrality of religion—this 
timespace could be secular—but there 
are always certain things to be done, 
said, heard, smelt, moved, touched, and 
even tasted which mark the begin-
nings and endings of things which we 
might find important; political theorist 
Bonnie Honig describes this as ‘a dense 
cultural sensorial synagogue that acts 
to wrest humanity or sacredness from 
the creaturely world of the everday’ 
(2015:469)... 
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CJ is one of the two guest performers for the preview, in-prog-
ress version of Recreation, presented at Yorkshire Dance, Leeds. 
I have sent him a pack of information about the show, which 
included a description of each of the sections of the work as I 
understood it at the time, a few weeks before the final patch of 
rehearsals. Much of this was speculative, of course, for I didn’t 
and couldn’t know how the drafts and sketches would proceed 
to form a performance. Some of it mentions meditation, for what 
I did know about the performance is that it would have some-
thing of this quality, or I wanted it to. It did at this stage, and 
does in the completed version, include a long text to which the 
audience listen at the opening of the show, which could be seen 
as some kind of meditative visualisation. In an email, CJ writes:
‘Just to confirm-the meditation bit has no religious element 
right?’ [sic]
And I respond:
‘None of the performance is religious, no. I’ve attached a draft 
version for you to check (it will likely change at least a bit).’
At the end of the public workshop in which CJ participated, I 
asked each participant to write down a word they associated 
with the term ‘recreation’ in order to begin a discussion. CJ 
wrote down ‘sabbath’. He is enthusiastic about this connec-
tion, and so am I. My father and his family are mostly secular 
Jews living in Israel, where I was born. In Israel, the sabbath is 
observed nationally, though this is changing and is dependent 
on the place in the country. Still, in most places, there is little or 
no public transport, many shops and amenities are closed, and 
things feel very quiet. On Friday afternoon, before the sabbath 
arrives, there is already a special feeling as people are mostly 
off work and either spending time with friends and family or, 
depending on their religiosity, preparing for the sabbath to 
...I don’t know what is done around 
Christian special days; I’m not and have 
never been a Christian. I know that in 
Judaism even many secular Jews will 
host some kind of special meal at the 
arrival of the Sabbath, maybe eating 
or saying or drinking special things. 
There is a parallel to the start and end 
of retreats in the Buddhist tradition in 
which I practice, where a dedication 
ceremony starts the period and a ritual, 
often involving a fire and ending in 
a chant, will close the events. These 
things are not exclusive to religious 
people. I wonder if a secular version 
might be a beer at the airport before 
going on holiday.
Giorgio Agamben’s writing on the 
sabbath is that which returns in bibli-
ographies related to the term, and his 
writing begins with a Jewish take on 
the concept. For Agamben, the sabbath, 
the Jewish Shabbat or Shabbas, is not 
simply an extra bit of time added to the 
workweek, but a special time which 
exists in both continuity and heteroge-
neity with the six days that precede it 
in each cycle (2011:109). The sabbath 
sits in a ‘relationship of proximity 
and almost reciprocal immanence’ 
with work and inoperativity (110). The 
sabbath and inoperativity, that state 
which is the other side of the coin to 
potentiality (Prozorov 2014), are neither 
consequences nor preconditions for 
one another (Agamben 2011). Instead, 
inoperativity ‘coincides with festive-
ness itself in the sense that it consists 
precisely in neutralizing and rendering 
inoperative human gestures, actions, 
and works, which in turn can become 
festive only in this way’ (Agamben 
2011:109). In this sense, inoperativity is 
connected to the kind of life that I am 
searching for in this chapter, in these 
accounts, a state that includes the 
potential for human endeavour without 
the necessity for its exercising, not a 
suspension of labour precisely, but a 
‘temporary suspension of productive 
activity’, regardless of the realm of that 
productivity (economic, domestic, etc.) 
(Honig 2015:478). 
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come in. As the sun sets, the new day is here, and families and 
friends, religious or not, gather to eat together. Over the coming 
24 hours, Israelis relax, see people, eat together, walk, perhaps 
take a trip into nature. Unlike a British weekend, these days 
are much less likely to include shopping, drinking, children’s 
activities, cleaning the car or DIY. Though fewer and fewer Jews 
observe—everyone I know still cooks and turns the light on—
there is still a feeling of sabbath.
The activities are nothing special, when I come to think of it. 
There’s nothing particular about eating with my family, or taking 
a nap, or visiting a friend. Doing it on the sabbath, though, gives 
each a certain colour, a warm energy, an intensity. It’s just doing 
life, but even more so. It’s life with space, without the rub of 
work right by it. There’s no guilt in not working; it’s the sabbath. 
Just one day a week to do these things which are only life, and 
not work. The earth’s turnings offer a clear beginning and end: 
as the sun comes down on Friday it begins its restful rotation, 
and when it disappears once more on Saturday evening the 
world is returned to its usual, workful state.
CJ’s conjuring of the sabbath tells me much about his perspec-
tive on the workshop, and perhaps indeed on the project as a 
whole. The workshop was attended by a range of people: the 
daughter of a Leeds-based socially-engaged artist, who also 
turned out to be a friend of one of my cousins, a couple of regu-
lar participants who had taken part in Juncture (see Chapter 4), 
a handful of local dance students, a dance artist, and five or six 
members of an older people’s arts group in the city.  
I knew very few of them before they walked through the door.  
In the workshop, we did a number of activities. After introducing 
the project and dealing with administration of University con-
sent forms, we started with a physical warm-up, using a score 
adapted from a workshop exercise by American performance 
artist Keith Hennessy, part of which involves spontaneously 
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workweek, but a special time which 
exists in both continuity and heteroge-
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sits in a ‘relationship of proximity 
and almost reciprocal immanence’ 
with work and inoperativity (110). The 
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which is the other side of the coin to 
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one another (Agamben 2011). Instead, 
inoperativity ‘coincides with festive-
ness itself in the sense that it consists 
precisely in neutralizing and rendering 
inoperative human gestures, actions, 
and works, which in turn can become 
festive only in this way’ (Agamben 
2011:109). In this sense, inoperativity is 
connected to the kind of life that I am 
searching for in this chapter, in these 
accounts, a state that includes the 
potential for human endeavour without 
the necessity for its exercising, not a 
suspension of labour precisely, but a 
‘temporary suspension of productive 
activity’, regardless of the realm of that 
productivity (economic, domestic, etc.) 
(Honig 2015:478). 
84
improvising a ‘folk dance’ with or without partners. The core 
performers led a vocal warm-up and taught the group some of 
the vocal work included in the show, which leads to the compo-
sition of what we call a ‘spell’, including some arm movements. 
We had the group create sculptures of themselves in relation to 
parts of the set, which was installed ready for the performance, 
and then make compositions in groups to show others. We did 
some spooning, an elaborate group cuddle. We chatted, and 
we laughed. It was very relaxed (apart from for me, when the PA 
wouldn’t play music from any of my devices). Though I’m fairly 
sure that these were relatively new actions for most, none of 
these activities, it appeared, seemed particularly unusual to 
anyone; nobody expressed concern or discontent. There was 
a sense of pottering along, doing a bit of this and then a bit 
of that. It was special kind of hanging out, made special not 
necessarily by its contents but rather its container—a choreog-
raphy, a dance studio, a group, a workshop. Like the sabbath, its 
quality came not from being necessarily in contrast to some-
thing outside of it—it was squeezed in, pressed—but rather the 
outside being absent raised it up to something simultaneously 
more energised and more slackened. Just like the sabbath, the 
workshop was a manifestation of an elevated everyday, usual 
and unusual at the same time.
---
CJ is tall and thin, long-limbed. His skin is dark and his hair short 
atop a round, smiling face. He has big eyes and a glowing smile, 
displayed only occasionally. He’s handsome. I can’t tell how old 
he might be: to my estimation it could be anything between 25 
and 35 years old.
I watch CJ rehearse a section of the performance we call ‘The 
Mermaids’. In this part of the work, the performers sit in a line 
across the stage, starting at stage left and reaching almost to 
It strikes me that the workshop is a 
way of practising the Sabbath, in the 
way that Honig suggests (2015). She 
proposes that there exists a sab-
bath-power which emerges from festive 
inoperativity, through which new forms 
of relation are possible. The sab-
bath-power is enacted through practice, 
a practice of the senses. In the work-
shop we use at least four of the five 
usual senses (taste is usually excluded), 
but also others: we use proprioception 
and balance, we feel one another’s body 
heat, and more mysterious things, like 
sensing another’s feeling of comfort or 
discomfort in coming into contact with 
them. Honig’s sabbath-power seems 
strong; a force. Thinking it in practice 
allows it to become much more subtle, 
it permeating, rather than charging, 
through a space and time.
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the other side of the square we tape onto the floor for each per-
formance for both spacing and design reasons. Each performer 
assumes a mermaid-like pose. The main points of contact with 
the floor are outer hip and palm, as their legs gently stretch 
away from their torso with a bend in the knee. Earlier in the 
process the posture was held upright, rigid, with the upper chest 
and chin lifted, legs glued together from hip to toe. I wanted the 
section to appear composed; to my mind something of the taut 
musculature surrounding a skeleton that appeared to assume 
a relaxed position possessed something of the faux-chill of 
twentieth century pin-ups. Later, this showbusiness reference 
seemed unimportant, so now the formation of the five perform-
ers, plus the transition from a previous section which involves 
more static composition, holds together a softer way of being: 
the chests cave slightly, the performers search for the fattiest, 
fleshiest bit of themselves on which to rest, the corners of the 
shoulders twist towards the supporting arm, the feet cross or 
separate.
CJ finds this pose easily, his length folding without resistance. 
He looks comfortable. From this position he begins the score, 
which lasts about twenty minutes:
1. Settle into your posture. Nestle. You may change positions 
throughout the section by rotating over the back of your 
pelvis to face the opposite direction, so the other hip and 
hand take your weight. You can pause with both hands on 
the floor behind you and knees bent if you like. Please don’t 
shuffle.
2. Keeping your eyes soft and moving naturally, start to sing 
voicelessly the song that you chose.
3. When you have done that for a while, you can alternate 
between this mouthing and singing the song with your free 
Just as ‘[p]resents, gifts and toys are 
objects with use and exchange value 
that are rendered inoperative, wrested 
from their economy’ (Agamben 2011:111), 
so are these postures recuperated from 
a state of high charge. Their economy 
should be one of dance, their value 
coming from stage dance’s traditional 
values of poise, strength, skill, and 
virtuosity, but the dancerly frame drops 
out of operativity in this sense in favour 
of the sensorial. In the practice of sab-
bath-power choreography changes on 
a level of quality rather than shape. Just 
as the sabbath can contain the same 
tasks as the workweek, so can the cho-
reography retain its normative values, 
but the alteration is visible as a result 




4. When you have done that for a while, you can move 
between mouthing, moving your arm and singing the song 
with your spine. Remember forward-backward-left-right- 
up-down-twist.
Singing the song with different parts of the body is what we 
call ‘cantabile dancing’, cantabile meaning ‘in a singing style’. 
The core cast and I have been working on this practice for six 
months, on and off, learning to be increasingly accurate with 
rhythm and tone as well as inventive with the physical possi-
bilities offered by arms and spines. It is trickier than it seems; it 
requires an absolute dedication to the vocal line to avoid simple 
grooving around. It requires a deep listening and concentration 
without mentally or physically retreating. When I watch him do 
The Mermaids score for the first time, CJ has tried this cantabile 
dancing for half an hour at most. His eyes dart around, checking 
the others. It’s as if I can see his thought-bubble popping up, 
hovering over him, asking ‘am I doing this right?’. The truth is, 
nobody is doing it quite right. I’m not sure I know what right is 
until I see it, and the rightness is predicated on the whole, on 
everyone doing it more or less right, or right in different ways, 
until the whole is right. CJ doesn’t stick out as doing it wrong so 
much as it is clear that something CJ is doing is knocking the 
whole thing out of shape.
But I am too full, too busy, too thinking about comps and 
backdrop-steaming and thank you cards and schedules and 
documentation and when will we eat tomorrow for god’s sake 
to do anything about it. I am cornered by the projectness of 
the project and can feel all these things rubbing up against me, 
stimulating my skin and preventing me from doing the work of 
direction, from doing the work of supporting these people who 
are offering their efforts to a thing that is called mine. Work and 
A sabbatical texture is one of being 
in the present, mindful of what is 
happening and what is being done. The 
sabbath’s actions are not in preparation 
for any future or the fallout of any past, 
but are undertaken within the sabbath 
itself. Work, particularly project work, 
conducts itself always towards a future: 
a project is a projection (Bayly 2013; 
Wikström 2016). 
The projectness I experience is the 
busyness Agamben suggests is the 
human race’s answer to our very sab-
batical nature: ‘[h]uman life is idle and 
aimless, but it is precisely this lack of 
action and aim which makes possible 
the incomparable busyness of the 
human race. Man has devoted himself 
to production and labour because he is 
in essence deprived of work, because 
he is above all a sabbatical animal’ 
(2007:138). 
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life don’t collide, but work and work do. Viki steps in. Viki’s way 
of stepping in is to find an off-moment, a break, a gap in the 
schedule where I have to talk to the lighting designer or find out 
where our tape has gone, to sidle into the topic.
‘Yeah, so when I do that section I think about really singing. It 
helped me to keep singing the song over and over. What’s your 
song?’
CJ shyly shares his song with Viki. It’s a song about prayer, 
sung by a woman country singer. It turns out to be a favourite 
of Amanda’s, and we have used it before. It’s a difficult song for 
this task because the tone is smooth and quiet, but the rhythm 
is oddly broken-up and staccato.
Viki plays the song through the PA system and starts to work 
with CJ. Kit joins in, and Amanda sings. Lauren, the other guest 
performer, watches with a smile. The studio feels lighter, the 
sound filling the large square space. The song is beautiful, and 
I think we are all enjoying it. There are many things happening 
all at once: snacking and laughing and singing and dancing and 
sitting and standing and reading texts and chatting. The only 
reason this is happening is because it is work and a break from 
work at the same time. It feels lifeful, vivid, and I realise now that 
that is what life is, somehow, or at least is in this story. It is the 
very simultaneous existence of many things, not because there 
is some sort of efficiency measure delivered by multitasking, 
but because there is no task whatsoever. When there is no task 
we human beings still do stuff, that’s what this moment in the 
studio seems to whisper or state or shout. We do still do stuff.
We do still work. Viki initiated the exercise not because she, 
strictly speaking, needed to. She did so because she cares 
about the work she’s doing, not because it is work and she’s 
being paid for it or gaining some other kind of personal 
This is the true feeling of sabbath. 
This when actions that could be done 
anytime are done with a relationship 
to the productive potentials of work 
without realising those potentials. The 
activity of work—and even its site—has 
not changed, or not changed much, but 
this reframing of the space and time as 
one of a break—a sabbath or sabbat-
ical—allows for ‘the liberation of the 
body from its utilitarian movements, the 
exhibition of gestures in their pure inop-
erativity’ (Lucian in Agamben 2011:111). 
This makes it possible, paradoxically, 
for something that could be called an 
important part of the rehearsal process 
to occur as part of a break. I think it 
is Recreation itself, its interests and 
agendas and methods, that allow this 
suspension to occur.
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advantage, but just because she does. CJ could have also taken 
a break, and Kit, and Amanda, and Lauren: they could have gone 
out and smoked a cigarette or whatever people do to get out of 
a room now that hardly anyone smokes. They continued to work 
in a way that didn’t feel like work but was one of many kinds 
of things that can happen. This wasn’t so much life and work-
ing rubbing together but many sorts of human capacity being 
activated and even enjoyed all at once, not rubbing together but 
rubbing along together. There is a comfortable jostle, touching 
and pressing and pushing but with delight and pleasure, with 
plenty of space for everything.
Later in the day, I watch the five performers repeat The Mer-
maids. CJ’s got it, now, he really has. But something weird is 
happening: his eyes are rolling back and his jaw is becoming 
slack and his neck is folding, chin rising out and up. This is odd, 
unfathomable. Did he read something into the instructions that 
I didn’t intend? Did someone say something about taking on 
a certain mode of being when I wasn’t in the room? No, I real-
ise later, it’s not that. CJ is exhausted. As he is performing The 
Mermaids he is dropping off, catching himself, then repeating. 
It takes me quite a long time to work this out, and am not even 
sure of my own conclusion until later when I discuss it with Viki. 
Was I really seeing what I was seeing? Is CJ so tired because 
of what we have been doing in the studio, I wonder, or because 
of things entirely outside of our shared actions: does he have 
a job working shifts, or is he studying late into the night? Does 
he have children who keep him up or does he have an addiction 
to video games? I can’t face raising the question with him: it 
feels intrusive to solicit any kind of information about the deeply 
intimate realm that is rest. I choose to take it positively: here is 
a place where life has been let in, even if it’s squeezing into the 
tiny fragments of space within the work itself.
---
Agamben doesn’t use the common 
phrase ‘day of rest’ to describe the 
sabbath, but Honig, writing through 
Agamben’s work, does so several times 
in one article, even playing in her writing 
with rest and wrest as homophones. 
I don’t know where I stand on this. It 
seems to rather suppress Agamben’s 
assertions about the sabbatical as inop-
erative, as unrealised potential; is the 
potential still present when the being 
is only semi-conscious? I come to two 
thoughts: either rest, particularly sleep, 
is so personal as to not belong to the 
political project of the sabbath, which 
always involves others; or rest is still so 
associated with recuperation from the 
last workday and preparation for the 
next that it cannot be sabbatical proper.
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CJ has a request.
‘Ummmmm, Gillie, yeah, I ummmmm have a job interview tomor-
row at 12.30. So, I errrrr wondered if we could take lunch around 
then, so I could do it in my lunch break.’
‘What? What the actual fuck?! Tomorrow is show day. Do you 
know what that means? That means we’re going to do a show, 
in front of people, in front of people who have bought tickets. 
This is my work! I’m paying you. I don’t care about your future 
job. Right now you’re working for me. This is your job. Tomorrow 
I need you all day, and we haven’t decided on the schedule yet 
so I don’t know when we’ll take lunch. Check your contract and 






I didn’t say this. I wanted to say this.
Such terrible friction. Friction between one person’s work and 
another. My work, this work, is my real work. It is extra-real 
because I have money to do it, or that’s how it turns out that I 
feel. It is the main thing I do. It is the most visible thing I do. It 
is what I tell people I do when they ask me what I do. I take it 
seriously. I am proud of it. It is my work.
My work is CJ’s ‘weird thing I did once’. Two and a half days 
shyly hanging out with people he does not know and most likely 
To my mind, this creation of a sabbatical 
landscape, a way of being together that 
suspends, as Agamben suggests, work 
and inoperativity in proximity to some-
thing festive like the sabbath, should 
be enough for anyone. CJ’s request 
represents the privilege of the sabbath, 
the fact that to take time out of the 
productive is not necessarily available 
to all people equally, however you cut it; 
there are material conditions in which 
people have to operate which prevent 
sabbaticals.
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will not meet again. Lying down. Chatting. Singing. Trying on 
pastel-coloured sweatshirts and jogging bottoms, uncomfort-
able in an outfit of baby pink. His work, his real work, is what he 
hopes to get through the job interview.
From my viewpoint, this is work and CJ’s interview is some other 
part of his life, something fluffy and far-away. I don’t know what 
the interview’s for; I know little of his life beyond a few titbits 
here and there. I can’t see clearly the contours of his life out-
side this context, my context, my working context. From CJ’s 
viewpoint, the interview is work, or at least the prospect of it, 
and Recreation is some other part of life, something fluffy and 
far-away not in actuality—he is in the room—but perhaps in 
terms of purpose. CJ doesn’t know what the performance is for; 
he knows little of the work of choreographers or choreographies 
like these beyond a few titbits here and there.
These two truths come into contact through a question, a 
request, and they rub. There’s no way for both to exist together: 
the two truth-objects meet and jostle. Without the lubrication 
of polite congeniality they would bash and knock, pressing and 
moving as each tries to make space for itself. Even with social 
grease the two press and move, almost sparking but ultimately 
reaching an impasse. The pressure is too much. I cave.
And it does feel like caving, like I must give up something hard-
won. It doesn’t take much to break through the thin veneer of 
bravado and showwomanship and pathetic internet activism 
that protects my work as work, as work in all the senses that I’d 
like it to have: that it has value, that I deserve credit for it, social 
and monetary, that it is necessary, that I am doing it because it 
has to be done, not just because I like it, or, worse, that some-
thing in my heart demands that I do it. I’ve never been much of 
that sort, the one who can’t not do art. I have to confess, here, 
that maybe my work doesn’t matter in these ways, that maybe 
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work doesn’t matter in these ways, and that, for someone, for 
CJ, this is just a thing that people do and not really work. It 
bothers me.
I see in this interaction another sort of friction. This friction 
is private, hidden most of the time even to me. As Recreation 
and this thesis are in many ways one and the same thing, or at 
least the Venn diagram involving each is composed more of 
overlap than remainder, the development of my ideas in each 
touches everything else. Throughout the process I have been 
very concerned with being ‘ethical’, not always remembering 
that ethics is a living process, not the firm lines of morality. For 
instance, I made a point of always paying everyone as equally as 
I could figure out how to do so; exceptions include my produc-
er’s standard rate, still very low for her experience, skill, and 
the extent to which this kind of arts worker is sought after, and 
one of my collaborators, whose payment came from a specific 
funding source whose terms determined the fee. I made start 
and end points of days very clear and never asked performers to 
work late or extra. For much of the process I made the days one 
hour shorter than usual, because I wanted to acknowledge the 
extra time my collaborators worked in sending emails, thinking 
about what had happened in the studio, and supporting mar-
keting efforts. My idea was that this protected everyone’s lives 
from the abrasion of work, that I would be doing the right thing 
if work was made fair and tidy. This way each worker’s life could 
be enlarged or at least sustained whilst working with me. In CJ’s 
request my authority to make this space is taken away, and my 
neat division of work and life is brought into question. That is, 
my ethics are brought into question. If all my reading and writing 
and thinking and talking and planning and dancing is directed 
towards an ethics of life, of life that is valued for its lifefulness, 
not for its usefulness along productivist lines, then surely the 
interaction might have gone like this:
The sabbath has its own ethics, its 
own political charge. This is not about 
making work better for the worker, but 
in coming into contact with produc-
tivism and seeing what else is there 
by stepping through it. Honig writes: 
‘we see here a practice that has some 
family resemblance to the idea of the 
General Strike: a suspension of work 
that presupposes the productive power 
of workers, but also generates the 
generative powers that may open new 
and different orders of economic life’ 
(2015:474). I’m inclined to disagree, for 
a strike presents itself as a temporary 
state through which, indeed, economic 
imaginaries can proliferate and cause 
change, but ultimately the impact 
remains within that sector of human 
action. Sabbatical inoperativity, on the 
other hand, has the potential to open 
up other orders completely, ones where 
deeds and words occur for lifeful pur-
poses unrelated to economics.
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‘Ummmmm, Gillie, yeah, I ummmmm have a job interview tomor-
row at 12.30. So, I errrrr wondered if we could take lunch around 
then, so I could do it in my lunch break.’
‘Oh! Sure.’
Or:
‘Ummmmm, Gillie, yeah, I ummmmm have a job interview tomor-
row at 12.30. So, I errrrr wondered if we could take lunch around 
then, so I could do it in my lunch break.’
‘Oh! Yeah, OK. What’s the interview for?’
Or any other number of other responses that would respect CJ’s 
life, including his own personal intertwining of life and work. 
Instead, my mind raced to a response—which I, luckily, did not 
verbalise—which tells of another, totally opposite point of view. 
It exposes the fact that in trying to protect life, as manifested 
in the lives of my collaborators, another agenda is fulfilled: 
it protects work. It protects work as work, its productivity, its 
transactionality, its legality. It protects me as the boss. One way 
in which I understand this is to despair: I don’t want to be that 
woman I don’t want to protect labour I don’t want to be a boss I 
don’t want to think that if I am the boss I own the workers their 
lives their time their energies their thoughts I don’t want to be 
responsible for perpetuating this charade that work is the most 
important thing ever ever ever I don’t want to I don’t want to. 
But despite my interest and education I find myself indoctri-
nated into this purview, shackled to work’s domineering associ-
ations. It’s unavoidable. My intellectual and ethical stance has 
not, it seems, taken me beyond the sticky rubbing together of 
life and work.
In the end, midst my momentary internal chafing, I hedge:
Honig writes that ‘[i]n the sabbatical 
state of exception all divisions are 
meant to disappear, rather than to 
be (re)inscribed’ (2015:473). In the 
conversation I am describing to the left 
our social divisions becoming blurred. 
In conventional terms I am the boss 
and CJ is the worker; his asking to take 
time out of what is contracted work is 
a challenge to this relationship, to this 
instance of power and control. But CJ’s 
understanding of what is happening 
is that it is a form of sabbath, in which 
‘the laws of social division are sus-
pended and everyone is a king’ (Honig 
2015:473). For us together to maintain 
our collective practice of the sabbath 
it was necessary for me to meet this 
challenge with what then felt like 
capitulation, and what now feels like 
a reasonable—and even desirable or 
‘enchanted and enchanting’—pursuit of 
the sabbatical (Honig 2015:474).
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‘Um yeah, I guess we could do that. I mean, on show days we try 
to start later and break later, that’s all. But I guess if you’ve got 
to go you’ve got to go. What time do you need to leave?’
An Indefinite Article 
These are stories, of sorts, glimpses into what has been a 
complex, lengthy and rich process. As these stories demon-
strate, this process is both particular to itself, its conditions, 
its environments and its characters, and is, in some ways, no 
more particular than any other artistic process, context of work, 
personal project or encounter between people. I have looked 
for moments that seemed to me to want to be thought about 
in terms of life and work, and have tried to describe them and 
their effects. As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, there 
would be no way to write in such a way that would encompass 
the whole project and its possible lifefulnesses: even the three 
accounts given are incomplete. They are also diverse enough 
to demonstrate that this is, of course, no Instagram lyf: the 
lifefulness of this project is not contained by the fact that it is a 
project, something that seems controlled, organised, sealed by 
its beginning-and-end nature; it is bigger and stranger than a 
neat pattern, neatly analysed.
This echoes Kathi Weeks’ brief discussion of the indefinite arti-
cle ‘a’ in the phrase ‘getting a life’ (2011:232). In this paragraph, 
she insists that this word in this phrase suggests that there are 
different lives to get, that getting a life does not determine the 
contents of that life. She draws on Deleuze to speak of a life of 
singularities not individualities, a description that applies readily 
to the three aspects of Recreation’s creation about which I have 
written here. I believe what I have written speaks of ‘a life that 
is common to and shared with others without being the same 
as theirs’ (Weeks 2011:232). I think I have been writing about my 
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life, a life that is mine, that includes this project but also many other things with which this project 
interacts: my friendships, my emotions, my habits of thought, my imagination. These things are 
not my work, they are my life, or, to continue to follow Weeks, ‘qualities that [I am] urged toward’ 
(2011:232). And of course something like a quality can’t be mine, cannot be possessed, cannot ‘be 
said precisely to own or even to hold’ (Weeks 2011:232), let alone fully described and offered as 
words on a page. A life, Weeks claims, has to be in its ‘getting’. In this sense, this chapter is less a 
description and more a hopeful act of getting, of going back into the past and trawling through 
something that appears like work to see what life can be got within it, adjacent to it, on top of it, 
below it, and through it. The chapter is less a description of a life that has been getting itself than 
the performative getting of a life which was itself being produced passively, or better accidentally, 
or perhaps better yet as a matter of course. Life is already always there, if I look for it carefully, 
and it is a life always already more than that of only ‘a consumer or worker’, as Weeks cautions 
(2011:232).
This approach, however optimistic, has its limitations. It is historical, looking back at something 
that did happen with a new lens, investigating its consequences and its interactions with the 
present. Weeks’ invocation is one heading towards the future: ‘the activity of ‘getting’ introduces 
a temporality to the mandate, one that points toward a different future’ (2011:232). Now that it is 
plain that life is indeed ‘a web of relations and qualities of experience’ (2011:233) with particular 
attributes, ones described here through their different sorts of meetings with work, how can this 
be grown, extended, amplified beyond what already is? Though Weeks is keen to avoid ‘burdening 
life with a fixed content’ (2011:233), I think that these webs of relations and qualities of experience 
can be found in the concrete, the bodily, the sensorial and the relational—and these need not be 
understood as fixed but dynamic and actualised. I think this chapter has already found ways within 
these concrete-but-not-fixed accounts to work with, as Weeks says, the deconstructive and the 
reconstructive, negation and affirmation, the critical and the utopian (2011). But, within this, life and 
its lifefulness is still set against work and its productivity. In order to get a life that can not only 
signal its appearance in moments of opportunity, when we’re looking really hard, but can escape 
and flourish and be as excessive as Weeks’ calls are, it is not sufficient to look back or even to look. 
I want to suggest that the webs of relations and qualities of experience that form a life can be 
exercised, trained, and practised deliberately, just as they were more accidentally in the process 
of creating Recreation. In the following chapter, I will build on the pockets of life unfolded here to 
consider how these elements are present in activities more readily described as recreational, and 
how these actions called recreation might be training grounds for the subjectivities needed to cre-
ate a future in which work is decentralised. I will think through how Recreation as a performance 
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provides some of these methods for inventing, imagining, and trying on the lifeful qualities we 
need to continue to get a life.
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You can view video documentation  
of the November 2017 presentation  
of Recreation at BALTIC Centre for  
Contemporary Art, Gateshead, here:
bit.ly/RecreationVideo
Please do that now, before moving  
on to Chapter 3.




3. On Recreation  
and Recreation
In Chapter 1 I thought about the ways in which the research and development stage of Recreation 
fulfilled and exceeded aspects of contemporary labour. In Chapter 2 I sought to elaborate the 
appearance of ‘life’, as opposed to work, as it manifested itself in later stages of the production of 
the performance. Here, I’d like to develop these ideas in a new direction. I want to retain the sort of 
heterotopic, forgiving quality that advocating for life against work offers, the possibility of it seem-
ing baseless and slippy, with many layers in four dimensions and more, obfuscating one another 
just as and just as much as they facilitate one another. It doesn’t visualise well, and it shouldn’t, 
this kind of mixed-up stew or slew of colours and textures and temporalities and interconnections 
that make up what a life could be, maybe should be, maybe is. It makes me think of one of those 
images from an album cover or Channel 4 drama from the 1990s, in which one person stands still 
in a cityscape, looking at the camera, while the brightly-coloured, lit-up world encircles them with 
speed. But that’s not quite right, either; in life itself nobody stands still and everyone whirls with 
everyone else. Even whirling isn’t the right thing to say, because that’s a four-dimensional move-
ment that is fully comprehensible with a singular human body, and that’s not what I’m trying to get 
to. Whatever this ‘life’ is, it’s exciting, but a difficult place from which to take a stand, to act: pro-
posals toward new forms of life in relation to work just get sucked into life’s technicolour whirlpool 
and drift away or dissolve.
It is this sort of indistinguishability that Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams jostle against in their 
resistance to what they describe as ‘folk politics’ in Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a 
World Without Work (2015). In this text they critique Occupy and other grassroots political agents 
for being unable to create political change, and describe the history of neoliberalism’s calculated 
entry into the normative political sphere in Europe as a method from which the Left, their terrain, 
must learn. They discuss the deliberate mechanisms neoliberalism’s advocates deployed to effec-
tively integrate a new political ideology into mainstream debates, ultimately enabling its normal-
isation within today’s political-economic landscape. In short, Srnicek and Williams claim that the 
post-work Left must learn to be clearer about what it wants, however presumptuous or incomplete 
the ask is, and strategically intervene based on that vision. David Frayne, in The Refusal of Work, 
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goes further to say that ‘[t]hose who resist work…have no overall mission, no public voice, and 
no real unity beyond their common set of experiences’ (2015:227). Kathi Weeks insists upon the 
demand as the only way in which the nature of work can change, following from the US Wages 
for Housework campaigns in the 1970s (2011). Demands can be spoken. They are the lynchpin of 
contemporary politic rhetoric. They can be uttered with force, turned into slogans, cropped and 
replayed for the radio, and turned into GIFs and memes (as this word is understood now, in 2019). 
I’m taking it a bit too lightly, of course. I do want contemporary working practices to change, I do 
want work to be decentralised as the very hook on which our entire personhoods hang, I do want 
all of us—everyone, everywhere—to have lives that are nourished, safe and fulfilled beyond the 
exploitation of ourselves through work at the service of wealthy people and institutions under 
globalised, neoliberal capitalism. I do. I just don’t know how to make a demand of that sort. Or 
perhaps I do, but I hover proximally, nervous to take the step into completely going for it because 
then I wonder about the space for the imaginary, the speculative, the ongoing, the incomplete, the 
sensorial, and so on once a demand is made. This space seems essential beyond the demand for 
a life other than that which is contained by or subsumed within work, in order to produce in the 
positive an image of what the post-work future might contain, what it might be like, what we might 
do, how it might feel. I don’t think it is the obligation of arts practices to fulfil or even participate in 
a demand, but I am seeking the kind of response to or interaction with the demand for less work 
which could signal towards some other qualities or textures of post-work life, which necessarily 
includes the paradoxes and complexities of such a vision.
Helen Hester and Nick Srnicek, two of the best-known contributors to the discourse around post-
work imaginaries, speak in a promotional video for one of the events in the Take Back Control 
series, a set of conversations about the future of society responding to recent political turbu-
lences. It’s very short, but some of the fleeting utterances relay the position of the speakers and 
some of the dominant views in the discourse more broadly. On the question of whether ‘robots will 
take our jobs’, Srnicek responds that we need to prepare for an automated society, for the fact that 
automation will indeed continue and that the machines will indeed continue to make many forms 
of human labour obsolete (2017). There will be policy issues with which to contend, regulatory 
frameworks, legislation. There will be continued technological change, with the need to improve, 
tailor and remedy issues with the machines we use and will use in an increasingly automated 
future. But there must also be a cultural shift, in which we each individually and collectively, as a 
society, reorganise our activities, our modes of being, our relations and our values in order not just 
prepare for the inevitable but also grow its potential for what we think is good.
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In this short presentation, Hester and Srnicek present two potential ways of popularising post-
work futures in order that these preparations can be realised. Briefly, Srnicek announces that we 
must remind people how terrible work is. This is quickly side-lined by a longer elaboration from 
both speakers about ‘reigniting the value of free time’, which, according to Hester and Srnicek, 
is more politically palatable than focusing on the end of work (2017). The free time advocated by 
Frayne, Hester and Srnicek and others, including André Gorz, to whose thinking I will return, is 
explicitly time away from work. This free time away from work is based on, largely, a campaign for 
shorter working hours (just as the Green Party’s recent announcement of its commitment to a Free 
Time Index follows a policy for a four-day working week (Green Party 2018)). The argument for this 
and the Marxist basis for the case are beyond what is necessary here; it suffices to say that they 
together argue that most work in our post-Fordist economy—and prior—is undertaken not because 
humanity requires the products of that labour but because income, identity and social value are 
produced by work and it is in the benefit of capital and its capitalists to continue to operate in 
such a way that these are seen to be tethered interminably and even with the notion that this is 
the natural order of things. Western politicians’ calls for ‘job creation’—a hollow myth, exposed by 
even the slightest of thinking—is a regular representation of this delusional ideology. But if we all 
work fewer hours each week (or, in Gorz’s utopia, each month or year or lifetime (1989)), what does 
this newly-free time look like? What would we do with it? And how would these expanded or cre-
ated activities produce new or developed forms of subjectivity and relation?
Recreation
In this chapter, I would like to work towards a description of what recreation, as a form of non-work, 
is or could feel like. In our work-centred society, recreation, like every other attempted categori-
sation of human life, is positioned as oppositional to or in relation to work. Nonetheless, it can 
be difficult to carve out this space. On the one hand, as Ivor Southwood and many other writers 
on contemporary labour have written, it can be thought of as that which we do to advance the 
possibility of future work, when not currently working, as a new form of work—not recreation after 
all (Southwood 2011). On the other hand, there can be multiple layers of guilt associated with free 
time itself, the free time that holds itself open for recreation. As David Frayne describes in The 
Refusal of Work (2015), the responsibility for carving out free time in each life is the responsibility 
of the individual worker. If the worker hasn’t successfully organised themselves to have enough 
time outside of work then it is their incapacity, their lacking, that has left them short of the req-
uisite free time, under the ‘ideological ruse’ that is the work-life balance (Gregg 2011:4). Not only 
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must we work at work, we must also work hard at even having free time. Making free time possi-
ble has been absorbed into the ‘taskification of the world’ (Taggart 2017); free time itself is then 
coloured by its management, with the question ‘is this the best use of my time?’ hanging over even 
the possibility of freedom (Taggart 2017).
Even pursuits mostly associated with leisure such as yoga or a pub quiz, and even rest or relax-
ation, could be seen as another professional development activity, increasing the worker’s creativ-
ity, concentration and productivity for the benefit of the employer (Cocozza 2017). Art-going fits 
into this category, too. Further, given that many of the spectators for contemporary, experimental 
performance—like Recreation, for instance—are makers of other contemporary, experimental per-
formance, attending a show is quite literally work, whether it be for networking, market research 
or creative inspiration. This means that at least some forms of art-going are not a free space to 
exercise the freedoms of free time, either. Alternative cultural consumption in the form of enter-
tainment does not fully satisfy a recreational opening, either, for, as Gorz describes and Frayne 
reprises, this exists only to help us to recover and recuperate from overwork so that we can start 
again (Gorz 1989: 92; Frayne 2015:221). So, none of this satisfies the category ‘recreation’. But if 
it’s not any of this, then what are the alternatives? What are they concretely? What will we do in a 
post-work, recreation-led world?
There are some examples of writers, thinkers and organisations offering suggestions. Scouring 
through Eva Swidler’s 2016 article entitled ‘Radical Leisure’ in independent socialist magazine 
Monthly Review produces a short list:
grow kitchen gardens 
cook at home 
walk and bike 
hang on the porch chatting 
shoot hoops 




nap in the sun
The independent leftist think tank, new economics foundation (sic), which has produced multiple 
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reports and propositions regarding the shorter working week and the growth of non-work time, 
also offers a number of activities they imagine would occur should there be more free time, and 
outside reproductive labour: ‘seeing friends and neighbours, walking, cycling and other kinds of 
exercise, playing games, making and listening to music, inventing and creating, watching movies 
and TV, cooking, reading, studying, reflecting, hanging out, doing ‘nothing’…’ (Coote et al 2010: 
23). Despite these attempts to bring the abstract post-work or post-work-centred future into the 
concrete through naming the actions of which it might be composed, there are multiple difficul-
ties with such definitions. Mareile Pfannebecker and J.A. Smith ask precisely the question ‘What 
Will We Do in the Post-Work Utopia?’ in the title of their critique of both Srnicek and Williams’ and 
Frayne’s 2015 texts. Part of Pfannebecker and Smith’s criticism of the post-work futures which 
these texts bring forth is that they too closely mirror the non-work, or, in the terms I’m interested 
in furnishing, recreational lives that closely mirror the needs or desires the activist and academic 
class of which Srnicek, Williams and Frayne are part. That is to say that for these writers and other 
post-work thinkers ‘the prospect of living between the allotment and the Hegel discussion group 
might seem idyllic,’ that ‘work is keeping us from reaching our full human potential, hence the 
promise that we could all become craft brewers, learn ballet and hold three PhDs’ (Pfannebecker 
and Smith 2016:para 13). As critics of the post-work discourse Frederick Harry Pitts and Ana C 
Dinerstein suggest, journalists, academics, artists and creatives can easily take up this vision of a 
post-work future, for it is already reasonably similar to the lifestyles they already inhabit (in Beck-
ett, 2018). This is something of a classist view of recreational activities—and indeed, one as moral-
istic as the work ethic—which, according to the writers, has necessarily been adopted as a result 
of the post-work discourse’s need to propose ‘a more grounded, fulfilling and self-sufficient life’ 
that work can offer in the present or the future (Pfannebecker and Smith 2016: para 9).
Both Inventing the Future and The Refusal of Work are based on the work of Karl Marx and the 
contributions of other writers working in the Marxist tradition; Pfannebecker and Smith note that 
Marx’s famous ‘hunt in the morning’ remark from The German Ideology is ‘totemic for the post-
work movement’ (2016: para 10). What the writers note about Marx’s statement, though is not so 
much that this proposal of a post-work future gestures towards the self-determined freedoms 
which includes productive, reproductive and leisure activities undertaken at liberty, but that Marx 
is still very much prescribing the very activities, and that those could be considered ‘productive 
enjoyments’ rather than other, less determinedly productive activities such as some of those listed 
by Swidler and the new economics foundation (2016). As soon as post-work writers determine 
what is to be done when there is no or less work, then, it is either somewhat familiar and a bit unex-
citing, as in both Swidler’s and nef’s (sic) offers, or disciplinarian and worthy, as in the case of the 
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post-workists.
Another approach within the post-work literature is to suggest that it is not necessary to define 
what a post-work world looks like, what sorts of things we would find ourselves doing. The best 
post-work activism, which Frayne, after Gorz, describes as the establishment of a politics of time, 
‘does not seek to enrol people in some pre-planned utopian scheme, but to gradually free them 
from prescribed roles, furnishing them with the time to become politically active citizens’ (Frayne 
2015:222). Creating more free or non-work time, then, is seen as the first step in creating the new 
manners of being, relating and doing that will only be possible under those conditions and that 
cannot be seen in advance. Though I can see the theoretical, practical and political reasons for 
taking this view, and can even sense my own excitement, throwing up my hands in a questioning 
but energised shrug, exclaiming how thrilling it is not to know, I still find it lacking. It’s scary to 
pitch into the unknown. To return to my earlier brief discussion of the demand, it seems to me a 
natural extension of the concrete nature of the demand for increased free time to demand the 
space and time to undertake particular things, however they are figured or described, and even if 
they are unrealistic, incorrect or ultimately become replaced by other more desirable or realisable 
things in the post-work future-to-come. I don’t think my dissatisfaction with the haziness of what 
a post-work world would contain is exclusively mine: Miya Tokumitsu in her article on the fight 
for free time in American leftist magazine Jacobin states that fighting for free time must mean 
‘thinking more deeply about free time, and how we would spend our lives in a society with many 
fewer hours on the job’ (2017). Despite her resolute demand, she doesn’t actually offer anything; 
her writing exposes the fact that the lists offered by nef and Swidler don’t fully satisfy the deep 
examination for which she is advocating. It is, though, frustrating not to have these writers offer a 
stronger foothold, a clearer way of projecting and celebrating what could be. It’s frustrating to me 
partially because I would so like these thinkers to give me something, to give me hope. It’s also 
frustrating because I sense the difficulty in articulating the demand for less work, for free time, for 
autonomy in our activities, for leisure and recreation, to those without post-work as a special inter-
est, to the population at large. Where post-work discourse appears in journalism—one of the major 
ways in which niche theoretical or activist activity can reach a non-specialist public, along with, I’d 
like to suggest, the arts—it is equally dissatisfied with the lack of concrete suggestions, as in the 
recent Long Read on post-work in the Guardian (Beckett 2018). This undermines the potentials of 
post-work thinking and makes it appear as a reduction, a silly, futile obsession of rich white people 
in universities who don’t understand the terror of the lack of work in its full current manifestation.
In Eva Swidler’s approach there is, perhaps, something of a way out. In ‘Radical Leisure’, she starts 
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by tracking the relationships between the environmental and labour movements in relation to less 
work and shorter working weeks, then turning to pre-industrial attitudes to work, or, more impor-
tantly, leisure. As in Gorz’s Critique of Economic Reason (1989), some of which I will use to scaffold 
much of the thinking later in the chapter, Swidler describes work at the turn of the industrial era, 
in which some workers in particular roles preferred to work just as much as they needed to satisfy 
their reproductive necessities, privileging free time above increased living standards in what she 
describes as the ‘leisure ethic’, a counter to the more familiar (Protestant) ‘work ethic’ (Weber 1905). 
It is this which Swidler would like to revive as a counter to the domination of work and its hold over 
status, identity, wellbeing, relationships and personal and community sovereignty. The leisure ethic 
and its living-out are predicated circularly on the creation or intensification of the public sphere 
outside of work. There needs to be a shared life to which people can turn when work ends, either 
at the end of the day or the end of a work-centred society. Without this post-work seems impov-
erished, miserable and anxious. In turn, the commons needs to be made up of those actions that 
are called leisure. Only when this commons appears does leisure become desirable, humming with 
alternative values sufficiently established to counter the work ethic. ‘[W]e need to build, or rebuild,’ 
Swidler proclaims, ‘a shared culture of leisure’ (2016).
I hear in Swidler’s call André Gorz describing, in a simple way, his ‘autonomous activities’, the final 
in a schema of three categories into which human activities can fall. Autonomous activities are 
the things humans do which are neither ‘work for economic ends’, what we typically call work, nor 
‘domestic labour and work-for-oneself’, which might be known as, in a loose way, social reproduc-
tion (1989).  In Critique of Economic Reason, Gorz describes these three forms of human doing 
at length and with depth. The appendix to this text is a ‘Summary for Trade Unionists and Other 
Left Activists’, presented as a paper at a Trade Union conference in 1986. Due to its designated 
audience, it is a shorter and somewhat practicable application of Gorz’s thoughts in the main part 
of the text. As such, I take it as a kind of practical direction, which is useful when considering the 
actualities of what recreation could be in practice. In this section, the three kinds of activity are fig-
ured in a manner more descriptive and easier to imagine than in other, more theoretical passages. 
It seems that Gorz, like Swidler, sees that working class culture already has in it the requisite 
components of the leisure ethic, that which is needed to have autonomous activities take up more 
space and time in our lives than those which are driven by outside forces.
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Interlude: Methodological Clarifications
Here, in this chapter, I’d like to think about how the performance Recreation could be considered 
to be recreation. My method follows on somewhat from the manner in which I worked in the pre-
vious chapter. There, I followed Kathi Weeks to consider the idea of and practice of ‘life’ in broad 
brushstrokes, firstly in negation to something I called ‘lyf’; through this, life was set in opposition 
to work. I used anecdotes about particular events and personalities from the production of the 
Recreation to illuminate the appearance of life, and to draw out through in the positive, three 
interrelated praxes, the ways in which life is separate from but supported, facilitated, squeezed or 
interrupted by work, and vice versa. Here, life was described as polyvalent, multiple, and somewhat 
undefinable but for its qualities; it was unfolded as a texture or a set of textures rather than as an 
abstraction.
In many ways, this chapter is a transformation of this method. It continues to seek out sensible 
properties of a set of events in order to start to inhabit and nourish an idea, not to produce a cog-
nisable definition but with the aim of an ampler feeling of something. Here I work with recreation, a 
term, concept or experience which seems to me to have a strange sense of the full and yet empty, 
in that I think what the various contributions to the topic from the post-work discourse seem to do 
is already know what it is despite not being able to furnish it much. The thinkers and writers who 
drift close to recreation in their work seem to avoid looking at it directly, despite its potential help-
fulness to the field and indeed to post-work activism. I want to give recreation more space, here, to 
think it through the practice that is Recreation in order to bring it into the concrete.
Thinking about life has been helpful because it broadens the focus and helps to see people as full 
people, and situations not as this or that thing but as a complex mixture of different ways of being, 
doing and relating. To think about recreation is to narrow and to focus, refining one aspect of life, 
an aspect that I think is neglected, dominated or warped by work. It is a part of human experience 
that could help expand life as a category and a value, informing and enriching what is otherwise 
always understood in opposition to work. To get to recreation as a concept and as a practice, I’d 
like to work through the defining qualities André Gorz gives to his category of autonomous activi-
ties, articulating this against a different perspective, that of French psychoanalyst and philosopher 
Christophe Dejours’ psychodynamics of work, a clinical and discursive field which appears little in 
anglophone literature. In so doing, I hope to both critique and elaborate on Gorz’s category, refine 
it and adapt it for my purposes, so that a useful recreational sphere is opened up, in which this 
particular variety of non-work can reveal its paradoxes, complexities, and conundrums, as well as 
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its energies, textures and potencies.
Before I get to it, I would like to remark upon the descriptive methods I am again taking up. Fol-
lowing my methodological influences, detailed in the introduction, and the autoethnographic 
narrative mode deployed in Chapter 2, here I will continue to experiment with detailed description, 
which here, unlike the previous chapters, focuses on Recreation itself, as a performance, a cultural 
artefact, over and above the work as a process, but not excluding my history with it in that way. 
I position myself as the maker-spectator subject that Nicola Conibere so usefully frames in her 
own practice-as-research PhD dissertation, where I am really watching the work as an audience 
member, so can assume something shared with others watching, but I know always that I am also 
the creator of the work (2014:112)—and, indeed, in the case of Recreation, that I am also sometimes 
occupying a cameo role with my vocal contributions. Despite the fact that I wish to foreground and 
acknowledge my own position as spectator, I am not taking up the enticing opportunity to analyse 
my own work as a spectator, not diving into the very wide and deep world of thought about the 
activity of the audience (which in recent times often uses Jacques Rancière’s The Emancipated 
Spectator (2008) as its emblem), largely because of the limitations of the length of this writing.
In the descriptions which follow (and their interpretation, analysis, and consideration), I am aware 
that the operation on the reader is not one of information. This text assumes that either the reader 
has seen the work before reading these chapters—and, as I suggest in the introduction, that the 
video documentation is reviewed before reading this particular chapter—or that the reader has 
not and is not interested in seeing the work. When video documentation is so readily available, the 
purpose of description must be another one than to render the work visible in the mind’s eye. Here, 
then, it is to support analysis, certainly, but its contribution is also to offer an impression of the 
work beyond the explanation of what happened. I have tried to write in such a way that the details 
of the work come together in a form which mirrors and reflects upon the nature of Recreation in 
terms of its formal concerns, its ambience and atmosphere, its soft drone of a tone.
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‘Autonomous Activities’ versus the  
Psychodynamics of Work
It is necessary for me to set up the two sets of ideas I will be working with for the rest of the 
chapter.
The first, which I have already introduced, is André Gorz’s categorisations of human activity. I 
appreciate that Gorz was writing in a different era of both capitalism and its theorisation and 
critique. Nonetheless, I think his thinking on this subject continues to be useful partially because 
more recent writers in the post-work field continue to use his work, influencing the discourse 
heavily (most notably Frayne). Despite this use, I do not see post-work writers examining or exper-
imenting with the part of Gorz’s thinking which focuses on non-work activities, and I see this as 
a discursive gap. So, I turn to Gorz’s ‘autonomous activities’. Though describing them as distinct 
forms of activity, Gorz himself admits to the overlaps between these categories:
Indeed, the same activity—bringing up children, preparing a meal or 
taking care of our surroundings, for example—can take the form of a 
chore in which one is subject to what seem like the oppressive con-
straints or of a gratifying activity, depending on whether the activity 
can be performed at leisure, in co-operation with others and through 
the voluntary sharing of the tasks involved.
(Gorz 1989: 222–3)
The difference, then, is not only whether they are pleasing or not. Autonomous activities are 
those ‘which are experienced as fulfilling, enriching, sources of meaning and happiness: artistic, 
philosophical, scientific, relational, educational, charitable and mutual-aid activities, activities 
of auto-production and so on’ (Gorz 1989:222). However, there are many varieties of economic 
or reproductive work which provide one or more of these positive qualities; I am an artist, so my 
work is oftentimes artistic, and, I hope a source of meaning or enrichment for others as well as for 
myself. But it is still work. I think the same is true for my friend who is a psychologist, or my brother 
who is a town planner: they experience fulfilment through activities which are relational and 
educational and helpful and so on, and that fulfilment may also be experienced by others in prox-
imity to or effected by their activities. It’s still work, in the sense that it is done primarily for eco-
nomic purposes. In fact, as discussed by David Frayne amongst many other post-work theorists, 
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contemporary labour is seen as the primary source of pleasure, dignity, and solidarity (2015).
For Christophe Dejours, in his study of the psychodynamics of work, the fact that work can pro-
duce these positive experiences is taken further, and celebrated rather than feared. Dejours’ vision 
of work is one in which it provides me, as a worker, the opportunity to ‘transform myself, enrich 
myself, and perhaps even fulfil myself’ (2007: 75). Work is associated with enjoyment and emotion 
and the heightening of the experience of the sensitive, erogenous body (2007). This is not the 
intimacy to which Melissa Gregg refers, where work saps all joy out of other parts of physical and 
emotional experience through its interminable encroachment, but work as the site generative of 
human transformation. This, then, is a considerable overlap with what Gorz sees as distinctly not 
work.
I will note here that Dejours uses a different definition of work than that of Gorz and other writ-
ers in the Marxist tradition—and, indeed the conception of work I’ve been pulling around through 
previous chapters. Whereas for Gorz work is an economic activity, undertaken within a relation 
of some form of employment, for Dejours ‘work is what is implied, in human terms, by the fact 
of working: gestures, know-how, the involvement of the body and the intelligence, the ability to 
analyse, interpret, and react to situations. It is the power to feel, to think, and to invent’ (2007: 72). 
This is clearly a very broad definition, which can include in it so much of human activity as to be 
unwieldy. He does refine, it, though, going on to say that work is essentially the act of confronting 
a task which has constraints (2007). This can still include many of the things included as autono-
mous activities, and indeed in the lists of potential leisure or non-work activities offered above, but 
in most of the examples Dejours gives he does indeed return to things that overlap more easily 
with Marxist and popular conceptions of work (factory work, for example). Though they come from 
different traditions, I think it is useful to read Dejours’ concept of work and its affects and impacts 
against Gorz’s autonomous activities in order to open the latter out, to find ways to clarify and test 
and stretch its possibilities. 
For an activity to be autonomous there are further conditions than them offering positive personal 
experience. Following Greek philosophy and then Marx, Gorz contends that autonomous activi-
ties can only occur outside the sphere of necessity. He is careful to make a further, more complex 
distinction, though. Autonomy stands in opposition to necessity, but it also stands in opposition to 
heteronomy, action influenced or driven by outside forces. Much of the work in the time in which 
Gorz was writing, and likely even more so today, is driven not by individual necessity but by a more 
insidious and confusing kind of social need, determined by all sorts of social and cultural factors. 
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This heteronomy makes it that
[w]e are therefore less in thrall to the ‘necessities’ of existence than to 
the external determination of our lives and our activity by the impera-
tives of a social apparatus of production and organization which pro-
vides willy-nilly both the essential and the superfluous, the economic 
and the anti-economic, the productive and the destructive.
(Gorz 1989:166)
The autonomous activities, what I would like to see as a movement towards leisure or recre-
ation, then, are rather difficult to find. They are produced in a double opposition midst a tangle of 
economic and non-economic, necessary and unnecessary, in a world in which even that which 
appears autonomous may indeed by heteronomous. It seems to me that the autonomous is not 
so much a definite category but an approach. If it is possible that bringing up children may be 
heteronomous, a kind of work-for-oneself or work-for-ourselves, or autonomous, gratifying for its 
own sake, then it is a matter of attitude or perspective as much as an ontological truth. Gorz offers 
this: ‘those activities are autonomous which are themselves their own end. In those activities, 
subjects experience their own sovereignty and fulfil themselves as persons’ (1989:166–7). This 
autonomy, this sovereignty, is always under question. Rather than seeing these independencies as 
absolute—which would be impossible with even the slightest glance towards feminist discourse, 
which has demonstrated in all kinds of ways the profound interdependencies between subjects—I 
see them as relative.1 If autonomous activities are always only relatively autonomous, then in what 
relation are they to heteronomous forces? Which ideologies, dynamics, norms or even rules do 
they succeed in evading? I want to hold on to the possibility that we might, in relation and even 
opposition to some of the destructive tendencies and effects of work discussed in Chapter 1, 
‘[reconquer] spaces of autonomy in which we can will what we are doing and take responsibility 
for it’ (Gorz 1989:166, emphases in original), and that involves producing something of an auton-
omous direction of action, because of the very real present of indelible, immutable, everlasting 
interconnectedness.
This sense of sovereignty has impacts as well as limits. As writer Alex Soojun-Kim Pang notes 
(Cocozza, 2017), the responsibility for productivity has shifted from organisations and their leaders 
1  I think quickly to the writings of both Joan Tronto (such as Moral Boundaries (1993) and Eva Feder Kittay (such as The 
Subject of Care (2002, with Ellen K Feder), both working in the field of care.
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to individual workers; the worker may have the feeling of individual sovereignty, to use Gorz’s term, 
but it is put to use heteronomously. An institutional wall may be met in terms of how much a team 
or department or business can increase productivity through structural means, but each worker by 
themselves can climb over the wall if they just try hard enough, deploy sufficient ‘life-hacks’ and 
so on. I can see how this fits rather neatly with increasing shifts towards (pseudo-)self-employ-
ment and temporary, part-time and otherwise precarious forms of work, in which the individual is 
responsible for maintaining and developing their working capacity from job to job. Alternatively, I 
can see through a Dejoursian lens that this is precisely the opportunity work offers to develop the 
subjectivity of the worker. For Dejours, this is precisely the potential of work: that there is a pre-
scription of what should happen, a task that should be met, in relation to which there is the actual-
ity of what can and will happen. This gap between assigned and actual is the ‘real’ in which failure 
must be faced, and the subject is required to be creative in order to overcome it; in so doing, the 
worker’s ‘powers’ are revealed and expanded (Dejours and Deranty 2010: 171).2
In rehearsals for Recreation, we would joke that we needed to stop Kit, the only member of the 
core cast without a qualification in dance performance, getting too good, as that would undo the 
point of his presence in the cast. He would become too efficient in his performing, he would do it 
too well, become too productive, thus undermining one of his reasons for being there, in that he is 
not a professional at this, at doing dance. He would satisfy the normative forces of the situation 
too well, reducing his unskilled autonomy and making too visible the heteronomous forces at work, 
which include my choreographic input, the notion of what a good dance is and how it is to be done, 
requirements from the audience to impress and so on. This really is a joke, but it has at its heart 
a genuine concern that a certain quality of performance disappears when it is done too well. I’m 
attached to the joy that seems to appear when the tasks at hand are done poorly or somewhat 
clunkily. I like it when ‘productivity’ is low, if I think through the language often used around the 
actual labours of human beings. I could certainly have asked one of the trained dancers in the cast 
to perform the only solo recognisable dance moment in the whole performance, a continuation of 
an improvised ‘folk dance’ that begins as a group. I like it precisely because the effort outweighs 
the impact; Kit demonstrates that he does not have the embodied skill and experience to grace-
fully work his way through it, so he must do it on his own terms. Kit makes visible the gap of the 
Dejoursian real as he moves, rendering available to the audience his working-out, his creativity, his 
failure and the efforts it takes to overcome that failure in new ways. Each time he does the dance 
2  I am aware that a Dejoursian conception of failure within or as work could be expanded with and through and in rela-
tion to the discourse on failure in performance studies (such as Sara Jane Bailes’ 2011 book on the subject), but this would 
be too major a digression for this chapter.
112
it is different, but some components remain: a lack of syncopation, a minimum of dynamic change, 
simple symmetries, awkward placings of hands on head, little motion in the trunk as limbs make 
repeated shapes. In this sense he reclaims this dance as an autonomous space not because he 
has sequestered it through skill but because he cannot satisfy the heteronomous forces through 
which the frame of the dance came to be. This is a meeting of Gorz’s autonomous activity and 
Dejours’ work, where the space for autonomy is produced out of the visibility of the effort to meet 
the task and the creativity in overcoming the constraints. This, of course, results in a dance that 
captures the performance of a folk dance in what might be called a true sense. It is a dance of 
the people; a dance of a person. It is inexpert. It is done for the sake of doing it, rather than for the 
sake of performing it. It is its own end, danced to be danced despite the fact that it is put in front 
of witnesses. According to Gorz, if something is its own end then it works to satisfy the category of 
autonomous activity (1989).
And yet it is effortful. Kit shows concentration in his face, determined to meet the audience’s gaze. 
He is enthusiastic in his movements, punching them out gawkily. There is too much energy for 
what the choreography itself requires, and it is this abundance, this effort without gain, that resists 
the productivity, the efficiency, of the professional dancer. There is a thing called ‘a dance’ which 
Kit’s energies meet and then oddly exceed; this excess is his own. Kit has never learned in tech-
nique classes how to shift his weight easily, where to place his feet in relation to one another, how 
to extend through fingers or offer motion in the torso in relation to the actions of the legs. Amongst 
the other impacts it has, technical training is the prime productivity intervention of dance perfor-
mance, and Kit hasn’t undergone this ‘hack’; instead, his work is to iteratively expand his powers 
through the constraints in order to always not-meet the task determined by outside forces. Kit’s 
dance, despite his many practices of it, remains unproductive in dance’s terms: it is not particularly 
novel, it lacks flair, it does not have a normative grace. But through this it really becomes a dance, 
a dance qua dance, a dance in and for itself without it needing to produce qualities which reflect 
on the performer’s talent, skill or ability. This is a simple dance, a dance that is only dance, a dance 
that does not reflect on its own quality as a dance. Because of these complexes of statuses of this 
short moment of movement—a dance as a dance that resists the efficient production of dance’s 
values whilst abundantly producing-consuming energies, and, in so doing, solidifies itself as only a 
dance for itself and nothing else—it resonates with the residues of workerly activity whilst setting 
them to one side, or, from a Dejoursian point of view, it is work and it uses work’s paradox—that the 
task required cannot ever be met—to make space for something like autonomy.
As Helen Hester points out in an article for the Autonomy think tank, ‘work’ is not synonymous 
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with ‘effortful activity’ (2017). She’s not chiding, suggesting that because something is the result 
of effort that it somehow doesn’t deserve the reputation of work. Rather, she is offering the pos-
sibility that we can all do things that demand effort without it being absorbed by the wage rela-
tion, that the exchange of that effort and the time it takes to expend it does not have to be for the 
benefit of the extraction of value for capital’s coffers. She is reminding, as Gorz does, that even 
autonomous activity requires ‘work’, and to conflate lack of effort with non-work activities masks 
its energetic, interesting, enjoyable and personally and socially valuable potentials. This aesthetics 
of effort is particularly notable because it is not present in most of the rest of the performance, 
and, perhaps, because this visibility of effort is very common in much recent performance, which 
works towards unfolding clearly the work necessary to make it happen, through either descriptive 
or physical means. Dejours writes of the different visibilities of layers of work, noting that though 
some elements of production are made visible and even performed—through a range of theatrics 
from the drama of staying late at work every night to always being late for the next meeting, echo-
ing strongly Federico Campagna’s vivid description of contemporary labourers (2013)—the real 
work of creatively overcoming the gap between the assigned and actual work is always invisible. 
It is always bodily, sensorial, a corporeal-intelligent work which is difficult to see in usual places 
of work. But its invisibility is mostly derived from the fact that in order to do the work of work, to 
encounter the impossibility of completing an assigned task and to find ways around it, always 
involves going beyond the accepted protocols, norms or even rules (Dejours 2007). This necessar-
ily involves a clandestine approach. These visibilities are teased out and reordered very differently 
in most of Recreation, but, here in Kit’s solo, it is the effort itself, and the transformation that is 
happening as a result of Kit’s effort, the going-beyond that he is undertaking in order to attempt 
to meet the tacit, normative tasks that doing a usually dance entails, which is made abundantly 
visible.
Kit’s work in the folk dance solo has this sense of the autonomous in it. I can describe it as a kind 
of non-work, or identify how it exceeds or slides around work in a metaphorical or even conceptual 
or philosophical sense. I want to be clear, though, that I think that while this abstraction is useful 
for the development of a discussion, it is economically and even socially less-than-accurate. The 
truth is that Kit is a worker in rehearsal and on stage, and I am the employer. This is true in an 
economic sense, but also in a practical, relational sense, in that I have designed the framework 
in which Kit and the other performers operate; I have chosen what will happen and when. I am 
cautious to remind myself that these economic and social constraints limit or at least shape the 
emancipatory gestures of Recreation. Kit is not at all autonomous in this sense. When I began this 
project—both the research and Recreation as a performance thereof, I was convinced that the 
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only way I could retain a positive ethical position was by paying everyone involved. Now I can see 
that the reality is much more complex and nuanced: imagining that everything in the performance 
would have otherwise been the same, had Kit not been subject to role ‘worker’ but the role ‘partic-
ipant’, his dance may be more readily described as autonomous, done in his own time, absolutely 
voluntarily. But I think that this, too, is an error: even if he was a volunteer participant undertaking 
the activity as part of his free time, he would still be a contributing performer offering his dance 
under the gaze of the named choreographer—that’s me—who would expect certain actions to be 
undertaken at prescribed and validated times in designated places with predetermined relations 
to others. Dejours would certainly include this in his conception of work, regardless of the eco-
nomic relation. Choreography of this sort is necessarily a disciplinary undertaking, with ‘workers’ 
and ‘managers’, regardless of the status of the actors therein.
Kit’s dancing was not his way of making a living. He gave himself to this dance, and indeed to the 
project as a whole, with very few conditions. Equally I was not making Recreation in order to make 
a living; it was the focus of this PhD project, the doing of which supported me for three years, but 
I likely would have made it for some other reason in some other way had this not been the case. 
Kit was given money in relation to his participation in the project; that money did not come from 
me but administratively flowed through my bank account from a public source—most of the funds 
came from grants from Arts Council England, with some other monies directly or indirectly from 
state or charitable organisations in the main—so I really wasn’t exchanging my own cash for Kit’s 
dancing. More than that though, I think Kit and I, and the others, formed a relationship which really 
was about seeing one another unconditionally as contributors to a common goal in which we had 
differing roles. Once it was us, doing the things we do, it had to continue in that way—and, as in the 
Shoreditch Town Hall performance in which Kit was injured and could not perform—when some-
one else had to replace one of us, this unconditionality broke down and so did the autonomy of our 
various actions. Kit’s dance had to be Kit’s dance, in our relation with one another, in order to retain 
that relation and, circularly, the sense of autonomy, the lack of outside force, and the economic 
incommensurability of the danced contribution. Dejours repeatedly insists that to work is to live 
together (Dejours 2007, Dejours and Deranty 2010). The kind of living together that my collabora-
tors and I undertook was one of an economic relationship and a social one, which I hope to unfold 
more richly in the coming pages using both Gorz and Dejours.
Gorz describes autonomous activities as having three criteria: they are ‘performed at leisure, in 
co-operation with others and through the voluntary sharing of the tasks involved’ (1989:223). I find 
this a useful framework for thinking through of what recreation consists, neither problematically 
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overdetermined as described earlier, nor wading in a fog which prevents the possibility of envi-
sioning the future and dulls the rhetoric. Where Eva Swidler would turn to working class leisure 
pursuits to nourish and activate her leisure ethic, I would like to suggest that artistic practices—
here, Recreation—can also find ways to reveal and articulate the many nuances, ambiguities and 
uncertainties in of what this leisure ethic might consist. I think that artistic practices of different 
sorts may be able to refine and expand the leisure ethic and its associated actions in the conver-
sation between and synthesis of theory and practice which Tokumitsu finds essential for gaining 
post-work ground (2017). In order to work through this, I will turn once again to the performance 
Recreation, using Gorz’s three criteria for autonomous activities and working with them using 
Dejours’ conception of work, with the hope that writing through these ideas will not only demon-
strate something of the leisure ethic in action but will also complicate and extend the ideas of the 
thinkers on whose work I have so far been drawing.
Performed at Leisure
The longest-serving section of Recreation is called ‘Mermaids’. Its development began on the 
very first day of the research and development period in January 2016. In fact, its inception came 
much earlier, in another performance of mine with the Danish choreographer Karen Lambaek; the 
second half of the double bill we made in 2012, DOUBLE ACT, was entitled The Mermaid and the 
Hammer.
At the BALTIC performance in November 2017, the previous part, a section called Care Sculptures, 
has just happened. The audience has just watched the five dancers perform a series of poses, 
poses which have the effect of the bodies forming sculptural units with the set on stage. The set 
itself is composed of coloured mats and peach-beige firm foam, each carved into graphic shapes: 
circles, almost-triangles, ovals, and a very big cloud-shaped piece of foam which has next to it a 
smaller version of itself. The impression is something like a 21st century Hepworth exhibition if 
everything was squashed into a performance space, bodies and objects alternating their identities 
in a blending of human and non-human agents to reciprocally negotiate, decorate and support. It’s 
not just that it’s more densely-packed than Hepworth would ever have it, it’s also that it’s as if the 
sculptor’s smooth, hard forms have been made squashy in themselves, something akin to soaking 
bread in liquid very briefly. The forms are still solid and shapely, but the substance is spongey. It’s 
cuddly.
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The poses the performers take up amongst this set change slowly and carefully, the five moving 
from one freeze-frame to the next with a sense of purpose that ensures that it is clear that they are 
not, after all, at leisure. Work is associated with speed and productivity to the extent that leisure 
takes on a sort of mythical connection with the slow. Think of recreation and basking in the sun 
or pottering slowly around the garden come to mind, a meandering way of being, without veloc-
ity towards a goal. In Care Sculptures, though, there is a more tensile quality, a precision of pace 
and focus which makes it clear that this is not made up on the spot. The positions are not found 
through feeling; they’re known ahead and assumed. The performers are not engaged in that sort 
of wandering attention; they seem to be in something more like a flow state, that absorbed men-
tal-physical condition originally conceptualised within the context of work (Csikszentmihalyi 1975). 
Care Sculptures is being performed at leisure, but it’s a different kind of leisure; it’s a leisure that 
demands care and presence, interest and focus. The thing about Care Sculptures is that it’s really 
hard to do: it’s a fixed set of positions (adapted to the needs of the cast where necessary), learned 
very quickly over a couple of hours. Each frame involves a different number of performers in differ-
ent places on the stage, and the relationship between them is key, for if one is incorrect or missed 
out then the remaining sequence will not be able to proceed. The tempo is also fixed but nuanced; 
not every change has the same speed. This is a huge challenge for the guest performers in partic-
ular, and I can sometimes see them checking the faces of their more experienced colleagues from 
across the playing space, looking for clues as to when the right time might be to set off for the 
next image. The ‘leisure’ quality of Care Sculptures is more chess than rounders, more careful carv-
ing than distracted knitting. Care Sculptures offers a reminder of a different sort of leisure than the 
throwaway relaxation so easy to summon: a leisure with a deep presence.
This deep presence resonates with Dejours’ writing that work, under his definition, produces an 
intensification of subjectivity (Dejours and Deranty 2010). I am not suggesting that this is visi-
ble, here. I don’t think that the performers, if asked, would describing their experience as having 
intensified their subjectivities. But, as Dejours and Deranty explain, this intensification is corporeal, 
bodily: ‘the body, as it were, feels its own life more intensely and more fully’ (2010: 171), and, as 
such, is somewhat incommunicable, not fully understandable, perhaps, even to the subject them-
self. For Dejours, this contributes to the invisibility of real work; here, in the Care Sculptures sec-
tion of Recreation, something of this intensification is rendered not visible, exactly, but somehow 
otherwise sensible. It is through the choreography as a whole—what this section is made up of in 
terms of actions on stage, plus the set, and the lighting change, and the long text I am reading out 
at the same time, and the introduction made by one of the cast about how this section will work—
which seems to, after all, communicate something of this intensification which is a consequence of 
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the structure and enactment of a kind of activity called work. This communication is not linguistic 
or ocular but makes me think of the way in which American postmodern choreographer Deborah 
Hay describes the cell-to-cell communication of her practice (Foster 2006; Wilson 2013). This 
communication of the intensification of subjectivity—which always includes the body—towards an 
audience appears out of a set of circumstances which are, in the way I have described, leisurely, 
recreational. This complicates the binary of work and leisure, multiplying the axes along which to 
make decisions about categorisation and generating a way of being which houses one inside the 
other reciprocally, infinitely.
The first posture of Mermaids is the last posture of Care Sculptures. First, Amanda and Viki sit side 
by side, stage left, slightly downstage of centre. Their arms closest to one another form vectors 
perpendicular to the floor, where their palms take much of the weight of the upper body, the arm 
straight from wrist to shoulder. Their torsos and faces are straight on to the audience but by no 
means combative, the gaze direct but indistinct. Their bodies fall away from the arms in chevrons, 
upper legs at an angle to torso, lower legs at an angle to upper legs, feet at an angle to lower 
legs. The mind fills in the differences to mark that they are symmetrical, or notices the attempt 
towards symmetry and its real-life deviation. It is a sculpture of care, a positioning of the body that 
is careful, meticulous, just as placed as all the others but for the first time in the series this one is 
organised presentationally, in that the front of each body on stage faces the front of each body on 
the seats.
Next, Chris and Kit make the same positions further stage right, this time with feet connected 
instead of hands. They are the inverse posture, like two different sets of lions at a grand double 
staircase somewhere. Chris and Kit, not having had dance training as Amanda and Viki have, are 
ever so slightly less symmetrical. Just as the women are, they are different people of different 
sizes and different proportions, strengths, muscle tonus and the rest, but they are even more 
different from one another than the women. This is acceptable in the conditions, where posture 
after posture has been made, the bodies placed next to the measured perfect neat geometric set 
blocks and compared, made almost the same, forgiven for their unsynthetic animality. Chris and 
Kit are understood as quite the same neat formal posture, another care sculpture in the sense of 
carefulness, just as directly offered to the audience. Finally, Jenn positions herself between the 
two couples, her shoulder almost meeting Kit’s and her feet almost meeting Viki’s. She joins up 
the geometry, forming a line with V-shaped ups and downs from Amanda’s feet to Chris’ feet. The 
mermaids, each on her own rock adjacent to all the other rocks, or on one big long cliff facing the 
sea, are a care sculpture of a new kind, the most formal of them all.
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After a short while, roughly the length of one of the longer Care Sculptures images, the mermaids 
soften. Their chests hollow, shoulders sliding forward, side-bodies drooping. They might roll over so 
both hands reach the floor, knees remaining bent, body and face directed towards the side of the 
stage, or they might lower onto a forearm, the weight shifting from acute pressure on hand and hip 
and spreading more evenly along the limbs. They might flip the direction of the pose altogether, 
facing the back of the stage, retaining the mermaid shape but on the other side of their body. The 
gazes lower or raise, not quite avoiding the audience but not taking any notice, either. The Mer-
maids dance begins. It is a small dance, and begins at its smallest point: the mouth. Each mermaid 
begins to enunciate, their tongue teeth lips cheeks chin and anything else that joins in moving in 
relation to one another, composing themselves collaboratively. Then the abdomen of each per-
former begins to move in strange staccato rhythms and swift swirls; ribs jut front and back or 
around, the spin curves from side to side, the sternum pulls through or pushes into the ribcage. 
The mouths don’t stop, so now there are ten points of action—five mouths, five abdomens—as well 
as the occasional shifts of angle or direction of the pose. Then a further five limbs join the dance, 
with each performers’ free arm, with all its articulations, shoulder and elbow and wrist and fingers, 
is brought into motion, following or echoing or replacing the movements of the mouths and torsos.
It is altogether an indistinct sort of dance, too definite and too directly shared amongst the per-
formers to be a random improvisation, too fluffy and undefined to be clearly anything in particular. 
It appears to be choreographed but only just choreographed. The performers are all doing the 
same thing and yet all doing it rather differently: their mouths don’t take the shape of the same 
words, or one person’s shoulder is the more active and for another it’s the wrist. There’s a wander-
ing feeling, a flickery wobbliness, something I’m just not managing to put my finger on in writing. It 
is, in many ways, the opposite of Care Sculptures:
Where Care Sculptures is definite, Mermaids is indefinite. Where Care Sculptures is linear, Mer-
maids is all at once. Where Care Sculptures is geometric, Mermaids is flickering. Where Care 
Sculptures is a few at a time, Mermaids is everyone always. Where Care Sculptures is big shapes, 
Mermaids is small motions. Where Care Sculptures is the whole space, Mermaids is a distinct area. 
Where Care Sculptures has audio accompaniment, Mermaids only has its own shuffly sounds. 
Where Care Sculptures waits to be seen, Mermaids unfolds in its own time.
I think I know what the performers’ attention is doing: what we have agreed is that they follow a 
whole song of their own choosing, mouthing the words and echoing the vocal line with their spine 
and arm. As they add in each additional sub-score, they can select which elements to include, 
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and how many. They are engaged in a considerable compositional task; unlike Care Sculptures, 
where the postures and their transitions are fixed, Mermaids is a score in which each performer is 
designing the details of their own practice. And, unlike Care Sculptures where the beginning-mid-
dle-end is known and in relation to which the performers can measure their energy and anticipate 
an ending, Mermaids is more or less the same throughout, but for a gentle crescendo through the 
staged introduction of different body parts. It is almost impossible for the performers to gauge the 
passing of time in this material (we tested this many times in rehearsal and the range of guesses 
for, say, a ten-minute rendition of the score, could be anything from six to 25 minutes). As a result 
of the combination of complexity and open-endedness, the relative solipsism, the performers take 
on the audience’s wandering focus, as they let the mental music permeate their actions.
In contrast, I sense the audience’s attention drawing in. Care Sculptures, with its two main com-
ponent parts—the movements and the text—which rub against one another, proposes a kind of 
overwhelm, an impossibility of following everything. With the invitation to let the mind wander, this 
results in a form of spectatorship which opens out, mirroring the use of the whole stage space, 
all brightly lit. For Mermaids, the lights draw in to focus only on the performers as they deviate 
little from the formal, ridged line they produce the moment Jenn assumes her position. Similarly, 
I notice my maker-spectator attention sucked into what they are doing, following one performer 
for a while through her arm gesturing, or then noticing the counterpoint relation between the rib 
actions of two others. I enjoy the restful, meandering nature of my attention which is not going 
beyond what I am watching, as I imagine the attention of the spectators to be during Care Sculp-
tures, but a gentle noticing of that which arises and falls away, of what tickles at my perception 
and then disappears, within the choreography. This isn’t that flow state that the performers of Care 
Sculptures might experience; it’s not a direct switch of performer and audience states. Rather, it’s 
a reconfiguration of the recreational. Here, I speculate, the audience and the performers are as 
close to one another in manner of being than they have been anywhere else. It is towards the end 
of the show and they have been, quite literally, through a lot together. I get the impression that 
everyone is sufficiently practised now, everyone has become accustomed to one another and to 
the situation, to such a degree that everything can slacken. It’s a drawing-in to oneself and being 
open to the other. It’s a different sort of performance at leisure. This is the sort of leisure that 
leisure brings to mind: this is sitting in a garden on the evening of a hot day with good friends, not 
speaking because there’s nothing to say. There is no awkwardness, for nothing more than this is 
expected.
This exchange of qualities, of modes of attentiveness, between cast and audience, is a moment 
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of sociality which renders the social context of the event perceptible. It is a reminder that this is 
not so much a cultural artefact, done and dusted, where it is the audience that is engaged in the 
social, in their night out or gallery visit with friends; equally it is not the kind of performance where 
the operations on stage are what produces the sociality at stake only, with the spectators there as 
witnesses. In Recreation, though the performers and the cast are engaged in mostly very different 
activities, there is a common sociality produced through a subtle switching of positions, a nuanced 
movement between who is working for whom and in what way. I think that there has been a lot of 
work, in both the material and social ways Dejours categorises work (2007), as resistances against 
the world in different planes. But this work has made possible a sociality of solidarity, of belonging, 
overcoming together the difficulties of work to produce something like a recreational space within 
which the activity of work is suspended, the effects and affects of the effort humming in relational-
ity but not in continuous action.
Apart from for me. This is the end of the performance I have worked on in different ways for several 
years. Soon, at the end of Mermaids and after a short coda which follows it, the performance will 
be over and I will have to face the audience. I am no better at gauging the length of this section 
than anyone else, so we have a system with the technical operator who times the section and 
gives a hidden cue at a designated moment. I don’t know when this will happen; I can’t seem to 
sensitise myself to this, however hard I try. So after a while trying to be present to and even enjoy 
the work of the cast, I start to worry. I try to discreetly look at my watch, remembering if we started 
on time. I try to sneak a peek at the technician’s table. At the Shoreditch Town Hall, London per-
formance of Recreation in October 2017 I found myself willing with all my energies that Amanda 
would feel that somehow this had gone on much longer than usual and she would catch my eye 
and understand through eye contact alone that it would be a good moment to take her cue and 
calmly leave the stage, starting the cascade that ends Mermaids. The tension in my body and mind 
during most of Mermaids is not leisurely, not for me. It is agonising, like waiting for exam results 
and waiting for a text message response from a new boyfriend all at the same time. It is in this 
moment when I feel most alone in the performance. For the first time I feel that the performers 
and the spectators are operating in the same leisurely plane, albeit in different forms. They are 
basking, their thought-behaviour permitted, whatever it is, transparent in what Dejours would call 
their ‘deontic activity’, their working around the task however they can, individually and collectively. 
I am not doing what the performance would have me do: I am working, working in the sense that 
my sense of self is bound so tightly with the success of the work that there is no space whatsoever 
for me to find another way of being; and, moreover, that’s not how I ‘should’ be. I’m no longer the 
bridge between the stage and the auditorium through my work as a choreographed voice from the 
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audience but cast out as cast and audience come closer through their own modes of action. I am 
feeling strongly the sense of suffering that Dejours says is always contained within work (2007), 
and, in this moment, I cannot find the positive, life-affirming effects.
In Co-operation
Near the beginning of Recreation there is a spell. To perform this spell, the five performers stand 
almost shoulder-to-shoulder in an arc slightly upstage left. They each stand on two feet, balanced, 
the spaces between them just more than what would be comfortable and necessary in every-
day life, like the careful spacing between the newly-shaped, scarcely-practised letters a primary 
school child might form in a handwriting exercise. Like this writing, the standing together is both 
simple and commonplace, replicating a usual phenomenon with an extra touch of staging, of care.
Each of the performers come from their previous locations, either offstage or within the space, 
finding efficiently but casually this collective posture. Hands are by sides, waiting. This is the first 
time the costume as a whole is displayed, leisure-wear in pastel blue and pink, and navy. Each per-
former has their own version of the combination, navy t-shirt with pale blue jogging bottoms, or a 
column of baby pink. They could be a sports team of some sort, or a 90s pop band just starting out, 
still with their day jobs in cafes and schools and offices, with not enough money for a designer or 
stylist but with a few quid to get something matching-ish from the Internet. The costume collects 
them whilst asserting their differences, not only through the variation in colour but also by demon-
strating their bodily differences through the measuring apparatus that is the same clothes of the 
same proportions, even in different sizes. Tall guest performer Chris’ trousers are shorter than he 
might accept offstage, the legs of the trousers dangling straight down with no rumpling; Viki’s, in 
contrast, reach right past her ankles and ruffle outwards as they compress, accordion-like, down 
her short legs.
Kit offers a note. He is good at remembering notes. It is an F natural. Each of the others uses 
Kit’s note to find their own, the same one or an octave either side. They check and double-check 
themselves with the others, necks slightly straining forwards to hear whilst staying put. They are 
connecting with one another for the first time, preparing for the first collective action. The fact 
that this is a primarily a sung action demands this connection (as well as a lot of rehearsal); it is 
extremely obvious to all but the least-musical in the room if it is incorrect. I get the impression that 
the performers enjoy this moment, feeling a bit like an orchestra tuning up, knowing that this is at 
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least as interesting as what the preparation is for, for its announcement of a mystery follow-up as 
much as for its satisfying audible properties. Another image flickers: they are, in my mind, a bunch 
of celebrity singers around a microphone waiting to record their parts in a charity single, hovering 
upwards and inwards with their gazes, one hand on ear with the other hand available for gestural 
analogies for their increasingly melismatic offerings.
The first vocalisation responds to this image, or perhaps I have this image in my mind now 
because, of course, I always know what is to come. There are four notes, sung once and then twice, 
as a repetition. There are three parts: a harmony, a melody and a drone, based on part of the cho-
rus of Donna Summer’s 1977 disco hit I Feel Love. The manner is projected and the sound loud. The 
five performers turn their attentions and their torsos towards the audience, addressing them with 
over-the-top arm and hand gestures reminiscent more of a spoof opera singer than a real profes-
sional classical vocalist. It’s a burst of energy in all directions, arms intuitively moving slightly back 
on the inhale and then pulsing out and extending and extending a little more over the course of 
the exhale, over the course of the four notes if they manage it, reaching as much for the audience 
as out of themselves. There’s a hint of competition in the overlapping of arms as each performer 
stretches their upper limbs beyond the neat gap given to them by the others’ careful placing.
And then they stop.
They pause, rest.
That was merely a teaser, maybe an amuse-bouche, a little burst of a familiar trope of perfor-
mance—a kind of hammy, panto-esque charade of performers showing off—to tickle the audi-
ence’s attention before the spell proper begins.
First Kit. Kit sings his four notes, the melody, twice. Kit has a soothing, calm voice, musically very 
accurate, which is tremendously soothing and calming for me because I have almost no doubt that 
it will happen exactly as we have planned and practised it without embellishment or error. To a new 
hearer, I imagine it is also soothing and calming, a pleasant voice to hear, a tonic for the brazen 
bellowing of just seconds before. The others join in one-by-one, bringing in lower and higher parts. 
As they sing, they sing more and more together, listening less to the frequencies of the watchers 
watching and more to the frequencies of their fellow doers. It is very soft, and as slow as their 
lungs can manage: each sequence of four notes takes up one very full breath. This means that 
they are breathing together, the core of their very different bodies operating in the same rhythm, 
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not in the almost-togetherness of choreographed unison, always always always slightly off and 
recreated as ‘unison’ in the spectators’ minds, but a real unison of body and voice, or five bodies 
and five voices, or indeed of one body and one voice made up of everyone cooperating. Co-operat-
ing, working together, working together only.
This is, perhaps, a little hopeful. In Dejours’ writing on work, co-operation is placed in conceptual 
opposition and practical parallel with co-ordination. Co-ordination is analogous to the official task 
at hand in the context of work: it is the external control of the activities of workers through pro-
cedures and managerial actions. It is the management from above of the relationships between 
workers. Co-operation, on the other hand, could be seen as analogous to the actual work workers 
undertake in relation to the official, prescribed task. It is the self-organising of the workers them-
selves against, outside of or alongside the rules and instructions, which together produces a dif-
ferent kind of living together. As in the individual, it arises only in relation to its prescribed partner. I 
think something similar is happening here: I established the rules. I have choreographed, managed 
the performers into a particular situation—so they are not ‘working together only’, but working 
together in relation to my direction. But I am far from responsible for all that they do, and this 
additional way of communicating, organising and working together necessarily has to go beyond 
and sometimes against my suggestions or prescriptions. This extended co-operation can only be 
realised if co-ordination exists; without it, the group would have no context for being together, and 
their co-operation would not be this collaborative invention.
This does not mean that everyone does the same thing. Viki has the responsibility of initiating the 
main body of the spell. Viki has a similar responsibility throughout Recreation for, for whatever 
reason, as yet unknown, she seems to have a sense of time more accurate than the others. Viki 
always knows how long to do something to have it feel right, by which I mean it feels right to me, 
right to me in relation to what feels right for the others. Viki has the responsibility of guiding time 
from the stage because I cannot guide the time effectively from the seats. Viki guides the time 
not as a boss but as the person with this specific skill who can then draw in the others, just as Kit 
offers the note. Their contributions are not born of authority but of responsibility to the others, and 
the responsibility doesn’t exist if the others aren’t in, too. This is co-operation. Viki takes up her 
by taking up her hands, softly bringing them into action. They rise slowly but definitively, just as 
clouds are soft and light and barely-there but barely there is still most certainly there. She begins 
to form soft shapes with her hands, as if rolling a ball between them, or using one to pick up and 
put down something like the lightest softest balls of dough, maybe those Japanese steamed buns 
called bao, whose name makes one’s mouth into the shape of how they feel, round, and shapely 
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and empty at the same time. Viki’s gestures are the same: full of nothing.
The four others use Viki’s gestural dancing as the cue to test if they, too, are ready to do their 
version of the same dance. I seem them deciding, not wanting to go all at once but still animated 
with the impulse that a set cue has. They see in their peripheral visions each other and line up their 
own desire to move with a common composition. Their gazes fold in, but that doesn’t mean they’ve 
stopped working together. It’s as if, without the visual part of themselves activated, the ten hands 
find the same hazy space, the same softness in connective tissues, the same confident, doughy 
quality. This isn’t always the case: at BALTIC it seemed to work particularly well, the five northeast-
erners stepping in line to one another, everyone speaking in roughly the same way in rehearsals 
somehow resulting in everyone dancing roughly the same way on stage.
They are still singing, and the singing and movement of the hands direct themselves towards 
one another, drawing together, coming close in both texture and, somehow, space. Each dancer 
is absorbed in the casting of their own spell, each shaping a different set of actions softly, softly, 
softly. They are based on a slowed-down, re-oriented set of actions from cooking, either the cook-
ing of a favourite recipe for a person you love, or, for variation, the gestures of a TV chef squeezed 
through the same choreographic manipulations. Only I know this along with the performers, and 
maybe the few other collaborators who have seen this part being rehearsed. I am trying to unknow 
this so that I can see what else might be happening, but this feels impossible with this particular 
section, and, in fact, several audience member friends mentioned independently that this part 
looked like cooking. Everyone’s cooking a different recipe: Amanda makes a sturdy shepherd’s pie, 
Viki a flamboyant Jamie Oliver fish dish, Kit a soothing noodle soup. Together, the five performers 
are preparing a feast, a feast whose stirring, delicious scents are carried by their voices to the 
audience and beyond. The feast arises from the imaginary cauldron between them, the appear-
ance of each dish arising only in dependence on the preparatory actions of everyone: Kit’s ramen 
can only exist if Amanda’s pie does too.
The singing echoes this interdependence: as the singers get tired, either physically or from the 
boredom of mostly repeating the same four notes over and over, they can drop out for a round or 
two, or, in some cases, choose to sing a different line for a while. (This second option happened 
a lot at BALTIC because, fortuitously, both guest performers were unusually strong singers. It 
happened much less at, say, Shoreditch Town Hall, at which Kit was too injured to perform and 
the guest performers were vocally less confident.) I still don’t fully understand how they did this: 
this section was often rehearsed with guidance from the core performers while I took part in 
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technical preparations and, though the idea and its practice were developed in rehearsals under 
my direction, it seems I have forgotten how it works. I suspect it works differently now, anyway; I’d 
be reminded every time I watch it otherwise. It is, as such, quite as enigmatic for me as it is for the 
spectators. I hear different lines becoming stronger, the descant line appearing here and there, 
Viki’s high drone fortified by Chris’ bass tones. I hear a duet of two higher voices, and then, without 
discussion or negotiation, they stop to be replaced by the harmony, dangling low and alone. I know 
it can’t be totally fixed, these comings and goings—there’s simply not enough time in the rehearsal 
process to realise a set score of that complexity—but the performers know what they are doing 
and what the others are doing without much hesitation. It seems like magic. And, all the while, the 
hands are moving, holding everything down, keeping everyone going, performing a magic of their 
own.
According to Dejours, work is a domain in which an individual’s subjectivity makes itself known 
to itself, develops its powers, expands its capacities—it performs a magic of its own. Doing this 
in relation to others, through co-ordination and co-operation, extends these potentials and elab-
orates them interpersonally and socially. This involves a commitment to ‘mobilising the workers’ 
determination in order to ward off violence in the disputes or conflicts that might arise from 
disagreements over the ways of working’ (Dejours 2010: 83). This requires not only a kind of 
going-along-with but another layer of dedicated action—‘deontic activity’—which is beyond the 
basic needs of the task but is undertaken in order to work together, which, for Dejours, is always 
living together. This deontic activity exposes the fact that working together is not self-evident but 
involves additional effort (Dejours 2010). Part of this effort is offered in not an excess but in a with-
drawal or holding-back: it is ‘limiting one’s intelligence and subjectivity’, the very things that are 
exercised and stretched and even produced through work for the benefit of all involved (Dejours 
2010: 83). As such, working together is a necessarily social, companionate act, which includes 
something of a sacrifice of one’s own desire to transform. This is apparent in the spell, where each 
of the performers is subtly, delicately moderating their own performance in relation to the oth-
ers. This might be about making their movements smaller, or lighter, or share a quality similar to 
their neighbouring performer, in order to support the others. It could be, conversely, about singing 
louder, or more regularly, or not taking a break when they might. It means putting the collective 
transformation, the joint magic, before that of the individual’s own desire to sing or not sing, move 
or not move, and certainly above the rules agreed beforehand with me. I want to emphasise that 
this is not about equality, of effort or visibility on stage or of skill, but about both prior, explicit and 
in-the-moment, tacit agreements to co-operate on the basis of who is there and what is happen-
ing. Dejours’ vision of work and the language he uses to describe it is vivid—for him, it is intimately 
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related to celebrating life (Dejours 2010), and this involves an attentiveness to life itself as it 
unfolds.
With the same seeming knowing, the same practised magic, the same agreement between them, 
the singing stops. I know the performers have planned this but it still feels like a surprise; I can’t 
figure out what the rule is to make it end. Then, one by one, the hands stop dancing and come 
to each person’s sides. The fact that the spectators are not given the rules but that it is clearly 
neither totally fixed nor entirely chance brings to the fore the spell’s cooperative nature, and its 
relation to an outside co-ordinator. By setting apart these five people from the others in the room 
in their knowing of how what is happening is happening, their groupness is emphasised. This could 
be true of any performance, of course, but what is emphasised here is the suspended, partial 
transparency, the feeling that it should be possible to figure it out, and yet the hidden cues, the 
private rules, the mystery of their co-operation. The subtle difficulty of the multiple harmonies, the 
detailed movements, the simultaneity of the parts in each person, and the ongoing collaborative 
composition which appears to shift and come to an end without a cue, points to the work under-
taken in rehearsal. This work is not just graft, it seems, explication or repetition of a set of predeter-
mined activities, but the work of co-operation itself, the delicate, careful work of coming together 
to come together in work. Co-operation itself is emphasised in a pouring of individual efforts into 
swirling, shared pot.
Here the spell transforms, first into a common swaying, a shy bouncing, as the performers attempt 
to find a common pulse. It’s a strange moment, their shared folding into the spell suddenly opened, 
with silence making things weird. Why did they stop? It seemed like the right thing to do. No more 
than that. They know each other and what’s happening and just felt it out, together. In the move-
ment that follows it’s as if you can see their side-eye bodily listening, the occasional glances at 
one another’s knees to see if they’re aligned, or at least on their way. After a short while they find 
one another again, with full eye contact and energetic bouncing at the knees. Before long I find 
myself internally bouncing with them, egging them on, my body a barely-moving cheerleader. I 
wonder if the other people watching are there too, or if it is only me joining in, choiceless in my 
nervous system’s response to the insistent pulsation. I wonder if their insides are participating. I 
think so. I hope so.
A movement is added. It takes up two bounces. The hands come together, right hand in left, palms 
upwards. 1–2. One person does it. It’s catching. Another does the same, some bounces later. And 
then there’s another movement, two hands rising and making a half-circle, altogether taking three 
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bounces. A silent musicality arises, with the bouncers each offering the same two movements at 
different moments. There’s unison, canon, counterpoint, ripples of action along the semi-circle in 
which they stand or moments of connection between opposite performers, choreographic devices 
appearing only as a consequence of the score; it’s too complicated to arrange in advance (for me, 
at least). It’s a complicated drum line played across five players, or maybe a Meredith Monk vocal 
work with no sound, sound replaced by action. The mode of reception appears not to be looking 
but listening, as if each has their eyes closed. I watch them like watching an orchestra, the seeing 
supporting the hearing, enriching it but not replacing it. It’s not just the performers who are co-op-
erating, but the senses that seem to co-operate, working dependently on one other, shifting from 
the humming dreamy haze of commonality in the early sub-section to this pseudo-synaesthesia 
here.
A performer says a number. 4. A few more bounces. 1. Bouncing, bouncing. 3, 4. And on, with the 
performers adding numbers. I devised this game, where the performers match the numbers in the 
bar with those already gone before, inserting their offering at random moments, but it still makes 
me nervous. It’s very difficult. If one person goes off, says a 3 when the shared number determined 
by the previous utterances is 2, it is obvious, and a huge challenge to reset. Each performer must 
work with incredible concentration on their own internal counting, whilst being receptive and avail-
able to changing in case someone makes an error; they need to give up where they are and reform 
the collective thought in order to proceed. Besides the need to correct mistakes, the performers 
need to be near-clairvoyant—connected in their co-operation—to anticipate others’ verbal offer-
ings in order to, as before, work with a shared improvised choreography within the score. There’s 
no I in TEAM, they say, but there is in CO-OPERATION, right there, a vowel sneaking in to distort 
the sound of its preceding consonant, and it is this internal-external, individual-shared, alone-to-
gether aspect of this game that makes it both so precarious and so engaging. The interlocking of 
individual work at the service of a shared outcome is what charges the space. My cheerleading 
impulse gets stronger, like it’s the last few moments of a sporting event and my team is winning 
but only just. It feels risky. I think the spectators see what is happening, are perhaps counting 
along too, understanding the rules in a way that they couldn’t with the spell. I hope that they are 
also supporting my guys, willing them to get through it. It’s seductive, compelling, enveloping, this 
collective endeavour, this game so close to being lost at any moment.
The performers build the intensity of the game, adding more numbers whilst attempting to keep 
the physical composition going. The more numbers, the easier it is, and the effort eases off into 
a more playful place, an enthusiastic shouting, the bellowing of a group of friends singing along 
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to a well-known song, maybe something that supports that bellowing. Oasis comes to mind. They 
are now resting, awaiting the next cue, which again comes from Viki: a gesture that she does only 
once. Her right hand makes a line at her left side, then her right, then drops down. Three bounc-
es-worth of movement, that’s all. At the next bar, where 1234 would be collectively started again, 
5678 is instead spoken with all the conviction and purpose of a children’s jazz dance teacher. 5678 
always means a new thing in dance; it always really means ‘go!’. And so they do, moving away from 
this spell of cooperation, into the next thing.
Voluntary Sharing
Sharing and cooperation are very close neighbours. Here, I’d like to think of sharing as sharing-out, 
the division of activities, of work and other things. As much as Recreation is made up mostly of 
group activities, there are numerous actions that are the responsibility of just one of the team. 
Three of the most visible solos are those I haven’t yet touched in writing. They come at the open-
ing and closing of the performance on stage.
When the lights first rise on the playing space, Viki sits alone near the back of the stage, framed by 
a backdrop many times her size; she is small, and it is large. She shares its colours, swathed as she 
is in sloppy, comfortable pale pink and pale blue, with her hair usually a colour complementary to 
Recreation’s design. She is singing into an invisible microphone, her left hand raised in a loose fist 
near her face. She’s singing a pop song from the 1990s, a familiar one, I think, to most in the room. 
She has a distinct tone to her voice, both deep in pitch and girlish, nasal. She has, as talent shows 
like to say, made the song her own: she has repitched the very high chorus so it’s nearer to the 
range in which the verse lands. It is not especially musically accurate or in any way spectacular, 
but there is a pleasure in hearing the recognisable song sung in a relaxed way. She rests herself on 
her free arm, weight on hip, vaguely facing the audience, or sits cross-legged, body leaning for-
ward. At one point she kneels, seat on feet, facing stage left, body upright, and the extra space the 
position creates affords her the room for grooving, beating the tempo with tiny pulses coming from 
within. 
Amanda enters as Viki is making her way slowly towards the pile of scenography upstage left on 
which the latter woman then sits, watches, and waits for her next bit. On the floor is a square of 
red tape marking the playing space, which the performers only leave to indicate their being ‘off’. 
Amanda enters stage right and stands firmly on the upstage right corner of the taped square. She 
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is Olga Korbut, about to take a gold medal at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. She is poised, 
prepared. She raises her arm to the V of the gymnast and proceeds accordingly. Instead of enter-
ing the space, though, she follows the red line across the back of the space, the tape becoming a 
beam. She hops and skips, leaps and lands. Given that she is not, after all, a Belarussian teenage 
gymnast from the 20th century, but an arts manager and former dancer in her mid-40s from Nor-
thumberland, she does not complete the most acrobatic moves, instead indicating somersaults 
and cartwheels with angled turns, arms spread wide to represent all four outstretched limbs. 
Despite not completing the most athletic feats, Amanda’s dancing resembles Korbut’s rhythmic 
complexity and mischievous charm. There are little leg flicks and turns of the head like a panto-
mime deer, and a neatness of hands and feet, all pointed, and a delicate poise. After a couple of 
laps, Amanda takes out her ponytail, takes a foam block from the pile, and lies over it, centre stage, 
blonde hair spread out in a fan facing the audience.
This lying back posture is echoed at the end of the show. As the performers leave one-by-one, 
each venue’s female-identifying guest performer takes another block—different for each per-
former, depending on the space’s sight lines and her height—and lies back on it. Where possible, 
her hips and knees are higher than her head: she is descending, literally putting her feet up. First 
this role was performed by Lauren, Yorkshire Dance’s Facilities Manager. Then it was Jen (one n) 
who works on the bar at ARC in Stockton. In London it was Shoreditch Town Hall’s Front of House 
Manager, Zena. Most recently it was Jenn (two ns), who is part of BALTIC’s Crew, mostly doing 
invigilation in the galleries. Each took the block we had decided, moved it to a new place on the 
stage if necessary, and gently, carefully, assumed her pose. After a short rest, she began to sing 
to whomever was remaining on stage, which changed at each place as the performance was 
adjusted. Actually, she didn’t sing to them, but they were there, and they listened, just as she didn’t 
sing to the audience but we were there, and we listened. Exceptionally fortunately, each of these 
women turned out to be singers ranging from pretty good to outstanding. Each sang a variation 
of I Love to Love, a British disco classic. It’s a song that has a sweetness in tone; it compares the 
two leisure activities, club dancing and recreational sex. A cappella, and singing slowly with many 
pauses, Recreation’s guest performer made the song languid and melting, quite like her posture. 
Her fellow stagegoers peel off one-by-one, leaving her singing alone, projecting her high voice 
into the air above her, not quite directed anywhere. When she has finished the parts of the song 
that she had prepared, she gracefully tips herself off her plinth and walks offstage, ending the 
performance.
These are not the only solo elements in Recreation; I have described and discussed those others 
130
elsewhere. These three also share certain qualities: they are performed by women, and these 
women are doing things for which they are not trained; the activities are not part of their work life 
proper. Each solo activity is composed of a performance event—singing or gymnastics—which has 
its own clearly-defined and recognisable criteria of being done well. Even if Recreation’s perform-
ers had the skills to undertake these tasks—such as the guest performer always really being able 
to sing—the possibility of her doing so adequately was distorted, made difficult: Viki’s song was 
not in her range, Amanda didn’t have the correct gymnastic equipment or space, Lauren/Jen/
Zena/Jenn’s posture is distinctly unfavourable for singing. The solos heighten and make visible the 
resistance that is required for an activity to be work. Each solo section has a choreography which 
involves the demarcation and prescription of a specific task, and an exaggerated problem in the 
way of that happening, making apparent Dejours’ ‘real’ (Dejours 2007:73). This real is that which 
comprises what work is in work; it ‘manifests itself to the subject through its resistance to proce-
dures, know-how, techniques, and knowledge’ (Dejours 2007:73). In these solos, the real of work is 
made visible at the same time as the quality of recreation is maintained. In so doing, the perform-
ers are operating between their knowns and their unknowns, each inventing new versions of the 
work and of herself. 
Together these three solos and their soloists share the burden of some of Recreation’s politics, 
a politics of alternative excellences, a phrase Peggy Olislaegers used after seeing the Yorkshire 
Dance preview version of the show. I think this means, here, that the solos work to expose the 
‘deontic activity’ of work, that which, as Dejours has it, has to happen in order to find one’s way to 
satisfying the assigned task but which is not part of, or may even be contrary to, the rules of the 
situation, in collusion with others: the other collaborators support the production of and contin-
uation of the rules which the soloists require to continue with their work. The performers meet 
their tasks—they sing or do gymnastics—but their effort to overcome the resistance of the mate-
rial world—the very definition of work, according to Dejours—produces this extra action which is 
usually hidden (Dejours 2007). Because this task-plus-resistance is built into the choreography 
it has the effect of making important that which is usually hidden, of celebrating the alternative, 
the other ways of doing things, and the other ways of things being ‘excellent’. Crucially, none of 
these solos display the kinds of aesthetics of effort discussed with regards to Kit’s folk dance solo 
earlier in the chapter. These sections are not about showing effort in that way. Instead, they are 
limited to a tonal plane which is about either luxuriously languishing, or exuberantly playing. As 
such, work-as-effort—work in Dejours’ sense—comes to meet recreation, and recreation itself is 
shown as requiring work. To make this possible, each of the performers share part of her process 
of work, in the slightly romantic way in which Dejours sometimes describes it: the revelation of the 
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new powers of the body, the new range of feelings, the corporeal challenge. There is something 
personal about each of the solos: they are slightly embarrassing things to do, to sing inexpertly or 
with difficulty, or to pretend to do gymnastics as an adult woman. The performers, then, share of 
the intimate challenge of work, the intimate nature of the unfolding relationship between them-
selves and the apparatus of the choreography, including the space and the set and the light and 
the time and the audience through this potentially embarrassing action. This sharing may not have 
been entirely voluntary—not spontaneously so, in any case, as its form was devised in advance—
but it was done willingly, and, I think, with some keenness.
The sharing-out of activities was mirrored in the process of making the performance. I found 
myself with this large, complex project to run, and I felt overwhelmed. For the most part, I tried to 
keep this to myself or discuss it with outside eye Roberta or producer Beckie. But it seeped out, 
with my arriving on mornings of work very tired or exposing my stress increasingly in conversa-
tions with Amanda, Kit and Viki. So, willingly and voluntarily, people started to take extra things on. 
Amanda laundered the costume. Viki took care of filming things. Kit found the app for setting the 
note. Lighting designer George sewed a bit of extra fabric onto the backdrop when we found our-
selves in a theatre with a higher rig. Roberta made a draft of the show a few days before the pre-
view when I couldn’t see what was happening any more (I didn’t use her version, but it still helped). 
Beckie steamed the backdrop. Everyone carried set up and down and in and out, seemingly end-
lessly. It is so hard to admit to these things because it so closely enacts the components of some 
forms of exploitation, where a role expands beyond the confines of the contract and the agreed 
remuneration for those responsibilities, even though this is the very basis of capitalism. But I don’t 
think this was an exploitative action any more than the wage relation in any other well-mean-
ing context. The sharing was expansive in rather another direction. Just as the performers were 
not-really or not-quite professional performers in most cases, the cast and crew of Recreation also 
found themselves acting as not-really or not-quite logistics experts or documenters or wardrobe 
mistresses. This sharing of the burden, the sharing-out of the project’s actions, makes each person 
more than their prescribed role. In that way, the capacities that each person is not just invited but 
permitted to perform become broader, and begin to cross over with one another. 
To use Eva Swidler’s language, I think this is what makes a commons. The sharing out of activities 
beyond the narrow band of a professional role within which an individual’s contribution should be 
channelled—even when that role is to be a non-professional performer—allows for a deep sharing 
that goes beyond slicing the pie, dividing the operations into chunks. Instead it produces overlap, 
repetition, abundance of willingness, each turn of generosity producing more and more of it. The 
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collective contributions come together to produce a way of being and a set of shared actions 
that are both deeply tied to their originator and free from individual ownership. The sharing itself 
is what makes the commons: it’s not what the individuals share but that they share, that there 
is sharing, creating an environment in which sharing is increasingly possible. But in that sharing 
each person must do something distinct, their own, somewhat unshared in a context of sharing. I 
tried to set up a process where there were opportunities to reflect on the offerings of each person 
involved, such as check-out conversations at the end of the day in which each person was thanked 
by another for a specific contribution they made. This wasn’t an attempt to manipulate the atmo-
sphere or to mask the real situation of the work as work, but to invigorate an alternate possibility, 
to acknowledge the giving that was already happening as noticed and valued by everyone. I was 
not the only arbiter of what kinds of offers were merited congratulation; each person rejoiced in 
the merits of another without my intervention. I too was one of the group. My generosities, even 
in the context of a production that was ‘mine’, were celebrated. The things in which we rejoiced 
were never the ‘productive’ components: it was never about a top-notch lighting state or a song 
well sung. It was always about the things around and beyond the tasks themselves, the additional 
activity that each person and the group needed to do to make things work: kindnesses, charac-
ter traits, attitudes, and how these appeared in action. As a result, these closing rituals became 
another way to recognise and make space for the real of work.
This co-opting and adaptation of the Buddhist practice of rejoicing in merits was very enjoyable. 
It is designed to invoke positive emotion and a sense of connectedness with others and it did 
that in the rehearsal rooms of Recreation. I think the performers of the three solos I have here 
described also very much enjoyed their individual sections. I could see them glimmering, excited 
for those parts, wishing to rehearse them not only to be able to do them well and confidently and 
comfortably but because it was fun to do that, fun to sing dreamily or sleepily, fun to lie down on 
the foam, fun to pretend to be Olga Korbut (Korbut is, truly, Amanda’s all-time hero). That these 
activities were fun, even recreational, for Amanda, Viki and the guest performers does not undo 
their non-voluntary status. They shared the work, as all my colleagues did in the rehearsal process, 
but it was not really up to them what they did and how they did it and when they did it. They were 
participants in the process but the final decision was mine. I feel uneasy about this, about writing 
this down, about confessing that Recreation doesn’t satisfy this aspect of recreation. I would like 
to go back a few paragraphs, focus on the ways in which the people around me spontaneously and 
enthusiastically volunteered themselves for things. They did do that, and it did all the heart-open-
ing I want to turn towards; it is a glimpse of the recreational utopia I would like to dream up. But it 
appeared through work, through thought and consideration and planning and direction. It is not 
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only this wage or employer relation which made it work, but the physical, psychical and relational 
efforts that each person and the group together made. It is through the setting of work tasks—by 
me or by whomever—and the constant and dedicated effort to creatively meeting and working 
through the difficulty, or ‘suffering’, of failing and transforming that made it possible for something 
like recreation to make itself known and felt and enacted. This suggests, perhaps, that this rec-
reational utopia beyond Recreation must be similarly manifested, not through the spontaneous, 
simultaneous arrival of the leisure ethic and the commons that Eva Swidler seeks, but through the 
spaces of and action of work in its broadest sense.
Working towards Recreation
These three aspects of autonomous activities are not separate. As I hope I’ve shown, Recreation 
expresses these qualities in ways that are overlapping and interdependent. I’ve used parts of the 
performance and its creation as a way of exploring the ideas, and the ideas as a way of exploring 
the performance; I could have configured the elements differently to illuminate each in a different 
way but no less productively. Moreover, I have attempted to think through some of the ways in 
which autonomous activities are not exactly autonomous, or properly fitting to a sphere that could 
be called recreation, without a conception of work.
In order for this to happen, I have had to follow Christophe Dejours to a more open understanding 
of work, in which all activities that involve the experience of the resistance of the material or social 
worlds, encountered in the effort towards completing a task, are included. This naturally involves 
extending ‘work’ to mean something beyond that which is purely economic, and can include things 
that, for André Gorz, would be work-for-oneself or -oneselves or autonomous activities. Politically, 
this seems a crucial move, but one that should be made carefully. I note that this does not simply 
suggest that all things are work, because that does precisely the life-destroying sucking-in of all 
things into the economic sphere which need not be, fortifying claims that work absorbs all human 
energies and depletes us towards other things. That is not the kind of expansion I am advocating. 
It seems crucial to follow Dejours to remind ourselves that many other things which involve work-
ful effort exist, and that, indeed, they cannot and should not be economically rationalised. This 
allows a shameless attention to broader human interests, endeavours and powers which need not 
be validated by them being called ‘work’, in the economic sense. As a result, those who direct their 
efforts—‘autonomously’ or otherwise—towards other things in other domains (including child-rear-
ing, art-making, community organising and so on) would no longer need to justify their activities by 
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calling them economic work, comparing them to economic work, or through any other apology for 
using their capacities to something other than economic or somehow para-economic ends (such 
as training for future work). This begins to make space for something called recreation, activities 
that can be suspended, perhaps, in a category called ‘autonomous activities’ despite emerging 
from and through different forms of effort. This kind of activity might be predicated upon or other-
wise involved with work-as-effort but has itself as its own end. Thinking recreation through work, 
surprisingly, allows recreation and its qualities to properly be seen. I think that this is what I have 
tried to uncover through the performance Recreation and in thinking about it in this chapter.
Despite the fact that it is possible to extend the conception of work fruitfully, much work in con-
temporary society is in relation to some kind of economic purpose. Many people still work many 
hours in employment of some kind. What Dejours’ thinking suggests is that this is not as bad as 
we might think. I propose this cautiously, because to see anything positive in work seems to risk 
underwriting some of contemporary labour’s harmful effects; Dejours himself argues that contem-
porary management practices cause ‘the collapse of the ground that allows individuals to rec-
ognise what they have in common, what they share, and what lies at the very basis of their confi-
dence in one another’ (2007: 86). Nonetheless, Dejours’ main argument is that work is also the way 
in which human capacities transform and develop, where subjectivities intensify, where people live 
together. As such it is a kind of training ground or development opportunity if, as he writes, ‘what 
emerges from subjectivity in work is recognised and respected’ (2007: 85). I wonder about whose 
recognition and respect Dejours is calling for. If it is those who determine the structure of the man-
agement practices—the managers, consultants, capitalists—there is a risk that these things too 
will be co-opted into that which can be charged as economic work. If the workers ourselves could 
recognise and respect—really recognise and respect, not begrudgingly, not in-spite-of—then this 
would be an opportunity to subvert the domination of unwanted work and use what it can offer to 
our own ends. This is possible whether or not the managers attempt to take from what they see: 
transformations in subjectivity and in lived human relationships are not something, I hope, that 
can be stolen away thus. This is not the limit of Dejours’ political ambitions. Reminding that it is not 
only that society influences how we work but that modes of work influence society, he suggests 
that acknowledging and giving dignity to that in work which unleashes and extends the workers’ 
subjectivities has far-reaching consequences for how we imagine and organise ourselves beyond 
the domain of work proper. Seeing work for what it is—even celebrating it—can lead to emancipa-
tion (Dejours and Deranty 2010). 
One of the obvious but helpful things about performance is that it places work in a social context, 
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meeting a certain kind of social reality the moment an audience walks in (if not before). This allows 
the work that takes place in a performance to have, perhaps, a more direct address to something 
called society, and to feel a rebound or other effect, in something close to real time. This chapter 
on recreation as a form of non-work and perhaps as the form of non-work crucial to the develop-
ment of post-work futures was always going to appear in this thesis, given the title of the perfor-
mance which occupies its centre. At the time, the naming of the performance was a response to a 
sort of hunch; it was named, in fact, before I began the PhD research proper. The direction of this 
section of writing, though, was instigated by a comment made by an audience member after the 
Shoreditch Town Hall performance in October 2017. This spectator, a friendly acquaintance who 
works for a consultancy which helps international businesses make their supply chains comply 
with best labour practices, particularly for women, told me that as she was watching the per-
formance she found herself wondering if this is what life would be like if we had Universal Basic 
Income (UBI). As I lightly probed her thinking in this speedy, social way, it appeared to me that 
what she meant is that the performance had an air of the recreational: it worked—made effort—to 
invent a way for the powers of those present to be extended into this domain. According to post-
work theorist David Frayne, ‘leisure is a capacity’ (Beckett 2018:para 47). I think Recreation, in 
some ways, was an attempt to ‘recognise and respect’ the work of everyone involved—including 









This is the final chapter of this thesis. So far, I have attended to a performance of my own making, 
Recreation, pulling through it features of contemporary labour in Chapter 1; in Chapter 2 I elabo-
rated a conception of ‘life’ as work’s alternative; then, in Chapter 3, I thought about what recreation 
itself could be and its relationship to work. The approach, has been narrow and deep, delving into 
the innards of a single artistic artefact, excavating just one choreography for as much as it can 
offer to the thinking on and doing of human activity within and beyond work.
Here the focus of the thesis becomes more expansive in at least two respects. First, Recreation 
is put to one side and attention shifts to the works of other choreographers, each of whom have 
made at least one work presented in professional contexts in which part or all of the cast were not 
professional dancers. These three works were presented, alongside others, in a festival I curated 
with Yorkshire Dance as an iteration of Juncture, which had previously been curated by choreog-
raphers Charlotte Vincent (in 2012) and Wendy Houstoun (in 2014). The new focus of this writing 
to the works of others marks a shift not only in the content being presented and explored, but in 
the vantage point from which the work is examined. I have never been intimately involved in the 
creation of and presentation of the works I discuss in this chapter in the way my experience can 
be seen as being central to the making of Recreation. I know the works by watching them, quite 
as any audience member would, particularly one working in dance and performance. I know the 
artists who made the work and, in two of the three cases, knew them a long time before turning my 
attention to their work curatorially and scholastically. They are all my peers, presenting work in the 
same contexts and sharing colleagues and friends. We are sometimes competitors, attempting to 
acquire the same resources from the same sources. In the context of their 2016 presentations in 
Leeds, I was jointly responsible—with other people and organisations including Yorkshire Dance, 
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the venues around the city in which the performances were presented, and the artists them-
selves—for the making-public of the projects for those who participated as performers and those 
who attended as spectators. I was involved in many discussions, practical and critical, argumenta-
tive and agreeable, formal and casual about each of the works and the festival as a whole (which, 
I note here for context, included many more events than the three discussed in this writing). I was 
often required to be in the position of advocate, a role I took on readily as a keen fan of each of 
the artists. All of this means that I am not writing from the relatively distant and objective posi-
tion of the traditional scholar but continue to place this endeavour within the framework of prac-
tice-based research, for the intellectual, artistic and practical work of my curating was intertwined 
with the artists’ intellectual, artistic and practical work of choreography. As such, I will continue to 
adopt in part the autoethnographic register of previous chapters, despite none of the works being 
of my authoring. As such, when I refer to the artists I will use their first names.
As well as my own experience of the works and their attendant workings, I conducted interviews 
with each of the choreographers; I limited this aspect of the research to this group primarily due to 
scope, and a desire to find voices parallel to my own role in Recreation. In future research I would 
be interested to investigate the experience of others involved, including audience members, par-
ticipants, and staff from Yorkshire Dance. I see these informal interviews as background informa-
tion which has informed my thinking rather than as source material and will not quote from them 
verbatim; they were as much an evaluative encounter for Juncture as they were a research device. 
I should point out that though I always intended to work through the choreographies of others, at 
the inception of this research, I did not know the offer of Juncture would arise. To my great sur-
prise, months into my research I was invited to discuss the possibility of co-curating a festival with 
and for Yorkshire Dance. I was very excited and interested, but knew and told the Yorkshire Dance 
team that it would only be possible if I were able to devise a curatorial frame which related to my 
ongoing research. I expected my work with Juncture to be a helpful and interesting side project. 
As the work progressed, I decided to set down my originally planned case studies in favour of 
writing about what had happened in the festival. This was partly a decision based on the practi-
calities of time, but mostly it came about because I could see that the thinking and actions I was 
undertaking to make the curation possible was generative of new pathways of thought in relation 
to the PhD project as a whole. As such I didn’t know that these activities and observations would 
contribute directly to this research project. Therefore, it was not recorded with the fine detail that 
would be usual in designed fieldwork scenarios whose participant-observer role is in many other 
ways similar to what I have done (though I do have many written records of the ins-and-outs of the 
process in other ways). This chapter, then, is written from a place of what I might call accidental 
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ethnography, a place both more intimate and more informal than initially intended.
Because there are three works to discuss as well as the context to make visible, the nature of the 
writing on them will be marked by a different sort of economy. Where I have attempted to unfold 
Recreation at length and from many angles, sometimes writing about the same thing more than 
once in different interpretive frames, I have been more selective with the works discussed here. 
I aim to strike a balance between working through chosen features, qualities or aspects of these 
works in a manner selective enough to advance some new thinking on them and works of their 
natures, while allowing each to breathe in its own right beyond a mere tool for my own mean-
ing-making. To begin this new tone, I will simply name the works here: Assembly by Nicola (Nic) 
Conibere, LAURA LAURA Double Penetration by Jamila Johnson-Small and Mira Kautto working in 
their collaboration immigrants and animals [sic] (ina), and Swarm Sculptures by Lucy Suggate.
In the second way in which this chapter differs from what comes before, I will take the attention 
away from post-work thought and its relations to focus on questions of participatory and social 
practice in dance, theatre and visual art. Work, and its agents, axes and opposites are not left 
behind, but here I would like to think about how the specific artworks and their common or dif-
ferent ways of dealing with the presence and participation of non-professional dancers—those 
people who are not, in an official sense, working—come to reflect on dance’s participatory, social, 
or ‘community’ dance practices alongside those called ‘professional’.
We Can’t Have a Community Dance 
Festival
The new direction is indicated by an exclamation: ‘We can’t have a community dance festival!’. 
This was uttered by Wieke Eringa, the director of Yorkshire Dance, as I began to form my ideas for 
the curatorial profile of my iteration of Juncture. I had explained that I could only take up the offer, 
proposed after I began my research, if it were directly related to my PhD, and so was suggesting a 
festival of works whose collaborators, if not performers, as in the three works discussed, were not 
dance professionals. Community dance continues to be a term used in the field mostly as partic-
ipatory dance activity led by professional dance artists, often but certainly not always specialists 
in community dance. It is related to parallel practices in other artistic disciplines but, just as it has 
retained the word ‘community’ in a way theatre and visual art, for neighbouring examples, have 
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not, it has also held on to a set of values, threads of practice, and explicit and tacit ideologies, to 
which I refer below. Community dance, like its counterparts, has a history of low-key, self-directed, 
grassroots activity led by artists in consultation with participants and other stakeholders, along 
with myriad and varied political agendas and influences. As with much arts practice, particularly 
since the severe cuts to the DCMS’s funding of Arts Council England since 2010 and the resulting 
loss of many, many posts and functions of the body, it is increasingly the case that organisations 
act as the conduit for the resources for community dance practice. Consequently, dance develop-
ment organisations such as Yorkshire Dance have an extended remit around community dance, 
and strategize around, develop, finance and lead on community dance activity in their region, 
employing artists to deliver the work directly, partly replacing activities which would have been 
practitioner-directed in the past.
Like most similar institutions, Yorkshire Dance employs separate teams to focus on community 
dance and on professional dance, the inadequate shorthand title for dance activity involving 
only or mostly dance professionals. It has different funding streams to resource these activities, 
different partners who support the work and different stakeholders whose needs are met in each 
strand. As such, despite the organisation broadly working as a single entity, at the time I was asked 
to curate Juncture the divisions between the two areas of work were carefully held. Juncture is 
part of Yorkshire Dance’s professional dance work, and, as such, is designed to satisfy a collection 
of requirements: it must present work otherwise not seen—usually understood as experimental, 
small-scale, fringe choreography—between Glasgow and Nottingham; it should offer professional 
development opportunities to dance artists based in Yorkshire; it should include the presentation 
of international work; it should offer a discursive platform about dance and choreography; and it 
should elevate the profile of both the organisation and the artist curating the festival. So far, no 
mention of community dance.
Perhaps it would be helpful to add a definition of community dance, here, but the understanding of 
the term appears to be in a continual, gentle flux, suspended in the practice and between practi-
tioners. Even the website of the organisation representing, advocating for and developing the sec-
tor, People Dancing (formerly the Foundation for Community Dance), does not provide a snappy 
and succinct manifesto or set of guidelines for what the practice is—it is quite as plural as any 
other artistic discipline. Working mostly through the practitioner- rather than scholar-produced 
literature (such as Amans 2008 or the regular People Dancing journal Animated) offers numer-
ous sets of ideals, aims, and objectives. Many of these are about the transformative potential of 
dance participation for individuals and communities, an attention to a radically inclusive approach 
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regarding the backgrounds, abilities and aspirations of community dance participants, and a focus 
on the importance of what a participant themselves brings to the dance activity (Bartlett 2008; 
Bartlett in Foundation for Community Dance 1996; Rubidge in Amans 2008; People Dancing Prac-
titioners’ Code of Conduct 2018). In short: everybody can dance, and community dance can be the 
support, resource, and aid in making that dancing enjoyable and transformative. Yorkshire Dance’s 
slogan of the 2000s was ‘Everybody Dances’, and this could indeed be the tagline for community 
dance.
It is important to note community dance’s near-neighbours: community dance is increasingly 
distinct from participatory dance, in which community dance carries the history of its ideals from 
the 20th century community arts movement. Participatory dance, though, can include entirely 
commercial dance-related endeavours with none of the political undertones regarding inclusion or 
deliberately transformative heart. In her 2011 text Social Works: performing art, supporting publics, 
scholar Shannon Jackson notes that there is an image problem associated with the term ‘com-
munity theatre’, and, in tracking the debate around community art, follows art writer Grant Kester 
to describe influential art historian Claire Bishop’s view of community art as that which occupies 
‘the lowest circle of hell’ (2011:55). It is more common to see art practice with non-professionals 
described as ‘participatory’, but this can extend to works in which the public would engage as 
spectators through their role as audience, or, in another sense close to the works I discuss in this 
chapter, as temporary participants in a work’s presentation. The terms are not any more straight-
forward than the practices they seek to describe. Still, Wieke had a strong response to something 
that sounded to her like distinctly community dance. I want to draw some questions out of Wieke’s 
statement. Why would she misunderstand the works I began to put forward—by professional cho-
reographers or performance-makers with some sort of non-professional dancer collaboration—as 
community dance? Why would she be so resistant to community dance?
The first question I might approach with a thought about infrastructure, following Jackson’s 
method of focussing on networks of support. Community dance and professional dance—meaning 
here dance-as-art, as opposed to dance for the sake of entertainment or commerce—in England 
both operate within a subsidised terrain, and as a result are each required through one route or 
another to demonstrate their commitment to the agendas of their funders. Where this is Arts 
Council England (ACE), as it often is, we are asked to show how our projects fulfil their mission: 
‘Great Art and Culture for Everyone’ (2010–2020). The everyone is important: in applications and in 
evaluative materials it is required to give numbers of beneficiaries, that is, the people with whom 
the work comes into contact (the question of whether or not the work actually produces a benefit 
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is not a philosophical point entered into very readily by ACE, at least in the relatively light-touch 
grant-giving scenario). Because both community dance and professional dance both need to show 
value for money in terms of the amount of subsidy given for the pool of beneficiaries, each tries to 
reduce costs while addressing as many people as possible. This results in a divergence in aes-
thetics produced by the same forces: in professional dance artists try to reach as many audience 
members as possible with as small a team as they can manage, often with very few performers; 
whilst community dance has an equally small team for a large number of dancers, for these danc-
ers are the participants and are the beneficiaries. Many of the works produced by professional 
artists featuring non-professional performers parallel the model of community dance, here, with 
a large number of unpaid performers considered the beneficiaries, rather than the agents, of the 
project, fulfilling the needs of England’s largest arts funder. In all, the works of Juncture sought to 
include the efforts of 70 participants across a number of different works; anticipating this through 
our conversation, I can imagine that this brought to Wieke’s mind large-scale community dance 
initiatives such as Big Dance, firmly connecting the collection of works in which I was interested 
to community dance.1 Nic’s Assembly and Lucy’s Swarm Sculptures fit into this model precisely, 
whereas ina’s LAURA LAURA Double Penetration required only two very carefully selected per-
formers. Both Lucy and Nic were keen to note that their works are not artistically predicated on 
unpaid, non-professional performers, and with various caveats, were considering future versions 
that might feature professional casts. The funding infrastructure—amongst other factors—contrib-
utes to aesthetic rifts between professional and community dance that have little to do with the 
ambition or nature of the work itself.
I think Wieke’s resistance to a potential community dancification of Juncture is also built upon 
a need to protect professional dance. Community dance can sometimes be seen as the poor 
neighbour of professional dance, and artists and participants have fought for resources and 
attention for its work. Since the 1990s, though, community dance’s socially transformative poten-
tials have been put to good political use and the practice has been supported to be increasingly 
instrumental in social, community, and health contexts (Houston 2009). Professional dance found 
it, then, difficult to make a case, art-for-art’s-sake (whatever art’s sake might be) less easily satis-
fying direct social change agendas and therefore attracting fewer resources; organisations and 
independents felt (and still feel) a drive to include in (or even crowbar into) projects some kind of 
engagement activity that can serve as some kind of community dance activity. Despite a shift 
1  ‘Big Dance in the UK was a biennial festival of people dancing led by the Mayor of London in partnership with People 
Dancing and the Big Dance Hubs, a network of leading dance organisations across the UK’ (Big Dance accessed 2018: para 
1). Big Dance occurred in even years 2010–2016.
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from 2010 onwards to an interest in ‘excellence’ and the marketability of, for example, touring work, 
ACE continues to fund socially-focused community dance, particularly in the regions, more readily 
than professional productions. Despite several attempts, Yorkshire Dance has not been able to 
secure funds for Juncture from ACE, instead fundraising from trusts, foundations and private 
support for each iteration. Juncture is Yorkshire Dance’s most visible—and expensive—interven-
tion into and offer towards the professional dance landscape, and Wieke, it seems, found herself 
cautious about a curatorial agenda that might diminish that hard-won ground.
These descriptions might suggest that the works in which this chapter, and indeed this thesis, are 
interested—professional choreographic works featuring non-professional performers, for which I 
wish I had a snappier name—are pulling community dance and professional dance together. One 
of the ways to think about them is through imagining a Venn diagram in which these works fulfil 
the overlapping, central section. I think there are elements of the works that indeed do draw these 
two parts of English dance practice into a more or less harmonious concomitance. However, I also 
think that Wieke’s exclamation and its consequences or bases suggest that the works through 
which I’m thinking act in a rather different way. In fact, I think they are at the same time drawing 
the two circles of the Venn diagram into overlap and pushing them apart, forcing them to find 
distinction. Between the circles there is a gap, and in that gap things can happen, values can be 
exchanged, subjectivities activated, that cannot happen either in community dance or in profes-
sional dance and certainly not when the two are collapsed into one another. In part, this chapter 
attempts to articulate this new spaciousness created between the two areas of dance practice, 
and to see how that might illuminate the character and nature of the activities undertaken within 
this gap in relation to work and its opposites.
Theoretical backdrop
In seeking a definition for community dance, I have already referred to the nature of the literature 
on community dance: but for few examples, it is largely produced by the sector itself, with a range 
of publications offered by public bodies mostly advocating for and celebrating rather than critiqu-
ing its work. Much of the writing is descriptive rather than analytical. Though it is a helpful and 
interesting background, it does not provide, in a phrase favoured by Shannon Jackson, the kind of 
‘critical traction’ I need to face my interests. Instead, I am working with a specific, recent, lineage 
of thinking on the participation of non-professional performers in the artworks of professionals. It 
is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer an in-depth recounting of the various arguments and 
144
counter-arguments in this tradition (Jackson and Jen Harvie each give their own versions of the 
history of this thought in Social Works (2011) and Fair Play (2013) respectively), but I will mention 
three texts that have influenced, in different ways, my thinking.
Art critic Claire Bishop’s Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (2011) 
has become a central book in the discourse on participatory art, particularly but not exclusively 
within the visual art tradition. This text, which builds on a series of articles written and exchanges 
undertaken in the preceding years, covers a wide range of artistic production involving participa-
tion, mostly in Europe in the 20th and 21st centuries, from the dérive of Situationist International 
through the activities of the Artist Placement Group to the pedagogically-oriented projects of 
Thomas Hirschhorn. This text tracks a ‘return to the social’ (Bishop 2011:3), in which work of the 
1990s and 2000s, categorised under a social turn, are related historically to their precedents. 
Artificial Hells is indebted to Nicolas Bourriaud’s 1998 Relational Aesthetics, in which he discussed 
artworks whose ‘aesthetic spheres’ were of ‘inter-subjective exchange’ (Jackson 2011:45). Bishop 
acknowledges that the discourse he initiated through this text and related curatorial endeavours 
enabled so-called ‘socially engaged’ art to enter from the side-lines of community art into the 
visual art mainstream. However, Bishop insists that ‘[i]t should be stressed from the outset that 
the projects discussed in this book have little to do with Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics 
(1998/2002), even though the rhetoric around this work appears, on a theoretical level at least, 
to be somewhat similar’ (Bishop 2012:2). Bishop distances herself strongly from the text and the 
field of practice because she sees the artists within her study to be less engaged with a ‘relational 
aesthetic than in the creative rewards of participation as a politicised working process’ (2011:2), 
noting, nonetheless, that it is a consequence of Bourriaud’s project that the works in which she is 
interested found themselves accepted by the visual arts institutions.
This might indicate that Bishop’s perspective aligns with the politics and history of community 
dance, with its interest in radical social change beyond the danced activity itself. Shannon Jack-
son, writing in 2011, before the publication of Artificial Hells, works through Bishop’s earlier writ-
ings (mostly in specialist art journals) and their problems, which, I suggest, are continued in the 
book. In the lengthy critique, Jackson discusses Bishop’s resistance to artistic projects which 
either ‘feel good’ or ‘do good’ (Jackson 2011:48), suggesting that, in fact, Bishop’s leanings might 
be away from community dance and activities like it; this is not to suggest that community dance 
itself is only invested in these outcomes, but that Bishop’s approach unfairly side-lines artworks 
which might feel or do good, in Jackson’s terms, missing the fact that such works might also be 
rich, complex, and powerful. This resistance to artworks that do or feel good emerges out of the 
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desire to maintain an antinomy between the aesthetic and the political in order to be able to think 
the relations between them. There is some difficult critical fall-out from this stance: the view that 
the private gallery system provides a less ideologically saturated, more neutral space for artistic 
endeavour than that of the government-subsidised version (particularly under 1990s-2000s New 
Labour in the UK); that artworks involved in explicit antagonism with the audience or participants 
is more valuable; that there is something called ‘artistic autonomy’ which must be held firmly, and 
that artworks must retain this in order to retain power and historical-critical importance. For this 
research, one of the difficulties with Bishop’s angle is her relationship to labour; she states that her 
‘discussion is framed with a tradition of Marxist and post-Marxist writing on art as a de-alienating 
endeavour that should not be subject to the division of labour and professional specialisation’ 
(Bishop 2011:2–3). I hope that my writing so far has already put this perspective under some strain.
Theatre scholar Jen Harvie, in 2013’s Fair Play: Art, Performance, and Neoliberalism, also places 
forms and consequences of forms of labour under question, within a set of discussions of the 
relationships between participatory performance and neoliberalism. Though in the introduction 
Harvie is clear that she will ‘neither utilise nor propose a set terminology for socially engaged art 
and performance practices because [she] want[s] to recognize and explore their variety, dynamism 
and hybridity’ (19), this results in a subsequent chapter (Chapter 2: Labour: Participation, Delega-
tion and Deregulation) that conflates and theorises together disparate activities whose actions, 
textures and consequences are in large part different. The primary concern for me relates to her 
discussion of ‘delegated’ performance (a term borrowed from Bishop, and of which I too will make 
use, below), in which artists invite, request or otherwise invoke the actions of others in order to 
realise their work. Her examples draw from works made in the contexts of both theatre and visual 
(gallery-based) art, in which the artists (Punchdrunk, You Me Bum Bum Train, Anish Kapoor, Phil 
Collins and others) are dependent on other people to make the art product a reality.
There are two main categories. The first involves artists involving others in their process, an exam-
ple being Phil Collins paying people in Ramallah to dance in a video, which he then exhibits, or the 
You Me Bum Bum Train directors asking for volunteers to work on their show. The second category 
is that of participatory artworks, in which the mode of spectatorship requires the audience to do 
something, usually physically (30); she writes about immersive theatre company Punchdrunk’s 
work here, and the single audience member in each of early 2010’s hit theatre gimmick You Me 
Bum Bum Train’s performances. Though it is true that each could be described as delegation to 
someone else, they are nonetheless very different things. The former situation could quite easily 
describe most theatre and dance performances. Most directors and choreographers at one time or 
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another work with performers who are not them. In a tour of my performance A Lyrical Dance Con-
cert (2013, with Sara Lindström), performer Eleanor Sikorski joined me on stage. There’s no need, 
as I see it, to describe this in this special way as ‘delegated’. She’s simply a collaborator who joins 
in something I am authoring; the delegation might be true, but it does not merit the use of a new 
conceptual category. In A Lyrical Dance Concert there is also the other kind of ‘delegated perform-
ers’: the audience. The show is pretty much entirely dependent on the participation of the people 
who come. They act. They sing, and dance, and laugh, and hold our hands, and even sometimes 
come onto the stage. Imagining that this is suddenly more of an activation because the people 
are moving about betrays the Rancièrian emancipation that Harvie—and indeed Bishop—invokes. 
Audiences are active in their engagement always, even when they choose to fall asleep, ignore 
the action, or walk out. Where Harvie states that such works are engaged in ‘distributing agency 
to a greater number of people’ (36), I would argue that any artwork is the site of many vectors of 
agency, including, always, the spectators.
Harvie raises the question of such audiences as ‘prosumers’, those consumers who are produc-
ing their own products of consumption. I struggle to understand this description any more than I 
would find it easy to think about my stroking a dog being a moment of prosumption. It’s true that 
I am active in producing the action that allows me the sensation; my action is indeed part of the 
sensation—it’s not that only I feel the fur or experience the consequence of slowed heart rate, but 
that the sensation of my action, of lifting and moving my hand and arm, is at the centre of the com-
plex of feelings, emotional and physical, that can be described by ‘stroking a dog’. Further, Harvie 
suggests that this delegated performance is a form of deregulated labour, remaining unremuner-
ated and even very often requiring ticket purchase in return for permission to undertake it, thus 
producing a form of exploitation. Though in Recreation the performers were indeed paid, this is not 
the case for all of the works of Juncture and I do not consider it necessarily ‘more’ ethical to pay 
people: instead, the payment constitutes part of the ethics of the work overall and can be inter-
rogated with greater nuance. Though I disagree with Harvie’s approach, she nonetheless offers 
useful ballast in connecting historiographies and analyses of participatory art and particularly 
performance to contemporary labour under neoliberalism.
Like Harvie, performance theorist Shannon Jackson refers to and critiques both Bourriaud and 
Bishop, using the legacies and, perhaps, inadequacies of their contributions to develop an argu-
ment in a new direction. Responding in part to Bishop’s preoccupation with the autonomy of the 
art object and the resultant intellectual inconsistencies, in Social Works (2011) she elaborates on 
the impossibility of the autonomy of the artwork. Through a series of essays covering a wide range 
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of socially-turned artwork, mostly from the visual art tradition, and a wide range of theoretical 
sources, she foregrounds what she describes as an ‘infrastructual aesthetic’. Moving away from 
relational aesthetics to ‘interdependent performance’ (240), she attends to the work of Santiago 
Sierra, William Pope L., Rimini Protokoll, Elmgreen and Dragset and others to describe forms of art 
in which the aesthetic and the infrastructural are indivisible from one another: ‘the specious divi-
sions between aesthetic insides and social outsides must go’ (15). Instead, Jackson develops a the-
ory of support, of infrastructural avowal, in which everything—everything—that goes into making 
an artwork what it is must be included in its analysis. This means the concrete apparatuses upon 
which physical objects might stand, but can also include the ephemeral labours of actual living 
humans, even when the work itself is ephemeral, in the way that performance is often defined. This 
question of support is echoed by the whispering thread of ‘care’, as a topic and approach, which 
runs through both the previous chapters of this thesis and Recreation. Support is of Jackson’s 
interest not only strictly within artistic domains, but also in relation to broader ideas of the social: 
she is ‘most interested in social practices where the exposure of the aesthetic infrastructure 
that supports the aesthetic object coincides with the exposure of the social infrastructure that 
supports human societies’ (2011:39), reminding us that to operate from a position of institutional 
resistance can undo arguments for the institutions on which we depend for our health, culture, and 
ways of life.
The term ‘social practice’ is key to enabling Jackson to pursue her theory of infrastructural aes-
thetics. This term is central to the way in which participatory artwork is framed and understood, 
combining aesthetics and politics in a way which ‘many hope to find in the discipline of experimen-
tal theatre and performance’ (Jackson 2011:12). ‘Social practice’ is quite as broad as ‘performance’ 
and finds itself referring to a wide range of practice across multiple disciplinary territories which 
produce events that are ‘inter-relational, embodied and durational’ (12). The term both honours 
multi- or cross- or inter-disciplinarity and ‘gestures to the realm of the socio-political, recalling the 
activist and community-building ethics of socially engaged performance research’ (13). Jackson 
traces the blurred edges of the term, acknowledging that it can refer to activities with different 
lineages, standards of production, terminologies, and relational frames, in a heterogeneity that 
pushes against the boundaries of forms of art and life.
In this thesis, I have been interested in social practices within and beyond artworks called ‘work’ 
and ‘recreation’. These could be seen as sitting in the part of Jackson’s interest indicated by the 
phrase ‘the social infrastructure that supports human societies’, but, again, the divisions between 
the insides (aesthetic) and the outsides (social) are ‘specious’, and Jackson seeks ‘the unraveling 
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of the frame that would cast ‘the social’ as ‘extra’-aesthetic’ (2011:16). I think that this thesis so far 
has been engaged in integrating this aesthetic and social, or, rather, animating through writing 
and performance the coincidences of these not-fully-distinguishable domains, and I will continue 
with this approach which is informed by Jackson’s. I build from the previous chapter, hunting still 
for a graspable sense of recreation, now beyond Recreation. I seek in this chapter to consider how 
recreation is a variety of social practice which finds form in works made by professional chore-
ographers with non-professional performers, and how the works and their methods of production 
constitute the infrastructural support for recreation to take place. In the following sections, I will 
look at the three selected works from Juncture to work towards a discussion of the relationships 
between and through community and professional dance, and work and non-work, by unfolding 
the insides and outsides in relation to one another.
The Companion Species Manifesto
I have made the theoretical backdrop a backdrop on purpose, each text becoming part of the set, 
increasingly towards the front of the stage, in order that I may have the action supported by them, 
in an effort towards the avowal of the infrastructure that is this discourse. The action takes place 
in a slightly different mode, and has demanded a new critical-creative partner which can help me 
to think about the particular binaries in pairings of professional and non-professional or amateur, 
worker and non-work, labour and leisure, professional dance and community dance. To work with 
these ideas, I look to a rather unusual side-line: a radical feminist pamphlet about the relation-
ships between people and dogs. Donna Haraway’s 2003 text, The Companion Species Manifesto: 
Dogs, People and Significant Otherness, the precursor to the longer When Species Meet in 2007, 
is about the relationships between humans and animals, more specifically between humans and 
dogs as a domesticated species, and, in many moments, even more specifically between Haraway 
and her dogs Cayenne Pepper, an Australian Sheepdog, and Roland, an Aussie mix. In this short 
book, Haraway covers broad bio-philosophical ground, offering anecdotes about the life she and 
the dogs share along with stories from other dog lovers, other breeds, and the history of certain 
practices of canine domestication, including agricultural working dogs and the sport of dog agility. 
Through these, she advances a theory of the companion species, the sort of kinship relation in 
which each subject, dog or human, is the companion of the other.
To describe a relationship of companion species is to avoid the form of kinship in which humans 
code the animals in their lives and in their homes in terms of belonging to biological or adoptive 
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human family; Haraway is critical of those who talk about their companion animals as children or 
themselves as parents. This would contract the relation, which a relation between distinct others, 
into a sameness—of species, if not of direct genetic heritages. Haraway is careful to hold canine 
and human as distinct entities with a theoretical space between them, a space prescribed by the 
companionate relation, a relation of significant otherness. To be a companion species—and this 
always involves at least two, for the accompaniment goes both ways, or all ways—is to create this 
relation continually, this ethical modelling suspending two as two and never as one.
In this writing, Haraway picks up Marilyn Strathern’s ‘partial connections, which are about the 
counter-intuitive geometries and incongruent translations necessary to getting on together’ (Har-
away 2003:25). She hunts for them through tales/tails, making both the partiality and the connect-
edness rich with ‘shaggy dog stories’ (25), which enable the theory of significant otherness to be 
not only relevant to dog-human encounters and relationships but in order to think through how 
‘to live [with such ethics] at every scale, with all the partners’ (62). Haraway, in this book, identi-
fies or creates ‘ontological choreography’ (100) in which each subject, canine or human, remains 
both discretely in their category but comes to inscribe themselves on the other through these 
partial connections, through this relation of significant otherness. I am interested in observing 
and describing this ontological choreography, thinking about both the connections that are made 
between apparent binaries—concepts or fields as well as human subjects—and in the space pro-
duced through deliberate but companionate othering. The staying together whilst being apart is 
the most important of all, for if these characters, whether person, role, field or something else, are 
pushed apart without this commitment to caring connection then there is no charge. My question 
is complicated and simple at the same time: how do the companion species relations produced 
by works made by professional choreographers with non-professional performers support a social 
practice we could call recreation?
Significant Othernesses: LAURA LAURA 
Double Penetration
To recap, Haraway is setting up a relation between agents which allows for space between them. 
This is the kind of space I’m suggesting works made by professionals with a non-professional cast 
produce between professional and community dance. I want to use Haraway’s theory to con-
tinue to elaborate what that space might be, and what happens within it. There are other forms of 
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significant otherness here, all the dyads associated with the work I’m considering: facilitator and 
participant, giver and receiver, teacher and student, professional and non-professional (or amateur, 
etc.), superior and subordinate and so on. Here I must make clear that I am in no way suggesting 
that in any of these dyads one subject stands in for a human and the other a dog. These things are 
not exactly parallel. In some cases, it is helpful to set up these analogous relations as a metaphor, 
in order to be able to view and speculate upon things, but most of the time I am interested in how 
Haraway’s examination of the human-dog relationship provides bio-psychosocial thought-matter 
with which to work beyond such direct stand-ins.
To begin to think about significant otherness, I turn to the work LAURA LAURA Double Pene-
tration. Jamila Johnson-Small and Mira Kautto, working together under the name immigrants 
and animals, are highly skilled. They trained together at London Contemporary Dance School in 
undergraduate and postgraduate courses, and have since worked together, separately, and in var-
ious collaborations with others. Each has her own physical, technical and creative emphases, but 
both are athletic and virtuosic in their capacities. LAURA LAURA, when performed only by the two 
choreographers without making the work into a double bill, doubled by its being performed also 
by another pair in the same evening, is a site where these capacities are active, with substantial 
sequences of high-energy, fast-paced and long-limbed motions. In my mind’s eye there’s a whirl 
of straight arms and legs, balletic extensions mixed with whips of limbs not with the freeflow of 
release techniques but with the bound clarity of gymnastics.
The costume, too, alludes to sportiness, with black Adidas tracksuit tops, a fashion-orientated sort 
with a large white logo on the front and a mesh panel around the upper torso showing bare skin 
beneath. The fact that neither performer feels the need to wear a bra is a point of interest in my 
(larger-busted) view: only younger women, fitter women, women with smaller, more pert breasts 
would usually walk around publicly, let alone engage in a physically vigorous dance performance, 
without the support of a decent bra. The choice to show this seems significant: it’s a subtle but 
definable gesture of positional display: we are young, we are confident, we are stylish, we are good 
at this. This is our space. Below the tracksuit top each woman wears substantial black knickers, 
thin black tights, sports socks and trainers, the high-top aerobics kind worn by both Cher in her 
aerobics videos of the 1980s and Wim Vandekeybus’ Ultima Vez dancers in the 1990s. This is no 
slung-on costume, no Primark-dash bounty of the last day before the show when there’s little left 
of both time and budget, nor is it the relatively recently (again) fashionable trope of wearing ‘every-
day clothes’. It’s thought-through. Slick. Professional.
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In LAURA LAURA Double Penetration at Juncture, there are two more women. These two women 
perform the score as Jamila and Mira watch, then they swap, the choreographers immediately 
enacting their original version of the same work. These women are Alison and Sara, two women 
living in Leeds who were selected to be the doubles. They are not doubles, though, not doppel-
gängers. Alison and Sara are a couple of decades older than Mira and Jamila, of different ethnic 
backgrounds and looking nothing like the choreographers, apart from that one each is dark-haired 
and the other fair, the darker one always the taller. They wear a version of Jamila’s and Mira’s cos-
tume: brightly coloured pants over tights, plain vest tops, Converse-copies and matching colourful 
socks. I can see their bra straps. These are the finds of a last-minute shopping trip into Leeds’ high 
street stores, but it is still considered. They still match one another. The costumes are not irrele-
vant here, either. It is important that they match. It is the signifier that these women are a tribe of 
two, or, in Haraway’s terms, kin. Like Jamila and Mira’s coupling, the performance is predicated 
on the intimate teamwork possible only in a pair. They are conscripted into the pairing from the 
outset from the strangeness of their clothes, the gesture towards underwear, the private sameness 
like matching pyjamas matching sheets matching curtains in an imagined mid-twentieth century 
sitcom where husband and wife (the only intimate coupling allowed) share a room but not beds, 
bodies making parallel lines facing the camera and never one another.
Alison and Sara are much more tentative in their movements. They two-step and walk, wiggle their 
hips while staying in one place. They use less of the space: my mind chooses to remember them 
as an image, has them placed just off centre stage, whereas the original performers are a whirl-
wind, circumnambulating with force, with a kind of generous flight. Alison and Sara find awkward 
connections between one another; physical partnering in a dance performance is new to them 
and limbs stay straight, forcing the partner away as much as making contact. They are doing their 
dances, old ones and maybe new ones, dances that have come out of a few short days of work-
ing with ina. I don’t want to simply, applaudingly, awe at these dances; I want to stay away from 
the mode of attention to such dances that collects them into a space of celebration, because I 
don’t think that that is the function of this work. To write this performance in this way, in a clap-
ping-along, aren’t-we-all-supportive tone, would be to undo the radical questioning of dance 
performance itself in which LAURA LAURA is invested, whether it is doubled or not, but especially 
because it is doubled.
I want my approach to match the harsh attitude of the original performers’ manner. This is a 
serious matter. There’s no room for messing around. There’s not a smile or a giggle, even when 
it seems like it could happen. There’s a tension between the content, which in degrees is full of 
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spectacle, and the tone, which is closed-off, somewhat cold. Jamila and Mira move around the 
space in an efficient mode, getting through the material with something that feels like a deter-
mined defiance. There’s a sense of obligation. Part of the fascination with this work is the visible 
invitation to the audience to watch the extended performance capacities of these women, and, 
at the same time, a feeling of retraction, of jaw-jutting annoyance that the audience is there. No, 
it’s not quite annoyance. It’s like they’re putting up with us, knowing that this is the contract and 
needing to comply but not showing any expression of enthusiasm. I struggle with it at times; I feel 
I’m watching adolescents at their dance show when it’s not cool to do a dance show any more but 
really, underneath their teenage posturing, they do really like dancing and they do really like being 
watched dancing. It’s a tussle in my spectatorship. It produces in me the same slightly embar-
rassed feeling which arises when I happen upon a television singing competition like X Factor, 
wherein there’s a question about the reasons for the (so far) amateur singer’s presence: are they 
there because they’re excellent? Because they want to be a star? Because their families or friends 
kept prodding them to apply? Because there’s a sob story, some hardship that has been or would 
be overcome, perhaps with the help of the judges or coaches? Is their singing really good? Do they 
even really like singing? Do they like singing, but would prefer just to do it in front of the mirror? 
How much have they already done it front of the mirror, and does it show? In LAURA LAURA as in 
X Factor, the performer’s status is unstable. I can’t tell why she’s there, or whether I’m really sup-
posed to be watching.
This instability arises only when I’m watching Jamila and Mira. Surely, as the professional perform-
ers, this act of performing should be straightforward for them? They should enjoy it, or at least 
have learned to participate in the agreement we have about them being there because they want 
to. Their pushing away of this agreeableness, of the idea that performing is fun and should be 
demonstrated as such, or at least not be actively resisted, dispels a set of assumptions about why 
a non-professional performer should engage in such a project. Jamila and Mira, in separate con-
versations, each describe their coming together as being based partially on the fact that they both 
experience significant tensions in the act of performing. They like dancing; they like building struc-
tures for that dancing; they like thinking through and practising with the questions about what 
a body in front of others might mean. But being this body in front of others is fraught for each of 
them. As a consequence, they also raise the question of what it is to invite someone else into that 
process without the offer of the delight of performing. In Artificial Hells, Claire Bishop describes 
the work of Santiago Sierra, uses the term ‘delegated performance’ to discuss these gallery-based 
works in which the artist pays people of lower socio-economic status to undertake tasks such as 
being tattooed or sitting in a box for several hours. The participants in these works are understood 
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as the delegates of the named artists, breaking a tradition of author-performers, of which Marina 
Abramović is the poster woman, and through which the artist outsources authenticity (2012). I 
don’t know how any of the four women would describe their class status, but in this performance 
there is a sense of delegation in the structure, in the fact that the second two take the place of 
the first, that they emulate in their own way a set of actions which are not about formal compli-
ance but some kind of psychophysical consonance. I do think the economics matter: Jamila and 
Mira are not hotshot visual artists with representation and selling works on an art market in the 
way Sierra does, but they are paid more for their time to put this version of the work together than 
Alison and Sara are. Because the offer is not one to do with financial exchange—Alison and Sara 
were paid a contribution to expenses more than a true wage—the similarity to Sierra’s work breaks, 
for, in at least some of his works, the point that the delegated performers are paid minimum wage 
is part of the meaning-making of the art work. So, unlike Sierra’s participants, Alison and Sara are 
there neither for the cash nor for the pleasure of performing. Because the payment is small, there 
is a sense in which something about this experience should be enjoyable for the participants, but 
ina can’t promise this, because it’s not what’s in it for them. As such, the motivation for Alison’s and 
Sara’s participation hovers between or beyond these normative, socially acceptable reasons for 
doing things.
In this, and in the very presentation of LAURA LAURA Double Penetration, the artists demand a 
repurposing of the gathering of new kin which appears to be about the kinship itself, rather than 
the activity the companions do together. Indeed, this is made clear when thinking about the selec-
tion process: a call was put out through Yorkshire Dance’s networks which described the potential 
performers as two people who identified as women, who were already friends but not lovers, and 
where at least one of them was not a professional performer. The last criterion was mine, or rather, 
necessary for the frame of the festival—a previous iteration of the work had had two other profes-
sional dancers act as the doubles, and this would not have been suitable for Juncture. I had asked 
ina to make this version with non-professional dancers especially. The performance is itself about 
women’s experience of things associated with women, or with roles women find themselves taking 
on. The fact of being friends is what strikes me as special: it is what made Jamila’s and Mira’s 
collaboration what it was, and it seems that, for them, it was also crucial to the composition of the 
performance. Friendship is knotty, complicated, and, according to the accounts of the artists, this 
appeared for everyone in the studio, friendship becoming kinship as each pairing created a signif-
icant otherness, a companionship of performing without needing to perform companionship. On 
stage—or rather in the long rectangular space of Live Art Bistro, where the audience sits around 
the edge of a white dancefloor—this complex kinship is present in the refined choreography of 
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relation, produced through a series of shifts of both spatial relation and eye contact. In some 
moments, the two performers, either pair, occupy the same physical territory, either finding the 
same trajectories around the space, following the same pathways, or directly collecting near one 
another. At other moments they are apart, but all the while the charge is present: this performance 
is actually, in some part, about the two of them being two, of being in a relationship of significant 
otherness, a term which Haraway claims ‘won’t do for human sexual partners’ and is ‘little better to 
house the daily meanings of cobbled together kin relations in dogland’ (96). She admits her worry 
about words is too much, that ultimately this term will do to indicate what is happening. And what 
in performance-land, dance-land, that is, the stage? The stage is the place where the pair—Jamila 
and Mira, or Alison and Sara—can act out different forms of companionship, indicated by their 
gazes: the gaze of tribal togetherness, both against or towards the audience; the gaze of indepen-
dence, each focused on her own actions, but both together; and, most starkly in LAURA LAURA 
Double Penetration, particularly in the opening episode of the performance, the gaze of direct 
contact, in which each woman meets her companion’s gaze, staring, ignoring the others present 
in favour of her significant other. And what in performance-land, dance-land, that is, the rehearsal 
studio? I wasn’t there, but I heard: friendship was stretched, arguments were had. It was here, more 
than on the stage, that the friendship of daily life became the kinship of sharing an artistic process, 
sharing dancing, sharing the connection that comes only when there are two and nobody else can 
do it and the performance is tomorrow.
Pop music is key in this work; the music scaffolds the structure. Rihanna. Dolly Parton. Britney 
Spears. Women. Recognisable sounds, lyrics, harmonies. Music from a nightclub. Music from a 
different performance. Music from YouTube or TV. Upbeat music. Melancholy music. Brief music, 
music short enough for radio, though probably longer than anything anyone would watch a snip-
pet through social media. Neat vignettes, movements of a symphony, with distinct aural, spatial, 
and corporeal themes, distilled and contained in different ways by each pop track. To one of 
these tracks, one of the least recognisable, at least to me with a relatively limited knowledge of 
pop music, the pair performs a dance that looks the most like a choreographed dance, with neat 
movements done in time with the music and, more importantly, in unison with one another. Jamila 
and Mira’s movements are quick and syncopated, swifts runs and straight-armed turns landing 
in lunges, like Limón technique done by Cunningham dancers. It is precise, and difficult, not only 
in vocabulary but in the strange rhythms, cutting through the steady bass-drum beat. Alison and 
Sara’s dance has the same quality but is much slower. They look nervous, and falter. Where Jamila 
and Mira were at perpendicular angles to one another, the movement being seen in 360° wherever 
a spectator was sitting, Alison and Sara faced one another, eyes on the prize, that is, her significant 
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other. The difference is noticeable and notable, giving each relationship a different sense of history 
and connection. Alison and Sara need to look at one another, to stay together; I read Jamila and 
Mira’s tangential angles as a demonstration of a significant otherness that no longer needs direct 
contact: each is embedded in one another’s ‘personal-historical natureculture’ through a decade 
or more of significant otherness (99). They may no longer be friends—tangles in a shared network 
of friends caused a seemingly irrevocable rift not long before Juncture—but on stage, ina are one 
another’s significant others.
To one of the pop tracks they sing. At opposite ends of the performance area, Jamila and Mira 
take up positions behind microphones on stands. I can’t remember if they look at one another, but 
I’m certain they don’t do the cruise-ship or pub entertainer work of casting gazes around, making 
eye contact with particular audience members for key musical or lyrical moments. I don’t see any 
head-throwings-back, any gestures of arms or hands or fingers, any eyebrow-raises for high notes 
or jaw-drops for low. It’s not that they’re locked in, bodies tightly composed—this is no Kraftwerk 
parody, or homage. They’re holding the microphones in the stands and moving a little, but it’s a 
low-key karaoke. The track is playing, and they’re singing along with the recording.
Like the X Factor context, karaoke seems to produce some recognisable characters which each 
singer can assume. There’s the show-off, the genuinely talented singer who knows it and wants 
to make sure everyone else does, too. A gift doesn’t have to mean peacocking though, as another 
version might be to demonstrate vocal ability for the very pleasure in the feeling and the sound, or 
maybe to surprise unsuspecting onlookers. Some karaoke singers seem not to know the audience 
is there, turning away and concentrating on their own actions without attendance to their effects. 
Others are purposefully or knowingly bad, enjoying rousing the crowd with theatrics or comically 
terrible singing. Jamila and Mira don’t quite satisfy any of these, as they sing reasonably accurately 
but not with any particular excellence. They’re in tune but there’s no great riffing, no tonal excite-
ment, no ‘making it their own’. It’s not as though their singing isn’t good, but it’s more like not-not-
good than good, and this is quite the point, as I see it. They use their singing to bring themselves 
into the background and continue to perform. They haven’t relinquished their responsibility to the 
audience, and are still providing material for spectatorial engagement, but they’ve put themselves 
spatially and formally in the side-lines, occupying a conspicuous periphery.
Jamila and Mira are, here, backing singers. Like all good backing singers, they are attentive to both 
each other and the audience, but mostly their focus is on the star. Here this star comes in the form 
of a guest performer who emerges from her seat—the performance is in the round, or in the oval 
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when it was at Live Art Bistro in Leeds during Juncture—and begins her dance. The first time I saw 
LAURA LAURA this guest performer was the dancer Stephanie McMann. She is a very well-known 
dancer in the UK independent dance scene and had been working with Jamila and Mira on the 
show, so it was only later that I discovered that she had been asked but ten minutes before the 
performance to take this cameo role. Steph wore all black, including the lace-up, platformed boots 
I’d seen her wear throughout that winter, but for bright orange socks that peeked out between 
trouser hem and boot top when she bent her legs enough. It was entirely plausible as costume. 
Her dance was a wriggly one, half club groove, half the detailed improvisational work for which 
she is known. As I remember she used the space quite distinctly, sticking in a spot for a while, then 
choosing another for a more full-bodied dance. I love watching Steph dance, and loved watching 
this, a dance danced by an in-demand dancer of the British independent scene for her profound 
skill and stage charisma, gingerly grooving to the quotidian singing-along of two of her friends. In 
this I felt that Jamila and Mira were enacting a rite of support, singing a mantra whilst their friend 
made an offering. This was something, a ritual, a procedure, a dance, between the three of them 
to which the audience was allowed to bear witness but it wasn’t for us. In a different way than in 
the sections with the virtuosic dancing, the spectators were not being addressed, the invitation 
remaining open but limited. The actions were for them, for those doing, but that doing would not 
have fulfilled itself had it not been in the presence of others. In some ways a wedding is a good 
analogy: the rite can be undertaken with couple, legal witnesses and official alone, but most peo-
ple choose to have an audience in attendance not only for the benefit of a knees-up afterwards 
but because the ceremony itself is imbued with a different resonance due to the presence of 
onlookers.
At Juncture, I was surprised to find myself, moments before the performance began, being asked 
to take the cameo role for Alison and Sara’s iteration. The moment comes. The two Leeds perform-
ers, Alison and Sara, take up their spots at microphones at either end of the oval. They begin to 
sing:
Jolene, Jolene, Jolene, Joleeeeeeene I’m beggin’ of you please don’t take my man. Jolene, Jolene, 
Jolene, Joleeeeeeene Oh please don’t take him just because you can.
I am excited by the music. I like Dolly Parton. (I prefer her, the original, version of ‘I Will Always Love 
You’, but this will do.) I’m wearing a long-sleeved, floor-length 1970s dress, brown and black with 
flowers and squares, with a white shirt buttoned-up underneath. So far, so seventies. I find the 
era-matching pleasing, and the long skirt gives me something to work with. Best of all, I’m shod 
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with my favourite shoes ever, a pair of white, fringed cowboy boots with a black sole. I start my 
dance with some joking around, showing off the footwear and oom-pah-pahing my dress, gath-
ering the skirt and pumping my arms in time with the music. I skip around the dancefloor, chuck 
in a grapevine, and lose the will to continue. Jogging? I start jogging around the stage, feeling 
embarrassed. The spectators, most of whom I am familiar with because of the festival if not due to 
professional crossings-of-path before, were chuckling at the beginning, likely more to the surprise 
of the festival’s curator suddenly appearing within one of the performances than because I was 
doing anything especially amusing. But these flashes of delight don’t last and I’m left with a good 
two minutes of dawdling on stage. I can’t make eye contact as I’d like to. I feel undirected. Am I 
doing it right?
My connection to the work, to Alison and Sara, is too partial. It’s too distant to feel that sense of 
support, of connection, of kinship on stage. They are significant others to one another, and I am 
not. Companion species—and here, we feel like different species, or, rather, I feel they are of a 
different species to me or me to them—is a relation that is produced actively by addressing the 
partial connections, by investing in shared histories. This is too brief, too sudden, or maybe of the 
wrong order. When I watch others—all professional dancers—take this cameo role, I am struck 
by their difference from the ones singing. They are so confident, so easy with themselves in this 
improvisation, being all known improvisers. I am not really a trained dancer, not in the sense of hav-
ing been to dance school, and though I do improvise in my work I’m not an improvisor. My embar-
rassment and hesitation connects me to Alison and Sara, their rough singing sounding out in the 
same combination of enthusiasm and fear as I felt I was emitting. But there is something wrong 
in this companion species relation: I am one and I feel them as two. For a real companion species 
relation, each subject must stand for themselves, however contingently, each relation is itself, and 
I am too disconnected from them as individuals to make it ring true. My being othered—not signifi-
cantly othered, just made other by the surprise guest appearance—makes their just-enough partial 
connection stronger still.
I have been writing about this performance largely beginning with the version performed by Jamila 
and Mira. This is because that’s how I see it, or rather saw it: I saw LAURA LAURA before its even-
tual doubling. At Juncture, though, ina decided to present Alison and Sara’s version of the work 
first. According to Mira, this was not an easy decision, but one made to avoid a form of comparison 
occurring in which the originators were read as the exemplar, not quite lived up to by the new per-
formers. Of course, whichever way this double-bill, or any double-bill, was organised, a comparison 
would arise; this way just produced a set of excitements and difficulties different from the other 
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way around. Alison and Sara coming first disrupted the expectation, particularly on the first of the 
two nights on which the performance was undertaken. Here, Alison and Sara were extraordinarily 
nervous, unsure of themselves and one another and all of us there, watching them, at the open-
ing performance of the festival. I recognised in myself a feeling of watching a community dance 
or youth dance performance, in which my role as spectator is to be a cheerleader and supporter, 
to be there for them, a good watcher in the way that people prize good listeners. I wanted them 
to enjoy themselves. They were clearly not enjoying themselves, struck with some kind of ter-
ror that charged the space. When Mira and Jamila entered for the second round, their attitude 
amplified this charge and rounded it into completion, the terror becoming resignation or power. I 
didn’t feel the need to cheer for these dancers. The relation between the two sets of dancers was 
complex and rich, neither capitulating to the needs of the other or of some external norms from 
either professional or community dance about what the correct ethical relation might be between 
these pairs or between the performers and the audience. They were engaged in the metaplasmic 
action of the companion species relation, in which, as Haraway describes, the situation underwent 
remodelling or remoulding. Metaplasm, she writes, is the transformation of a word, or the remod-
elling of (dog and human) flesh, the remoulding of the codes of life. The energetic, psychic, emo-
tional tension within this first Leeds version of LAURA LAURA Double Penetration constituted an 
activation of a metaplasm where professional dance and community dance were engaged in an 
accident, a tripping up, a misstep or mispronunciation. This produced a new space in which in their 
difference the four performers were deeply involved in significant otherness, making each other 
other and significant, an ethics of everyone doing what’s right for them but always with the other 
included in that: an ethics of inseparable otherness.
The second night of the work was totally different. Suddenly confident and assured, Sara and 
Alison found their feet in their version of the performance. They swayed more generously to the 
music, stomped around the space, taking control. They were enjoying themselves. Phew! A huge 
relief. Their half of the bill felt joyous, despite my anxious guesting. Mira and Jamila, in contrast, 
seemed even more cold and distant, even more tense and harsh. Later, Mira told me how difficult 
it was to enter into that cheerful world and enact the performance they thought they’d made, with 
an agenda and tone they thought they’d made clear. It collapsed the doubling into a binary, in 
which a community or amateur version preceded the real-deal, where the superficiality of ste-
reotypical tone became the only way to read the relation. Jamila and Mira each told me that they 
had been disappointed that Sara and Alison’s version had ended up that way, that it undid what 
the artwork as artwork sought to do. In this, professional and community dance, the roles of the 
professional and the amateur, of supporter and supported fell, not away, into a benign space of 
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possibility, but into one another. They fell violently, limbs breaking, foreheads bashing. This is not a 
metaplasmic stumbling where potent transformation of ethics can take place, but a blunt throw-
ing of one against the other, and, in this, the relation of significant otherness breaks apart. Jamila 
and Mira are no longer the companions of Alison and Sara but are simply a different set of beings 
altogether.
Training Grounds: Assembly
Let me indulge, for a moment, the possibility of direct analogies, as a way to move through them 
to more nuanced or abstracted terrain. I’ll go for the stupidest: if the human in Haraway’s set-up 
is the professional artist, then the dog or dogs must be the non-professional performer. In some 
ways this plays out: it is the choreographer who knows what will happen, who sets up how the day 
will work, what activities will occur when, will provide guidance and boundaries and limitations. 
This is clear in Nicola Conibere’s Assembly. To elucidate, here is a description of my experience of 
seeing it for the first time:
I have a soft feeling about that viewing experience, a sense of feeling small in the cavernous space 
with its pleasing wooden floorboards. I didn’t notice that a woman walked in at the same time as 
me, on the other side of the tape marking audience from performers, and from the other side of the 
room, from behind a curtain at what would be called in a theatre stage right. I watched the per-
formers broadly. I know there were 23, not because I counted and remembered, but because, in her 
PhD thesis, Nic writes that that was how many performers there were (Conibere 2015). I watched 
them as I would watch any other bunch of people on a stage: I looked at them, took in their many 
different ages and sizes, made a reading of their multiple genders. I looked at their clothes, all 
neatly turned out, but everyday. I looked at the way they moved. I looked at all of these things as 
they walked, turned their heads, self-consciously swung their arms, and energetically danced as 
if to very fast music at a disco. If I was looking at them as I would look at anybody who is doing 
things for me to look at, they did not reciprocate according to any code I knew: there was no fourth 
wall, no gazing to the back seats, no ‘casual’ eye contact common in lots of experimental theatre. 
For quite a while I couldn’t understand what was happening. I didn’t know what was creating the 
comfortable but unusual tone.
One of my fellow audience members left, and a performer also left, drawing a line of opposing ten-
sion across the space which this time was obvious to me from my spectatorial position. Another 
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visitor left, again triggering a reduction in the performing cast by one. And then someone came 
in, drawing one of the recent leavers back in to join her fellow performers. The structure of the 
relationships became clear to me, and, in that, the mystery of the relational tone was solved: each 
performer was associated with a spectator, and that association is retained throughout. I could 
now see that one of the performers was ‘mine’: her body was subtly engaged in attention towards 
me, her gaze meeting mine. She was keeping an eye on me. She was keeping an eye on me as she 
shunted backwards on her bottom, legs straightish, reaching the back wall and then walking for-
wards to begin again. She was keeping an eye on me as she walked side to side. This could be like 
a pantomime dame or cabaret performer or boyband star making an audience member feel special 
by holding their gaze or reaching out to them, ‘the seduction of the spectator by the wiles of the 
performer,’ as Yvonne Rainer famously described (1965). But it wasn’t. This wasn’t a star, made 
larger-than-life by costume and makeup and music and celebrity, but a woman I’d never seen 
before and would maybe never see again, doing some movements with some others and welcom-
ing me with her attention. There is no talent-show stagecraft in this: I am not being seduced by 
this person’s extra special skills or finely-honed charisma, but drawn in by the intersection of the 
choreography, including everything, and the fact that this person is not a professional dancer or, at 
least, not doing anything that might indicate that she is a professional dancer.
To make this casual, easy connection happen whilst a set of movements are also in action, there is 
detailed work behind the scenes. The week before the performance in Leeds, I finish participating 
in a workshop as Nic enters the same studio to begin a rehearsal. She and her assistant get out 
a flipchart on which there are charts and lists. I don’t know what this is for, until Nic tells me that, 
in order to have the performance fulfil its gently changing choreography, as a performer enters 
they mark which action they will choose to do. They select from a prescribed vocabulary, learned 
and practised in rehearsal. After recording their choice, entering the space and beginning the 
action, the other performers make their way to join them, meaning that the choreographic content 
changes as often as a new performer enters the space, triggered themselves by a new audience 
member. There are further cues to activate changes of spatial formation, also noted before step-
ping in. The decision the performer has made offstage, based on their response to a written record 
of what has happened without them, is how the choreography shifts. All of this is very formal. 
Nothing that happens on the stage is about exercising the individual or group creativity, not about 
each person’s life trials or identity expression. As such, I could describe Assembly as putting to 
task ideas of what freedom is in relation to performing: it frames a performer’s creative contri-
bution as the decisions they make within the common, prescribed structure and makes explicitly 
visible these decisions only in relation to those of others.
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Like ina’s work, Assembly is interested in being received as a professional artwork, whose pur-
pose is to have a relationship to a visiting audience more than satisfy the expressive needs of the 
participating performers. This is supported by the fact that Nic is careful in any kind of promotion 
or marketing that ‘trades on’, in her words, the fact that the performers are non-professionals 
(she relaxed this stipulation for Juncture, as she felt the festival’s critical frame would serve to 
evade the simplification that could otherwise occur). Indeed, she imagines a future version, which, 
well-resourced, could be performed by experienced or trained, that is, fully paid dancers; nothing 
about the work’s purpose is tied up with the non-professional status of the performers. However, 
she says that should this professionals-only version be possible, the cast would comprise perform-
ers of different ages, body sizes and so on; the need to state this revisits an observation about 
professional dance’s regrettably limited on-stage workforce, a state of play which community 
dance resists and counteracts. I don’t see Nic’s desire to make something this way as a meeting-
in-the-middle; rather, I consider Assembly a choreographic structure which facilitates the arising 
of questions and observations about who is in and who is out in work and non-work.
In my analogy, then, Nic is the human and the dancers—whoever they are—the dogs. It is Nic who 
sets the terms of the engagement, decides to a large degree what will happen when, and creates 
environments in which the others are encouraged via various means to do those things that Nic 
has decreed. In a relatively long section of her short text, Haraway describes the training meth-
ods of two very different dog training experts. Despite their differences in approach—one carrot, 
the other stick—each begins with the point of view that the dog must be engaged on their own 
terms with the action in hand in order for the shared activity to be successful. It is still a human 
idea of success: in terms of the sport of agility, wherein humans lead dogs around an obstacle 
course through which the dog runs, jumps and ducks, it is a human judge who sets the course and 
decides if the human-dog dyad has done it according to human-prescribed rules.
In Assembly, Nic is similarly required to train the performers. It feels strange to use a term so 
educative, so vocational: it suggests a future outcome that will be productive for the participant, 
that they will be transformed in such a way that will be useful for them. It is also a highly unfash-
ionable term to describe the relationship between an artist and performers, the seemingly-equi-
table foregrounded through something that appears benign or even, like ‘collaborators’. This is the 
case for community arts, in which the exchange should be between equals in a process where 
the skills, knowledge and experience of the community participants are primary in the activity 
or creative production, the role of the artist meeting that status through their skills in facilitating 
the situation. And the ‘collaboration’ between authoring artist and fellow performing artist is also 
162
understood in much contemporary dance and performance as a meeting of equals undertaking 
different but socially equal roles. In Assembly, the efficacy necessary to transmit a complex work 
over a few evening and weekend rehearsals—that is, sitting within the support system of commu-
nity dance—makes for questioning of the authenticity of that relation. To be explicit: there is no 
ethical or ontological hierarchy between the author and the performers, just as there is no ethical 
or ontological hierarchy between human and dog, or any other form of ‘companion species relating 
under the sign of significant otherness’ (Haraway 2003: 48). But there is a social one, in the sense 
of the sociality of the specific environment of the artwork’s creation and presentation; significant 
otherness is neither predicated on nor prescribes social equity (45). Unlike LAURA LAURA Double 
Penetration, Assembly was created with the specific context of production with non-profession-
als in mind, which meant in this case that the choreographer needed to establish a hierarchical 
relationship in which she has and knows the performance and must teach—another term unfash-
ionable when referencing the working together within artistic production—it to the performers, 
rather than be in a situation of co-creation. This would be the case even if the performers were 
professionally-trained, that is, trained before Nic’s training of them in the doing of Assembly. This 
performance’s negotiation of the terms of what looks like community dance exposes the masking 
of complex and hierarchical relationships in all kinds of dance-as-art through the use of forms that 
sit far from community dance tropes.
If they are being trained, the performers should be able to do something they couldn’t before. Of 
course, this is true, for they will be able to do a performance of a detailed and nuanced choreo-
graphic work. They are not, however, trained to do some special movements, for the content is 
in the realm of everyday actions, though does require everyone to be able to walk, sit, stand, lie 
down and do various actions to move between and within these orientations. This may seem like 
an act of deskilling, to set up a situation of learning where the material doesn’t challenge: Jen 
Harvie critiques such situations as related to the deskilling of workforces under neoliberalism 
(2013). Returning to the dog and their trainer, the dog already knows how to jump and run; it is 
the trainer’s job to organise this in a specific way. The cast of Assembly is trained in a particular 
sort of awareness, an ability to make eye contact, to notice one another, and to be alert to ‘other-
ness-in-relation’ (Haraway 2003:50), just as the dog is asked to be when training for agility com-
petitions. Nic is clear that in her rehearsal process there is time made for the assembled company 
to be together, spend time talking and drinking tea. Part of the training is the bonding, the being 
together and forming trusting relationships that could be called companionate. Nic is the signif-
icant other exemplar in this situation, in specific and concrete singular relationships with each 
participant. And, at the same time, she represents ‘artist’ in a relationship of significant otherness 
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to the ‘participants’, as categories, breeds, or species. The training is not just one-way, not even 
because there is a hierarchy and something that seems like a transmission, a pouring of informa-
tion from one site to another, a way of describing that would have any thinker of radical pedagogy 
quaking. Nic, in these less formal encounters, is absorbing the ways in which she can satisfy the 
needs of the participants, needs which in turn change the way in which she asks them to meet her 
instructions. She, like the dog trainers, has a ‘focused attention on what the dogs [or the partici-
pants] are telling them’ (48). In this, there is something educative, though not in the sentimental 
sense often attributed to community arts in which facilitator and participant, or choreographer 
and performer, are learning from one another in a bilateral flow. It’s not even just that they’re each 
learning something else through the encounter with one another, though I’m sure this is part of it. 
I will follow from Donna Haraway to suggest that in the relational practice of training, all partici-
pants are remodelled (54); everyone becomes a different shape as a result of companion species 
relating. It is the relational practice itself, despite and because of its hierarchy, that facilitates a 
shift in what everyone is to one another.
This remodelling in the rehearsal room has an impact on the kind of relating available to the per-
formers during the presentation of Assembly. The kind of companion species relation instigated by 
Nic ripples through the participants from space to space, making a new kind of significant other-
ness to be engendered during the performance. It seems a stretch to apply a theory of kinship to 
a relationship between strangers which could last only moments, but the delicacy of the manner 
in which a performer comes to be assigned to a spectator midst the groups, as if one from each 
family come together to gather a bigger set of relations, just for that moment, directs me to this 
thinking. The performers have been remodelled by their training, and they can go on to lead the 
spectators to develop that relation once more, with a different tenor, with a different spatiality and 
temporality. This is ultimately Haraway’s goal in her theory: she is looking for forms of relating in 
which there is an expansion beyond the intimacy of kin:
The task is to become coherent enough in an incoherent world to 
engage in a joint dance of being that breeds respect and response in 
the flesh, in the run, on the course. And then to remember how to live 




The choreography is simple but careful: from the outside it appears that, at random moments, the 
group of around 15 performers shift from pacing around the space to forming a heap of bodies, 
attached cheek to cheek or as close to that as possible. This is not always smooth, and they don’t 
always make it, forehead coming to shoulder instead, or a straggling participant coming in to fill a 
gap. Once the sculpture is formed, it disintegrates, and the performers disperse, before the system 
is repeated in only slightly varying ways.
In Swarm Sculptures by Lucy Suggate, some performers really look like they’re working. In a dance 
performance, this need not be something that appears as working like a dog, but it has its own 
qualities. I notice one performer in particular as she walks around the ground floor gallery of the 
Tetley art gallery with her chest up, trainered feet slightly turned out, walking purposefully, moving 
through her whole foot heel-toe. I notice her because of this, because she is different from the 
others in the projection of herself, but also because she is projecting. She is using the skills of the 
performer to attract the attention of the spectator. It’s seduction of the sort dancers learn from the 
get-go, even as toddlers; I remember learning about it by watching seven-year-old dancers when 
I was five. I get the impression that this performer’s seduction could be by accident, a series of 
bodily habits that amount to her looking like a dancer doing her job. It stands out.
By contrast, the others don’t look so much like they’re working. They are engaged and diligent. 
They follow the score. They’re working, but they’re not showing-working, not showing-dancing. 
Lucy, the choreographer, walks around and quietly mutters numbers which appear to be directions. 
She makes sure that the instructions are audible to the cast, neither disguising them nor announc-
ing them to the spectators. I can’t be sure that anyone who didn’t know Lucy or that she was the 
choreographer would notice her doing this, but I do, and I note the gentle authority with which 
she speaks these numbers; I read them as reminders more than demands. Given these features, 
it’s not that work isn’t conjured as a frame of reference for this performance, but that the quality 
within it disrupts the possibility of reading it as such, which is why a more dance-workerly mode 
jars.
This could be read as exploitation, the workers working but not seeming to because of the tender-
ness, collectivity and care they show to one another and to the others present and to the space at 
large. A nice atmosphere produced by a clever bit of ambient electronic music could easily dis-
guise hard labour, alienated labour, even. It would be an error to miss content here, and structure, 
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by which I mean choreography. Navigating the very differences of the proposals by different 
bodies, different people, appears to be the work that is at stake; it’s physical labour imbued with 
Berardi’s ‘soul’, with forces of ‘mind, language and creativity’ but not subservient to them (2009:21). 
The soul has been at work in a set of relations that happened in the rehearsal, the intellectual 
and interpersonal demands of intimacy within the artificiality of a concatenated period of cre-
ative process. This is the demand within any kind of artistic experience, whether or not it would be 
presented in a professional performance; I associate this feeling of needing to work with people 
who are very different to me, with different reasons for doing what we’re doing, just as much with 
my experiences of youth and community dance from various points of view. In professional per-
formances I have made, such as Recreation, I have chosen my collaborators or have been chosen 
by them. There is an agreement about why we are there, even if it is not identical, and this sustains 
us through our exchange of intimate, creative forces: the meetings of our souls. When I have been 
involved in community dance—as a facilitator as well as in a participatory role—these meetings 
have often been more difficult, as we each navigate our reasons for being there (creative outlet, 
healthy movement, social interaction, development towards professional practice and so on) while 
jostling with one another’s. Our souls are doubly at work. 
The fact that it is a performance, rather than a process without a public outcome, matters. This 
is not just my perspective; writer and choreographer Heidi Wilson discusses a range of views 
regarding the importance of performance in community dance which can be helpful in thinking 
about why the performance matters. These include the demonstration of new skills, to extend the 
process of the community dance experience, to celebrate achievements and to satisfy or boost 
the profile of the activity to funders and stakeholders (2008). None of these are the purpose of 
this performance, this performance which takes place in the milieu of professional dance activ-
ity. I have two alternatives which relate to these benefits of community dance performance but 
have a partial connection with the goals of professional dance performance, drawing professional 
dance and community dance into significant otherness through the performance, rather than the 
process. First, I would like to remind myself that performing—despite Jamila’s and Mira’s experi-
ences—can often be very pleasurable. I know some of the things I like about it: I like the anticipa-
tion; I enjoy the strange fear and anxiety about doing things correctly or well, because it seems to 
matter more in front of others than just for myself or in rehearsal; I enjoy thinking about whether 
others are enjoying the performance or not. Performing is enjoyable for many of the people who 
choose to do it. It is difficult to say this because of my ‘artrepreneurial’ training, in which my artistic 
work is only valuable if it is ‘real work’, and ‘real work’ is associated with ‘hard work’, which should 
be not-pleasurable; the complications of this were explored when thinking about LAURA LAURA 
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Double Penetration, above. Paradoxically, or almost-paradoxically, the second and perhaps most 
important reason that making this process one with a performance turns it into something more 
readily experienced by others as work. This does not ring true for community dance performances 
in the way that it does for work made by a professional choreographer, and, crucially, presented 
within or by an arts organisation as part of their main programme. When this is the case, as it was 
with all the works in Juncture as well as Recreation, the performance is considered an artwork, the 
product of work, the enacting of work. A production is a product, made by work.
This confluence of the appearance of work and pleasure, albeit with strong residues of false 
binaries and superficial suppositions, is presented before others; one of the things a performance 
always does is that it points to a set of human activities and says, ‘this is important, look at this’. 
It’s not just that the fact of the performance matters in relation to a creative process beyond a 
rehearsal room. It’s also that a performance makes things matter; human beings choose to make 
artworks and put them before others because the things in them are important to them (and many 
other, more or less cynical reasons, of course). So, in putting non-professional dancers in a per-
formance makes their actions important before others, before a public, before a society. Those 
actions, made important, are ones full of work, but a work that has come to shake off some of its 
associations with alienation through its position in the recreational life of the performers—and 
in any case these performers have not received a wage but travel expenses only—and with the 
negative impacts of work, some of which were discussed in part in Chapter 1. This is what I find so 
important about these works made by professional choreographers with non-professional per-
formers: they make important a kind of being and doing which complicates the questions of work 
and its opposites, and facilitate a dynamism in both experiences and understandings of recreation, 
of voluntary non-work activity, that I do not find so easily elsewhere. In so doing, they not only 
conjure work and recreation in relation, but, just as training did for the subjectivities of trainer and 
trainee in Assembly, remodel each in concept and in practice, in ‘flesh and sign’ (Haraway 2003: 
25)
This way of seeing the nature of this activity opens up a space to see work beyond the boss-
worker relationship beyond domination and exploitation. Indeed, turning again to Donna Haraway’s 
examination of canine-human relations, it is now possible to relate the performers to Border 
Collies, a breed of dogs who are famous as working sheepdogs and triumph in the sport of agility. 
These dogs need to work; the breed has been genetically manipulated over centuries of dog-hu-
man relationships. Border Collies need to work so much that new owners, enthusiastic to cohabit 
with an obedient, intelligent animal, find themselves unable to provide the work necessary and 
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often give up their companion. Humans have not been artificially reared to find states of non-work 
unbearable, at least not genetically so, but that willing people participate in a contemporary dance 
work—which, critically, does not promise the same outcomes of personal transformation and social 
cohesion as can be found in community dance’s lists of aims and objectives—suggests strongly 
that some people do want to do some kind of work, even when it is not economic work, even when 
it is not in any direct or immediately comprehensible way socially or economically valuable. The 
motivation for these things isn’t as simple as it being enjoyable, or as it being a chance to express 
something singular and personal: Swarm Sculptures, like the other works in this chapter as well as 
Recreation, does not offer this kind of fun. Swarm Sculptures offers the chance to do something 
that seems a lot like a type of work, maybe even is a type of work, but without the wrappings of 
economy and social status. I don’t imagine that this is conscious in the thinking of participants, 
and Lucy never mentioned this as a motivation, but the work and projects like it appear to appeal 
to an aspect of human will which is not satisfied by the usual divisions of work, play and rest. 
All of this permits a refiguring of the companion species relation between Lucy and the perform-
ers. Haraway reminds the reader, and maybe herself: ‘If I have a dog, my dog has a human’ (2003: 
54). If the choreographer has performers, then, the performers have a choreographer, and nobody 
is the dog. If the boss has workers, the workers have a boss. This can be refracted through prisms 
of either delegation, as suggested by Claire Bishop, or support, as offered by Shannon Jackson. 
Delegation, as described above in the discussion of LAURA LAURA Double Penetration, sug-
gests that someone of a higher status or position in the relation passes on a part of their work to 
someone of a lower status or position in the relation. It could be assumed that Lucy is delegating 
to performers: she knows what is supposed to happen and is getting the dancers to do it. But 
the choreography of Swarm Sculptures, which is predicated so greatly on the specific sculptural 
possibilities of particular bodies, of particular people, disturbs this supposition. Instead, it is the 
performers who have the experience of their bodies, with those particular lengths and depths and 
widths, with the harsh boniness or dense muscularity or fleshy fatness or rigid metal (in the case of 
the performer who uses a wheelchair), with their capacity to fold or stretch or sit or stand or lie or 
crumple or arc or hover. It’s as if Lucy has been invited, commissioned, to sculpt these bodies into 
more or less harmonious shapes in the gallery space, to find ways to have these bodies make new 
shapes in relation to one another. Lucy has been set a puzzle by these people; they have dele-
gated their task of self- and co-sculpting to her. In setting up the work in the way she has, she has 
put herself forwards for a free commission, and this is the small swarm who has taken up her offer 
of collective, temporary portraiture.
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Delegation is not the opposite of support but a different view of the same thing. The dancers are 
supporting Lucy and her work. They are an infrastructural element as much as any material could 
be; they support the work just as an actor supports their character (Jackson 2011). The work can’t 
exist without them. They hold it up, just as the pillars of the gallery hold up the ceiling. At the same 
time, Lucy supports the performers. I could read the alphanumerical directives she mutters as 
she perambulates through the space, through the performance, not as instructions but as spo-
ken support, offerings of help to alleviate some of the mental effort of taking part in the perfor-
mance to allow for other priorities to arise in the performing: a sense of care, awareness of space, 
attention to all other people there present. She holds the performance up, through holding the 
performers up. I am not interested, here, in obliterating what seems like facts of the matter: that 
it is Lucy’s work, that she benefits from having the credit, from something like a contribution to a 
career (though given that she has since stepped back from choreographing due to a despondency 
with such systems I’m not sure she would see it in the same way). I know that this is the dominant 
way—the economic way—to look at these relations and I can see its importance. I am not direct-
ing attention to what appear to be gentler ways of dealing with this performance to be softer or 
kinder, but because I see these values as being equally present in the material, even if perceptual 
biases would have them seem secondary or lower. Support might seem like a kinder lens but it is 
no less complex. Drawing back to Haraway and her discussion of agility and a dog’s training for the 
sport, she follows the dog trainer Vicki Hearne to propose that in the companion species relation 
of training, of educating and facilitating skills in the canine significant other, is ‘a place to increase 
the dog’s power to claim rights against the human’ (2003: 53). Translating this to Swarm Sculp-
tures, and pulling together language of work, delegation and support, the situation of creating and 
presenting a performance ‘enfranchises’ the relationship (2003: 53): it empowers the dancers to 
have rights in relation to the choreographer, and, by extension, over the artwork, its reception, its 
audience and so on. This is dependent on neither equality—again, I will emphasise the various hier-
archies present in these relations in line with the canine-human dyad—nor fixity, but in a delicate, 
resilient, responsive mutuality.
I have a photograph of my friends Sara and Jim watching Swarm Sculptures. Sara is standing and 
leaning gently against a pillar; the back of her body is the centre of the shot. Jim sits against the 
back wall, facing me, his hands clasped around folded knees. Each looks to their left, to different 
sculptures made by two halves of the swarm. The photograph is of Sara and Jim, not of the sculp-
tures, so all I see in the image is a jumble of legs and bums and backs and heads; it’s not good 
documentation of the performance for marketing or archival purposes but it exposes layers of 
support. It shows the physical support: the shiny floor and the gleaming white pillars and the lights 
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and even a projector mount, ready for a film screening another day. It shows audience as a support 
for the work, in the form of Sara, who is also a support as a peer, for she is also presenting work in 
the festival, and in the form of Jim, who works at Dance4, the organisation which has supported 
the producing of Swarm Sculptures beyond its presentation in Juncture. If these things are the 
supports for the work, the work also supports them: supports their need to be there, doing the 
work that they do, as artists, arts workers, and even as the physical space of an institution: if there 
is no art, the institution can’t exist. Each relationship of support, of significant otherness, produces 
rights in each party. These are not the rights of employment, of legal, contractual engagement, but 
exist beyond work as it is understood in these terms.
Nonetheless all these relations are work: they are dependent on and only produced by purpose-
ful effort, by an attention to the creation of (non-economic) value, by sharing these efforts and 
attentions for the benefit of others. The confluence of all these processes of mutual support is 
dependent on neither chance nor sentiment: it is not something like love or compassion or care or 
hope that allows these systems of support to come into being and produce an artwork. It is work. 
Haraway discusses this in terms of the work that a dog does as a pet or as a livestock guardian: 
the dog is more deeply connected and their life preserved not because of fleeting affection but 
because their efforts are needed and wanted in the natureculture in which they find themself. 
There is something solid about this, assuring, at least as a maker of performance: it is not because 
people like me or even like my work that it continues to be possible for it to happen, but because 
of a network of work which is mutually appreciated amongst the partners. Here, in a choreography 
danced by non-professional performers, this is heightened: these performers are not taking part 
because they love Lucy or care for the Tetley, but because they want to do this work and their work 
is wanted. Lucy is not making space for these people to dance because she loves them and wants 
to transform their lives but because she wants to do this work and her work is wanted by them. As 
much as it is heightened it is also, still, a surprise for me to find this here. It is in this space of what 
appears to be non-work, at least for the performers, as it is part of their recreational, spare-time 
life, it is work that makes itself visible. If in the last chapter I was looking for recreation in the work-
erly space of Recreation, here I find work seeping through the leisure domain. As it squeezes itself 
out, it can be seen in a new form making other kinds of relations, including relations of significant 
otherness between things or ideas as well as people.
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Curating: Care
My job as curator also involved some kind of love; to curate, of course, is etymologically connected 
to caring, and though caring and love are far from the same thing the ideas and felt senses are 
held proximately and often concur. To care for this work, the work made by professional choreog-
raphers in professional settings with a non-professional cast began with being a fan—a critical 
fan, a fan with questions, but a fan nonetheless. Artist and scholar Owen G Parry, whose work has 
engaged with fandom and with fan fiction, works with the idea of fans as amateur experts (Parry 
2019). This would not suit for most curators, curating being a professional job with training and sta-
tus. I am not a professional curator; Juncture is always curated by a non-curator dance artist and 
this is emphasised in any marketing material and indeed in conversations with Yorkshire Dance, 
who certainly see themselves as the senior partner in matters of programming and event produc-
tion. At the inception of the project—or projects, if I include both Juncture and the PhD research 
in its entirety—it would have been difficult to see myself as anything of an expert in the area of 
which I was such a fan; it is through being a fan and devoting my attentions to this work that some 
knowledge has been generated.
This knowledge is by no means necessary for the care needed to undertake a big curatorial 
project, or indeed a scholarly one. In thinking about care, Nel Noddings describes the concentric 
circles in which we find ourselves (2013). At the innermost circle there is our family or other imme-
diate relationships. Beyond those people, we meet those for whom we have a ‘personal regard’, 
and outwards in layers towards total strangers. There are chains of care, cared-fors who are the 
ones-caring of other cared-fors, so that my caring is but one pair of links in either direction that 
connect to other intimacies of care, sitting in the circles of care, all of which are things I need not 
know about. Where Noddings’ begins with the privacy of a one-to-one relationship to imagine the 
wider ripples of care, I began my thinking with an investment in a field of work. Rather than begin 
caring for a singular artwork, artist, situation, organisation or participant-performer, I found myself 
caring deeply for an area of work on which I could find pretty much no study or serious curatorial 
or scholarly work. I cared about what this work was and why it was positioned in a margin between 
community and professional dance, a margin right in the middle of things rather than on the edges. 
I cared about how such choreography and its processes spoke to and within a context where to 
work or not to work is not so much a question but a matter of huge weight, and I cared deeply 
about the political situation in which the everyday lives of people are pressed against this matter. 
My chain of care, then, operated in something of an opposite direction, beginning at a macro level 
and needing to work down the chains of care to the specificity of individual choreographic works, 
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processes, and people. In a way, I cared more for the breed than for the dog, and I have been will-
ing to limit my scope—focusing on very few works, all made by artists working in the experimental, 
independent scene—in order to preserve that care.
This thinking has been possible because of an existing connection between the foci of experimen-
tal choreographers and of community dance: an investment in what dance dramaturg Peggy Olis-
laegers described in a personal communication regarding Recreation as ‘alternative excellences’. 
Each of the choreographers discussed here has, in the works examined as well as in their greater 
corpora, been interested in creating choreographic environments in which there is a resistance to 
normative criteria of what makes certain actions or sequences of actions performed in particular 
ways ‘good dancing’, a resistance which manifests itself in providing through the choreography 
alternative apparatus for the determination of excellence. This same approach is engendered 
by much community dance, where the success or failure of the dancing is not measured by the 
achievement of specific technical and physical bodily procedures. These two ‘knowledge practices’ 
find themselves in a position to ‘get on together’ through this partial connection (Haraway 2003:7), 
a pattern ‘in which the players are neither wholes nor parts’ (2003:8). Community dance and pro-
fessional dance themselves are brought into significant otherness through these works made for 
professional contexts featuring non-professional dancers: they ‘[cobble] together non-harmonious 
agencies and ways of living that are accountable both to their disparate inherited histories and to 
their barely possible but absolutely necessary joint futures’ (2003:7). In the context of Juncture, 
this chapter, and I think in most of the settings in which these works are found, they are located 
as professional dance in order to be understood as art; this is crucial, for it is here, that, as Nicolas 
Bourriaud describes, the space of relations is tightened, and, in so doing, the political offers of the 
work are made most acutely visible (1998). In professional dance we are invited to look again, with 
the critical apparatus not of a supporter but of an artgoer, at the relations between people, actions, 
and fields of action. But these relations can only be understood, can only exist, with and within the 
network of support—practical, aesthetic, ideological—that comes from community dance, includ-
ing community art’s and community artists’ tendency to move beyond individual artistic disciplines 
(Kuppers and Robertson 2007; Jackson 2011).
The ‘getting on together’, as I’ve described throughout, is dependent not on a collapsing into one 
another but through being held apart. Shannon Jackson describes how artworks can ‘measure 
their distance’ from an artform, a phrase she borrows from Elinor Fuchs (Jackson 2011: 144, 262 
note 3). The works discussed in this thesis find themselves measuring their distance from both 
professional and community dance, in their forms as well as in their organisation and marketing. 
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Their distances are not always the same, neither for each work nor for each participant nor each 
organisation nor each spectator. It is dynamic, fluid, making the measuring not one of fixed met-
erage but of a felt sense of nearby or over there. Turning the ideas around, I could suggest that 
these works are indeed a method for professional dance and community dance to measure their 
distance from one another, to keep themselves from falling into dysfunctional oneness and to 
preserve the living together that is the active othering of the companion species relation. As I have 
attempted to describe, it is in this measured distance, in this fluid space, that the usual practices 
of labouring and leisuring swim through one another, metaplasmically remodelling each other and 
those who undertake them.
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Brief notes towards  
a future practice
Later this year a handful of people, no more than can sit in an average living room, will receive 
an invitation to a performance. The invitation will come jointly from me and someone they know, 
a family member, friend, colleague or neighbour, someone who does not consider themselves a 
professional dancer. If they wish to take us up on the invitation, they will be asked to RSVP with a 
description of a dish of food they will bring along with them. They will not be asked to do or provide 
anything else.
A month or so later, the small audience will assemble in the home of their friend, who is to be the 
performer. Once we have welcomed the guests with drinks and introductions, I will explain what 
will happen:
[Name] will soon do a performance while we watch. This performance is not the first version of 
this choreography; the first time it was done I did it, for some people that I chose. I have worked 
with your friend over a couple of days to translate the choreography so it is suitable for them, and 
for you. The movements are not exactly the same, because they have been chosen for this exact 
situation, which is not the same as any other situation, but it shares enough that we consider it the 
same choreographic work. After the performance, which will be around 30 minutes long, we will 
tuck in to our wonderful collective spread, and I will offer some ways for us to talk about the per-
formance for a while, until we decide that enough’s enough and we would like to talk about other 
things.
I will ask the audience if they have any questions, or if they need anything, before the dancer 
begins.
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This new work has been activated by the previous ones. It emerges out of the research, in all its 
choreographic, curatorial, bibliographic and autoethnographic forms, of the past years. To think 
about it, to think about why I want to do it, it is helpful to review its relationship to what has come 
before. This text arrives where a conclusion could normally be expected, and in it there are some 
statements which help to put a marker in a set of processes, but these processes are continuing, 
through the particular new work I am introducing as well as in my life in the other ways it is lived. 
A conclusion, as such, seems premature. Instead, I use this text to begin to scribe the edges of 
interest of the new work. This is part of the choreography.
I will take a pause to take stock of some of the major themes that have arisen within what has 
been written so far as a way in. Most explicitly, the practices I undertook under the umbrella of 
the research have enabled me to think about how work as a classification of human activity is 
expressed within and complicated by choreography. Life appeared everywhere, from start to end 
of the research, escaping into parts of experience which were supposed to be called something 
else, often coming closer to a ‘curated’ ‘lyf’ than I would have liked. What recreation might be, and 
what that has to do with contemporary conversations across multiple spheres of thought about 
work and post-work, was tried out across choreographic and written forms. Finally, spending time 
with the work of others made possible ideas around the intersections and separations of commu-
nity and professional dance through work and non-work. Of course, here I am providing a sort of 
chronological summary of the chapters preceding these notes, but as I see it the thinking on each 
of these themes appears throughout the thesis and the performance Recreation, with different 
elements given particular focus at different moments.
The same concerns drive the new work. I am moved by an interest in the significant otherness held 
between professional dance and community dance, and the socialities offered by each inhabiting 
the other’s frames reciprocally. On the one hand, I will continue to think of this project as a choreo-
graphic work, presented as an artwork authored by a named artist. I hold onto this frame because, 
for the moment, it appears to help retain some of the perceived value of the work: it allows it to be 
engaged with as an artwork critically, it enables it to be assessed for its quality according to vari-
ous metrics, which might include originality, innovation, clarity of performance, political awareness, 
use of time and space, rhythmic complexity, appropriateness of costume, lighting, set and sound 
design, customer service, marketing and many, many more. Calling something a professional 
artwork affords the actions held within it a value merely by announcing itself as something worthy 
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of attention from what could be called a general public, even when, as in this case, the public is a 
chosen one.
On the other hand, the location of the work in a private home offers an alternative entry point. I 
find myself mentally mixing up various scenes from period dramas in which some young woman is 
bullied into performing a recital for her parents’ company. Here, a performance means the presen-
tation of some musical, theatrical or choreographic act by a specified performer for a specified 
audience, where the performer and audience are understood more as differently-behaving aspects 
of the same group than as two separate, different entities encountering one another through a set 
of circumstances where one side does something for the other. In a less comedically high-class 
fantasy, I think about games or activities which include an element of performing, of taking or 
doing a turn; I think about karaoke, and charades.
What I am interested in is a glimmer of what happens in community dance performances, where 
the audience comes not, or not only, to satisfy their own cultural appetites, but in order to root 
for, support and take pleasure in the activities of a dear one. The effect of this is palpable. Being 
an audience member in a community dance performance—even when you’re not there to see 
a friend—is an experience of an entirely different sort to that of watching a professional perfor-
mance. It is not the same as a fellow artist or arts worker coming along to see the work of a pal or 
colleague; the invitation is of another order. Many friends and colleagues came to see Recreation 
and the events of Juncture, but it was at least as much to serve their own creative-critical inter-
ests as it was to cheerlead for my endeavours. When I watch a community dance performance, 
however, I find some of my critical, analytical modalities of thought soften, and my receptivity to 
the situation—the performance plus the being-audience—becomes wider. It’s as if my perceptions 
spread out; my aim is to enjoy myself, and enjoy the enjoyment of others, and that permits a differ-
ent kind of sensitivity to what is happening on stage and in the audience. It is a highly connecting 
atmosphere, and I rejoice in it. That doesn’t mean that, as a community dance audience member, I 
can’t think: I am always thinking, preferring some things to others, wanting to discuss a particular 
aspect or moment, or finding something problematic enough to offer a critique to whomever will 
listen to me afterwards. But those things are not the point of my activity as an audience member; 
instead, I am there for the performers and for the audience members in a way that I am not able to 
meet in a professional performance. In part, I think that this occurs because the audience is made 
up of nodes of specified audiences sitting next to other specified audiences. The assumption is 
that everyone is there for someone, and that for each performer there is an audience, waiting. 
Nobody is a general.
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The work will be partially made and wholly presented in the domestic sphere, a sphere which has 
been gestured to in this thesis through the inclusion of material referring to what might be usually 
called my private life, but, due to the frame of the practices, was not inhabited by the work. I am 
interested in relocating some of the questions of this research into this environment, to realise—
both in the sense of make actual and in the sense of come to see or recognise—alternative conflu-
ences and complexes of work, life, and recreation which have not yet been available in the pre-
ceding work. Though the home is usually the space of reproductive labour, a category I have not 
put to work in this research, it is also a space for leisure (watching films on Netflix instead of going 
to the cinema comes to mind) and indeed for work (I am sitting on my sofa now). As such it offers 
an unstable terrain onto which I wish to dance and have dancing be done, enlivening and drawing 
attention to the complex plurality of the space through choreography. Presenting the work in the 
homes of the people who will dance the work directs a compelling force of complication through 
the relationship between choreographer and performer, professional and non-professional, worker 
and non-worker, host and guest and so on. Just as I have attempted to suspend these binaries in 
order to see the categories anew throughout this thesis, I will continue to unsettle the classifica-
tions in this new work. In a different move from that in Recreation, the performers will be unpaid 
and I will try to make it so that I can be paid. This is not only because I need money to sustain my 
life while I spend my time doing projects like these, but also because in this case I want one of the 
variables in the relationship between me and the performers to be that of worker and non-worker; 
I invite the performers to do this as part of their recreational life. I’m sure it is clear by this stage in 
this writing that I do not think that work is designated by money, or at least not by remuneration 
alone, but it is an important signifier to those who might engage with the project as supporters, 
performers or audience members.
Despite the fact that I have spent these years and these pages articulating the complexity of 
the work-leisure dyad through multiple choreographic and philosophical lenses, I find myself 
still with a post-workist viewpoint: work as we know it—whether or not we think or feel positively 
about work—is under pressure. In order to think about how to work differently, or to understand 
how it is changing, or to find ways to use it for our own ends, or to practice forms of work beyond 
our assumptions, or to relate in other ways through work, or to circumscribe work in new colours, 
requires the creation of a space called recreation, where, even if it is produced through, by, with, 
because of or despite of work, other textures surface, as if rubbing charcoal over paper over some-
thing that didn’t even seem knobbly in the first place.
As such, the new project continues Recreation’s interest in finding ways to amplify, project and 
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complicate the importance of activities undertaken as leisure. The work of artwork makes this 
possible both despite of and through its understanding as work. Through this new project, I wish to 
continue in this murky, tantalising space, pursuing the unsolvable questions that Recreation and 
its related thinking produced. Practice-as-research here, then, is understood not as an institutional 
frame—the new project does not (yet) find itself in relation to any academic situation—but as 
the action of turning over ideas through doing: not a method undertaken to give neat answers to 
pre-determined questions, but the generation of new concerns by unpicking the knots of the previ-
ous ones. The ideas discussed in this thesis and presented in the choreography Recreation are not 
identical to those with which I began the research; the research itself has made it possible to think 
about different things than that which I expected, through its doing. The new project picks up here, 
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Appendix B—Example  
Participant Consent Form
NB: as the participants took part in the practice element, it was most appropriate to call the proj-
ect Recreation for the purposes of these forms.
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
Title of Research Project: Recreation
Research background
This is research project conducted by Gillie Kleiman (the “Researcher”) investigates dance work 
made by professional artists for professional contexts but where the performers, at least in part, 
might be called ‘non-professionals’. This element of the research involves the creation and presen-
tation of a performance, performed by six people. As part of the research the performance will be 
presented publicly, to an audience attracted through marketing and PR activities undertaken by the 
researcher, her colleagues, and partner organisations.
Practice
You are invited to participate in this research project as a performer. Rehearsals will take place at 
agreed times at publicly-funded arts organisations in specialist studios for no more than 35 hours 
per week, for a maximum of seven weeks. Please note that these are maximums and individual 
schedules will be agreed and periodically updated in separate written documentation.
 As a participant-performer, you will be paid for your participation by the researcher. The University 
of Roehampton is not responsible for any payments or engagement of participant-performers in 
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this research project. In addition to this consent form, you will be required to agree to the attached 
agreement to be made between the research-performer and the researcher. Details of payments, 
including details of what happens to payments if you withdraw, are included therein.
Personal information (e.g. name, contact details) and images (still and moving photography) will be 
shared with the researcher’s contractors (e.g. producer, documenter) for practical purposes only. 
Photographs and recordings of rehearsals and performances which feature your image and actions 
may still be used even if you withdraw; it will always be made clear when such still and moving 
images and audio materials are being made.
The performance and any derivatives thereof (e.g. marketing materials, images, texts, audio record-
ings etc.) remain the property of the researcher in perpetuity.
Interviews
You will also be invited to be interviewed. Each interview will be informal and will take no more than 
90 minutes. You may be invited to participate more than once, as part of the creative research. The 
interviews will take place in a location agreed between you and the researcher, and will be recorded 
by a video camera. The processes and product of the studio-based research will also be recorded 
via video and stills photography. The video files and transcripts will be stored securely under pro-
cesses complying with University of Roehampton Data Protection Policy. The data from the practi-
cal research and from interviews will be used in the Researcher’s PhD thesis, and may be used for 
future publication by the Researcher.
Please inform the researcher if there are any concerns. The University staff whose information is 
detailed below may also be contacted.
Researcher’s Contact Details:
Gillie Kleiman 
Department of Dance 








I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any point 
without giving a reason, although if I do so I understand that my data might still be used. I 
understand that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protec-
tion Act 1998 and with the University’s Data Protection Policy.





I agree that my image will be recorded via moving and still photography. These images will be 
used for research, documentation and marketing purposes for the project outlined above and for 
the future practice of the researcher, and will remain the property of the researcher in perpetuity. 
These data will be shared securely and in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and with 




Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries 
please raise this with the investigator (or if the researcher is a student you can also contact the 
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Director of Studies). However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the 
Head of Department. 
Director of Studies Contact Details:  Head of Department Contact Details:
Dr Simon Bayly Dr Ann David 
Department of Drama, Department of Dance 
Theatre and Performance University of Roehampton 
University of Roehampton Roehampton Lane 
Roehampton Lane London 
London SW15 5PU 
SW15 5PU 
s.bayly@roehampton.ac.uk david@roehampton.ac.uk
020 8392 3582 020 8392 3658
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Appendix C—Recreation  
Programme Notes
Recreation
One way to see the arrangement we make in a theatre is like this: the people on the 
stage in the light are working, and the people sitting on the seats in the dark are not.
In Recreation something else is happening. The show is an invitation to come nearer to 
one another, to be both working and not-working whether on stage or off. In various 
ways, the performance invites you to work hard and to relax, to blur the distinction 
between being active and being receptive, between expecting something of yourself or 
someone else and not expecting anything, sort of pottering around in your experience.
The performers and spectators of Recreation are doing different things.  Each person's 
work and non-work are different. Even each performers’ work is different, not least 
because the cast comprises three performers who always do it and two local guests, who 
have been integrated over a couple of days. In both sets there are experienced perform-
ers and fresher movers in all sorts of ways. You might be able to guess who is who but 
probably not and I invite you not to care too much. In the same spirit, I hope that Recre-
ation is a way to not quite know who is working for whom, and, maybe, to let go of such 
values in favour of something more joyous, mysterious, and pleasurable.
Credits
Choreographer: Gillie Kleiman
Performers: Amanda Drago, Victoria Guy, Kit Haigh, Jenn Harper, Chris Searle
Designer: Emer Tumilty
Lighting Designer & Production Manager: George Leigh
Artistic Advisor (dramaturgy): Roberta Jean
Artistic Advisor (sound): Nicola Singh
Producer: Beckie Darlington
Commissioned by ARC Stockton, Shoreditch Town Hall, and Yorkshire Dance. Originally supported by 
Arts Council England, Rajni Shah Projects, Dance4, and via South East Dance and Jerwood Charitable 
Foundation Dramaturg in Residence programme. With special thanks to Dance City and Northumbria 
University.
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Appendix D—Juncture Festival Brochure































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Yorkshire Dance team
 
joke that I use the word  
‘rad’ all the tim
e. 
W





ark when used 
in publicity  m
aterial, ‘rad’ is 
tongue-in-cheek, reflexive, 
hopeful, whilst gesturing 
towards the future-possible. 






0113 243 8765 






orkshops Pass:  
£50.00 (Conc. £40.00)
W
   Free entry to these events 
to w
orkshop pass holders
Festival Pass:  
£50.00 (Conc. £40.00)
F
        Free entry to these events 
to festival pass holders
 Passes are available online,  
by phone or in person at  
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set in your bedroom
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beginning and you don’t see the end. 
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ething of a dance show
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of a karaoke session, som
ething of a gig.
A perform
ance of technique, abandon, 
joy, frustration and not giving a fuck.










en to consecutively dance this 
dance born out of the frustration and 
alienation of not relating to assigned 
and supposed gender roles.
 Supported by JoJo – O
ulu Dance Centre 
(Finland), Les Trois C-L (Luxem
bourg) 
and the Finnish Cultural Foundation.
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For full details see p17.
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Date Time Artists Event Name Event Type Venue
Tue 25 10.00am - 1.00pm immigrants and animals We Know That Everybody Dances Workshop YD
Tue 25 2.00pm - 5.00pm Gillie Kleiman We Know That Everybody Dances Workshop YD
Wed 26 10.00am - 1.00pm Nicola Conibere We Know That Everybody Dances Workshop YD
Wed 26 2.00pm - 5.00pm Jo Fong & Richard Gregory (Quarantine)
We Know That 
Everybody Dances Workshop YD
Thu 27 10.00am - 1.00pm Fitzgerald & Stapleton We Know That Everybody Dances Workshop YD
Thu 27 2.00pm - 5.00pm Sara Lindström We Know That Everybody Dances Workshop YD
Thu 27 6.00pm - 6.45pm Gillie Kleiman Festival Launch Celebration YD
Thu 27 7.00pm - 8.30pm immigrants and animals Laura Laura  Double Penetration Performance LAB
Fri 28 1.00pm - 3.00pm Lucy Suggate Swarm Sculptures Performance TT
Fri 28 3.00pm - 5.00pm Various Labour Talk YD
Fri 28 5.30pm - 6.30pm Fitzgerald & Stapleton MINE Performance LAB
Fri 28 8.00pm - 9.30pm Quarantine Wallflower Performance YD
Sat 29 11.00pm - 4.00pm Various Politics Talk YD
Sat 29 1.00pm - 4.00pm Nicola Conibere Assembly Performance R700
Sat 29 3.00pm - 8.00pm Quarantine Wallflower Performance YD
Sat 29 4.30pm - 6.30pm Various Place Talk YD
Sat 29 7.30pm - 9.00pm immigrants and animals Laura Laura  Double Penetration Performance LAB
Sat 29 9.00pm - late Live Art Bistro and YOU Karaoke Party Party LAB
Sun 30 11.00am - 1.00pm Various Family Talk TT
Sun 30 1.00pm - 3.00pm Lucy Suggate Swarm Sculptures Performance TT
Sun 30 3.00pm - 4.00pm Gillie Kleiman Festival Close Celebration TT
Sun 30 3.00pm - 4.00pm Sara Lindström Dancing On My Own Film Screening TT
Juncture, October 2016
www.juncturedance.com    |    0113 243 8765
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